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Abstract 
Provider incentives are a commonly used policy tool to mold provider behaviors.1 
However, while we frequently measure the change in patient outcomes, failure to consistently 
produce changes in outcomes does not mean that providers are not changing their behavior.  This 
paper focuses on two programs with null or inconsistent quality outcomes to try to identify why 
such inconsistency occurs.  The two programs, both ratified in the Affordable Care Act, are 1) 
patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs), and 2) the Medicare Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing (HVBP) program. 
Chapter 1: Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel survey (MEPS), I match provider 
characteristic surveys to member experience with care in order to evaluate characteristics key to 
patient-centered medical homes.  I find that patient-perceived patient-centeredness of a practice 
is not related to the number of PCMH attributes a practice reports.  However, some 
characteristics do play specific and significant roles in patient perception and outcomes.  For 
instance, case management is not only associated with increased patient perception of after-hours 
access to care, but overall costs were reduced.  Interestingly, having after hours clinic hours was 
more common with practices highly consistent with PCMH criteria, but these hours did not result 
in decreased emergency department use or cost of care.  
Chapter 2: The second provider incentive studied is the Medicare Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing Program (HVBP).  This program assigns payment adjustments based on performance 
on a series of rotating quality metrics.  To date, changes in patient outcomes cannot be attributed 
to the program; however, it should not be concluded that hospitals are not responding at all.  I 
identify changes in staffing by provider type as an early indicator of hospital response to 
payment incentives.  Data come from the Virginia Health Information (VHI) Hospital Cost 
Report, 2010-2017.  Using a generalized linear model, I find that when receiving a penalty, 
hospitals reduce staffing among the most and least expensive personnel (physicians and nursing 
aides).  Hospitals increase nursing and administrative staff following a bonus.  These findings are 
consistent with hospitals responding to incentives both by aiming to improve efficient use of 
resources and maintain or improve quality of care.  
Chapter 3: Finally, I assess potential unintended consequences of the HVBP program, 
specifically the provision of charity care.  Using the VHI cost reports for year 2013 to 2017 with 
a regression discontinuity model, I find that hospitals receiving a bonus decrease their charity 
care among the lowest income patients (under 100% federal poverty level (FPL)).  Hospitals 
receiving a penalty tend to reduce charity care among higher income patients (100%-200% FPL).  
These findings are consistent with two separate responses to the incentives.  Hospitals receiving 
bonuses appear to be cream-skimming healthier, wealthier individuals while hospitals receiving 
penalties appear to be shifting the focus of their  charity care to the most needy, likely in an 
effort to reduce cost of care levels overall while maintaining their community benefit programs, 
potentially as a result of goal gradient cognitive bias.
   
Introduction 
Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), an additional 20 million people 
have gained access to health insurance and more than 70% of people report having a usual source 
of care.2,3  However, there is little evidence that the overall health of Americans has substantially 
changed.4  In fact, recent reports indicate that the United States continues to rank last in overall 
performance, access, and health outcomes compared to 10 other industrialized countries.5  
Furthermore, while health expenditures slowed for a number of years following the ACA, when 
specific delivery system and payment reforms are evaluated, it is unclear which models are 
consistently cost savers and why.6  Now, several years after many of the ACA delivery system 
and payment reforms were implemented, it is critical to take a deeper look at these models to 
identify both how providers have responded to incentives and how patients are experiencing their 
care.   
This series of papers focus on two reforms: 1) patient-centered medical homes and 2) 
Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program.  Both of these programs have 
provided inconsistent effects on patient outcomes at best.  In the case of the HVBP program, 
many researchers argue that no improvements in care at all can be attributed to the payment 
incentive, though some disagree.7  Yet, despite failure to produce consistent effects, 
policymakers are not discussing ending either incentive structure.  Instead, continual modest 
adjustments are made to both programs in an effort to correct where the programs may be failing.  
However, with little research focused on why these programs produce inconsistent results and 
only on the results themselves, policymakers have little guidance on what adjustments to make.  
Therefore, it is incumbent on health policy, health economics, and health services researchers to 
investigate these policies more thoroughly in order to identify why these programs are failing to 
produce desired effects, and importantly, if the incentives are not producing the expected 
behavior, what behaviors are they producing?  Answering these questions will enable 
policymakers to build on and improve current programs and identify possible unintended 
detrimental effects.  This series aims to begin that investigation by identifying specific provider 
attributes associated with patient-centeredness, identifying how hospitals shift their workforce 
budgets in response to HVBP penalties, and measuring unintended consequences of the HVBP 
program in the form of charitable care provisions.
 Paper 1: Concordance between provider and patient-reported characteristics of patient-centered 
medical homes 
  
Chapter 1 Concordance between provider and patient-reported 
characteristics of patient-centered medical homes 
ABSTRACT 
Background: Patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs) have become increasingly more 
common throughout the country, however, evidence of their effects on both patient outcomes 
and expenditures is mixed.  With numerous accrediting bodies and methods of meeting 
accreditation criteria, this study aims to identify specific PCMH attributes that are correlated 
with patient perception of patient-centeredness and influence emergency department use and 
expenditures. 
Methods: Data come from the 2015 and 2016 MEPS Medical Organizational Survey (MOS), 
and Household Component (MEPS-HC).  The MOS supplement was first conducted in 2015 
(released in 2017), and is the first nationally representative survey to pair patient experiences 
with characteristics of their provider’s practice.  With two years of data, the final sample size 
was 12,127 paired surveys.  Indices were created to identify practices with few, medium, and 
large numbers of PCMH criteria both from the provider and patient perspectives.  Logit 
regressions were used to assess concordance between provider and patient perceptions and 
likelihood of an emergency department (ED) visit.  Individual attributes were also tested.  Log-
transformed OLS was used to assess change in expenditures. 
Results: Few practice attributes were associated with patient perceived patient-centeredness; 
however, practices that offered extended hours were more likely to hire nurse practitioners (NPs) 
or physician assistants (PAs) (0.27, p< 0.01).  However, extended hours did not lead to reduced 
ED use or expenditures.  Case management is associated with both increased perception of 
access to after-hours care (0.16, p< 0.05) and decreased overall cost (-0.01, p< 0.05). 
Discussion: PCMH attributes do not result in patients perceiving their care to be patient-
centered, nor does it result in fewer ED visits or lower expenditures.  There are, however certain 
attributes that may be more important than others.  Case management reduced expenditures and 
improved patient perceived access to care after hours.  While high patient–centered practices and 
practices with NPs or PAs were much more likely to offer extended office hours, these hours had 
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no effect on ED use or expenditures.  However, when taken together, measures of patient-
perceived accessibility (including extended office hours) were associated with a lower likelihood 
of an ED visit and a 2 percentage point reduction in expenditures.
 Paper 1: Concordance between provider and patient-reported characteristics of patient-centered 
medical homes 
  
INTRODUCTION 
A patient-centered medical home (PCMH) is a delivery system model aimed at 
improving primary care continuity and cost efficiency.  While there is no single definition, the 
concept of a PCMH was developed by several primary care professional societies and 
emphasized the importance of having an ongoing relationship with a “whole person” oriented 
provider, coordinated care across the continuum, enhanced access, and commitment to quality 
and safety.8  The PCMH model was then implemented through a series of demonstration projects 
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  Since enactment of the ACA, the PCMH model has 
grown, taking many forms, with a variety of certifying entities.  Although no two entities have 
the exact same definition of a PCMH, the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) 
has established PCMH principles that have been widely adopted by various PCMH certifying 
entities and the PCMH demonstrations authorized by the ACA.9,10  These principles include 
comprehensive and team-based care, care coordination, quality improvement, and patient-
centered access. 
When first implemented, the hope was that these medical homes would dramatically 
decrease costs by avoiding emergency department (ED) visits through appropriate use of 
preventive services, reduce duplicative services, and improve the patient experience of care.9  
Evaluations of these medical homes have found that in fact, many have succeeded in achieving 
these goals.11,12  For instance, in Seattle, PCMHs were found to decrease ED use by 29% while 
reducing costs by $10.30 per patient per month.11  However, numerous other studies have shown 
these medical homes to have little to no effect on costs, utilization or satisfaction.13–15  With such 
mixed findings, policy makers are left with no clear direction to move in primary care.  
One of the major limitations with evaluations of PCMHs is that while there are some 
general principles of a PCMH, little guidance has been provided on how these principles should 
be operationalized.  This has led to extensive heterogeneity of practices, and likely contributes to 
the mixed findings from PCMH evaluations.  Most studies evaluate certified PCMHs as a group, 
as if each medical home practice is the same;11–14 however, certification requirements may be 
met in a variety of ways and even basic criteria are inconsistent across accrediting entities.  
Therefore, it is difficult to know what to extrapolate from these findings.  Certified PCMH 
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practices may look as similar to each other as they do to practices with no certification, but who 
choose to adopt some patient-centered characteristics. 
There are a limited number of studies that focus on patient-centered attributes as opposed 
to certification.  These studies allow the principles of patient-centered medical homes to be 
examined outside of the certification framework.  From this type of analysis, it is clear that 
patients who report receiving care consistent with patient-centered principles of access, care 
coordination and continuity of care are more likely to report a positive experience, with the 
magnitude of the effects increasing as more patient-centered principles are met.16,17  However, 
these studies are limited in that they rely solely on the perspective of the patient.16,17  Without the 
ability to match the patient perspective to the practice, it is impossible to know what attributes 
are most closely related to the patient experience of patient-centered care.  In fact, studies that 
focus on attributes of practices, as opposed to patient’s perception, have shown opposite effects 
on quality – namely that practices more likely to adopt attributes consistent with PCMH 
principles also had higher rates of preventable readmissions.18  Identifying the relationship 
between patient experience and specific practice attributes is key for policy makers and providers 
aiming to establish and implement PCMH principles that improve quality of care.  Without this 
knowledge, there is little guidance on direct actions that may be taken to promote high quality 
primary care through patient-centered medical homes. 
To date, there has been no nationally representative data source that enables researchers 
to link the patient experience of care to the practice in which they receive the majority of their 
care.  However, a supplemental survey to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
released in 2017 not only links patient experience to provider characteristics, but also includes 
patient healthcare utilization, insurance status, and healthcare spending.  Using this unique data 
source, this study aims to compare the concordance between characteristics of a practice reported 
by the provider and their patients’ experience with the services and to identify which perspective 
most influences ED utilization and expenditures. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Not all primary care is created equal.  In an effort to identify key characteristics essential 
for providing high quality patient-centered care, the National Committee for Quality Assurance 
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(NCQA) established a model with six key principles for recognizing patient-centered primary 
care: 1) team-based care, 2) managing the patient population, 3) patient-centered access, 4) care 
management and support, 5) care coordination, and 6) quality improvement (see figure 1-1).  
These six patient-centered principles are not only the basis for PCMH recognition, but are 
echoed in other models for high-quality primary care, such as Bodenheimer et al.’s “10 Building 
Blocks of High-Performing Primary Care.”19  As the most widely cited PCMH recognition 
standards, the NCQA principles form the basis for identifying PCMH characteristics for this 
study. 
Figure 1-1. NCQA principles of patient-centered medical homes 
 
As PCMH principles are specifically intended to improve patient satisfaction, improve 
health outcomes, reduce ED use and reduce expenditures, I assume that practices exhibiting a 
higher number of attributes based on PCMH principles will be more likely to have patients that 
report experiencing patient-centered care and have better outcomes in the form of lower ED 
utilization and expenditures.  Based on the NCQA principles, these outcomes are achieved 
through a combination of practice workforce, technology, policies and structures.  For instance, 
the principle of team-based care requires that practices utilize the expertise of providers with a 
variety of backgrounds, such as physicians, nurse practitioners, specialists and primary care.  
Even the patient and patient’s caregivers are included as part of the care team.  Through the 
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inclusion and coordination of each of these perspectives, the intent is to provide comprehensive, 
“whole person” care consistent with the patient’s own goals.20   
The care coordination principle is related to team-based care, but in addition to having a 
variety of perspectives, it aims to ensure that all care providers across the continuum are aligned 
in their understanding of the patient’s needs and current treatments, and that the patient 
understands how to follow-through with each plan of care.20  This may mean that each patient is 
assigned to a case manager that is, for instance, alerted when a patient is discharged from the 
hospital and can coordinate referrals as needed. 
Aside from the various workforce roles and responsibilities, the NCQA principles heavily 
emphasize the role of electronic health records (EHRs).  Not only may an EHR contribute to 
more effective care coordination by enabling sharing of information across and within practices, 
it may also assist in adherence to evidence-based guidelines (care management and support 
principle), population management and performance improvement.  The principle of care 
management and support refers to the ability of the practice to provide evidence-based care for 
an individual patient.  NCQA sees EHRs as critical to this principle by providing decision 
support and reminders for care standards.  Population management is somewhat broader and 
refers to the practice’s overall management of their patient population’s level of adherence to 
various preventive care measures or other standard guidelines, such as flu shots, or percent of 
diabetics receiving A1C testing.  The EHR is able to aid in identifying patients with outstanding 
labs or screening needs, permitting documentation, and preparing reports for providers on how 
well they meet guidelines throughout their practice (performance improvement principle).20,21  
Lastly, health information technology may improve accessibility of care by allowing for email or 
portal communication in addition to more traditional forms of communication, like telephones.22  
PCMHs are intended to promote practice efficiency and increase satisfaction by 
optimizing primary care to be convenient for patients, meet clinical standards, and be aligned 
with patients’ personal goals.  This focus on patient needs and efficiency is then expected to 
reduce the need for non-emergent emergency department visits and prevent emergent visits 
through appropriate primary care.  Furthermore, it is expected to reduce expenditures, both 
through this prevention of ED utilization, but also through overall improved health and efficient 
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coordination of care.  Several studies have shown that, in fact, practices recognized by NCQA as 
a PCMH have improved patient satisfaction, and reduced ED utilization and expenditures.23–25   
The first step in identifying key PCMH attributes that may influence patient experience 
and outcomes is to compare practice reported attributes to the care patients perceive.  For 
instance, while providers may report offering certain services, such as same day appointments, 
patients may still report having difficulty getting in to see their provider.  This study aims to 
identify the extent to which patients and providers agree on which facilities are patient-centered. 
More specifically, the study aims to identify if there are certain practice attributes that stand out 
to patients in terms of changing how they view the patient-centeredness of their care.  In addition 
to measuring agreement between patient and provider perspectives, this study aims to use the 
NCQA PCMH principles to identify which perspective (the patient’s or the provider’s) most 
influences health expenditures and ED utilization.  This secondary analysis is critical to inform 
public policy that currently relies on PCMH certification as a way to reduce costs and improve 
health.26   
Hypotheses 
H1: The greater the number of PCMH attributes reported by providers about their practice, the 
more positively the patient will rate the patient-centeredness of their care.   
H2: Overall patient care expenditures will decrease as provider-reported PCMH attribute index 
increases. 
H2a: Overall patient care expenditures will decrease as patient-reported PCMH attribute 
index increases. 
H3: ED utilization will decrease as provider-reported PCMH attribute index increases. 
H3a: ED utilization will decrease as patient-reported PCMH attribute index increases. 
METHODS 
Data  
Data come from the 2015 and 2016 MEPS Medical Organizational Survey (MOS), and 
Household Component (MEPS-HC).  MEPS is supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
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and Quality (AHRQ) and collects detailed information on patient characteristics, health care 
utilization, health expenditures and insurance status.  The MOS supplement was first conducted 
in 2015 (released in 2017), and is the first nationally representative survey to pair patient 
experiences with characteristics of their provider’s practice.  The survey was designed to obtain 
more detailed information about practice characteristics specifically among providers who were 
identified by survey respondents as their usual source of care, or the provider that respondents go 
to most often when they have a health concern.  These providers are identified by general survey 
respondents who must have visited the provider at least once during the survey year, and may not 
be an emergency department provider.  Information such as payment structure, provider type, 
and services offered are collected and then matched with the referred patient.  The data is 
structured at the patient-level, with an average of 1.7 patients per provider surveyed.27   
In 2015, a total of 4,216 practices were surveyed corresponding to 7,161 individuals.27  
This sample size increased to 5,201 practices for 9,137 individuals in 2016, with a response rate 
of 76 percent for the MOS supplement.28  The cumulative response rate for the full-year 
household component and the MOS was 36.7% in 2015 and 35.0% in 2016.29,30  MEPS, like all 
federal household surveys, has experienced a decline in response rates in recent years, mostly 
due to declines in response rates to the National Health Interview Survey, which serves as a 
sampling frame for MEPS.31  While this raises some concerns about nonresponse bias, reports to 
date on federal household survey response rates suggest that nonresponse bias is less associated 
with overall response rates than specific items.  Survey weights are applied to adjust for 
differential nonresponse.31   
Item non-response is assessed for patterns in missing data.  It is found that when non-
clinical, non-office manager personnel – such as a receptionist or clerk – responded to the MOS 
survey, that more items were missing.  However, more than 92% of all surveys had fewer than 3 
missing items.  Surveys with 3 or more missing values (1,108 surveys) were considered too 
incomplete for analysis, and therefore excluded.  Of the remaining sample of 15,190 paired 
surveys, 3,974 still had at least one key practice characteristic variable missing.  Patterns in 
missingness were again assessed and were determined to be at random.  In order to maximize the 
utility of the information provided in these near complete survey responses, 4 variables with the 
highest number of missing values were imputed.  These variables included two practice survey 
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responses: 1) whether or not the practice used quality report cards to inform providers of their 
performance, and 2) whether or not the practice used an EHR system to remind providers of 
clinical guidelines.  Two additional variables from the patient perspective were also imputed.  
These variables were related to respondents that responded that they “did not know” whether or 
not their usual source of care was easy to reach by phone after hours or if the office was open 
beyond regular business hours.  As these are likely responses by patients that have not had to use 
these services, these responses provide valuable information that would be lost if excluded from 
the sample.  In order to retain the greatest power and maximize the use of information, these 4 
variables are imputed using multiple imputations by chained equations (MICE) including all 
covariates used in final models.  This method generates predicted estimates for these variables 
through multiple regression analyses using the information about both the practice these 
respondents may use, as well as the patient’s health status and other demographic 
information.32,33   Sensitivity analyses are performed on the categorization of the patient 
perspective variables, further described in the Sensitivity Analyses section.  In order to perform 
MICE methodology, remaining responses considered too incomplete to use in the predictive 
imputation model were excluded.32  This resulted in a final sample size of 12,127 paired survey 
responses (see figure 1-2).     
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Figure 1-2. Multiple imputation process and sample selection 
 
All estimates are weighted to be nationally representative at the person-level according to 
race/ethnicity, income, residential setting, and employment.  Weights are adjusted based on 
respondents that declined to have their usual source of care contacted.  Strata and primary 
sampling unit weights account for potential correlation between patients attending the same usual 
source of care provider.  All reported standard errors reflect adjustments made to account for 
complex survey design as well as added variance due to multiple imputation methods in 
statistical analysis of data.  
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Patient-Centered Care Measures 
In order to identify patient-centered medical home characteristics, I reference both the 
NCQA PCMH recognition standards and a series of studies by Rittenhouse, Casalino and 
Shortell that develop a PCMH index using provider characteristics.18,34  Although these studies 
used a different data source, much of the available information from respective surveys is 
similar.  Relevant items from the MEPS MOS survey for a provider practice PCMH index 
include 10 elements: 1) presence of a primary care provider, 2) presence of a nurse practitioner 
or physician assistant, 3) multiple specialty practice, 4) presence of case manager, 5) follow-up 
with patients discharged from a hospital within 72 hours, 6) reserved time for same day 
appointments, 7) preventive care reminders, 8) use of EHRs to communicate with patients, 9) use 
of EHRs for decision support or population management support, and 10) provider report cards.   
A provider practice is awarded 1 point for each of the patient-centered characteristics it 
exhibits.  For instance, if the practice reports using email to communicate with patients, that 
practice is awarded 1 point.  If it also permits same day appointments, it receives another point, 
and so forth.  Once each practice is awarded a total score for each of the 10 patient-centered 
characteristic (maximum score of 10), the practices are divided into modified tertiles 
representing practices displaying high, medium, or low patient-centered attributes.  In total, there 
were 2,991 low-patient centered practices who reported having 0-5 characteristics; 4,502 
practices with 6-8 PCMH characteristics; and 4,634 practices with 9 or 10 PCMH characteristics. 
 In order to identify concordance between the provider attributes and patient-perceived 
patient-centeredness, NCQA PCMH standards were also applied to the person-level 
questionnaire for questions corresponding to perceptions of their usual source of care.  Although 
patient survey questions were not identical to provider questions, similar principles were used to 
identify patient responses indicating patient-centered care.  Patient-centered care items included 
7 items: 1) ability to reach provider by phone, 2) ability to reach provider by phone after hours, 
3) extended practice hours (open weekends and evenings), 4) inclusion of patient in treatment 
decisions, 5) provider explains treatment options clearly, and 6) provider asks about other care 
patient is receiving, and 7) shows respect for treatment decisions (full questions shown in 
appendix 1-1).  While these questions clearly are aimed at addressing the patient-centeredness 
and patient-responsiveness of providers, they are not directly matched to the questions asked of 
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provider practices.  Therefore, provider indices are matched against individual patient-level 
questions as opposed to a patient index.   
For the patient survey, patients may provide one of 4 potential responses ranging from 
“never” to “always.”  For analysis purposes, all responses are categorized into binary variables, 
with “never” or “sometimes” grouped together, and then “often” and “always” grouped together.  
For outcome measures (ED use and expenditures), a point system, similar to that of the provider 
index is used to create a patient-centered index representing patients receiving low, medium, or 
highly patient-centered care.  This index for the patient perspective is only used in the ED and 
expenditures models. 
Expenditures and utilizations measures 
 In addition to measuring the congruence between the patient’s experience of their care 
and the provider’s attributes, health expenditures and utilization are included in analyses.  Many 
prior analyses of certified medical homes have found no impact on overall expenditures and 
mixed effects on ED use.12,13,15  Using PCMH attributes as opposed to certification may expand 
on these studies by identifying if attributes such as case management or use of electronic 
reminders of standards of care play a role in expenditures or ED use.  Healthcare expenditures 
include spending from all payers (including out-of-pocket) and all settings.  Expenditures is 
operationalized as a continuous variable.  Since all selected participants must have seen their 
usual source of care at least once during the study period, nearly all participants have 
expenditures greater than zero.  ED utilization is measured on a binary scale as having any visit 
or no visit during the 2015 and 2016 interview timeframes.  A binary variable as opposed to a 
count variable is used to measure ED use, since ED visits are considered a rare event in this 
dataset. 
Health status 
Respondents in poor health are likely to utilize healthcare to a greater degree than 
respondents in good to excellent health.  Therefore, health can be considered an indicator of 
exposure to the healthcare system.  Although the data does not explicitly indicate number of 
visits with the usual source of care, models predicting utilization and expenditures should adjust 
for health status to account for potential variation in exposure.  Health status is identified using 
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the patient-level question on perceived health status.  The variable is categorical ranging from 
poor health to excellent health.   
Covariates 
 All models are adjusted for respondent demographics and insurance status.  Demographic 
information includes gender, age, marital status, education (less than high school, high school or 
GED, some college, at least a bachelor’s degree), race/ethnicity (White non-Hispanic, Black non-
Hispanic, Asian non-Hispanic, Hispanic and other), and region of residence (Northeast, South, 
Midwest, and West).  Income is measured as percent of the federal poverty level (FPL).  
Insurance status is based on full year coverage.  A respondent is classified as uninsured if he or 
she was uninsured for the full survey period.  For those with insurance for any duration, 
respondents were classified into Medicare, Medicaid, Private or other coverage based the 
coverage held for the longest time period.  Respondents holding both Medicaid and Medicare 
coverage for equal time periods were categorized as Medicare, since income level is already 
accounted for through another covariate. 
Statistical analysis 
 Multivariable logit regressions are used to examine overall concordance between 
provider-reported patient centeredness and patient-reported patient-centeredness of care.  
Marginal effects are estimated to asses percentage point change in likelihood of patient–reported 
patient-centered care.  Estimates of marginal effects on multiple imputed data is consistent with 
Rubin’s rule for post-analysis of imputed data.35  Regressions use the provider index regressed 
onto individual patient perceptions of care.  To identify which particular practice attributes may 
be driving the associations between the provider index and patient perceptions, a secondary 
analysis is conducted using individual practice characteristics in place of the overall index.  
Similar multivariable logit regressions are then modelled to estimate likelihood of having an ED 
visit.  Data distribution and goodness of fit is checked with a Hosmer-Lemeshow test modified to 
account for survey weights and multiple imputation datasets.  Expenditures are estimated using 
ordinary least squares.  However, due to significant positive skewness of expenditure data, all 
expenditures are log-transformed to approximate a normal distribution.  Since the sample is 
based only on respondents that saw a physician at least once during the survey period, only 14 
respondents are identified as having no healthcare costs.  Therefore, it is not necessary to address 
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further distribution concerns regarding high proportion of the sample with zero costs, as is 
typical in healthcare expenditure analyses.  Log transformation is sufficient to produce normally 
distributed expenditure estimates.  To address concerns of log-transforming an estimate of $0, $1 
is added to all healthcare expenditure estimates.  Duan smearing factor is used to re-transform 
model estimates for meaningful interpretation.  
 Seven separate models are estimated to measure agreement between the provider 
perspective of patient-centeredness, representing the seven patient-level survey questions.  All 
models use the same covariates and form.  As an example, one logit model for extended office 
hours is shown, comparing patient-reported availability of extended hours to the provider 
reported patient-centered index: 
Ln[(extended hours)/(1-(extended hours))]it = α + β1(provider patient-centeredness index) 
it + β2(education) it + β3(income) it + β4(race/ethnicity) it  + β5(marital status) it  + β6(age) it 
+ Β7(region) it  + β8(insurance type) it  + β9(general health status) it + β10(practice type) it + 
𝑢it 
For the two outcomes, ED use and expenditures, one model is estimated each.  The outcome 
models include the provider index as used previously, as well as an index for patient-perceived 
patient-centeredness.  Models for both outcomes are shown below: 
Ln[E(ED use)/(1-E(ED use))]it = α + β1(provider index) it + β2(patient index) it + 
β3(education) it + β4(income) it  + β5(race/ethnicity) it  + β6(marital status) it + Β7(age) it  + 
β8(region) it  + β9(insurance type) it + β10(general health status) it + β11(practice type) it  + 
𝑢it 
Ln[E(expenditures)]it = α + β1(provider index) it + β2(patient index) it + β3(education) it + 
β4(income) it  + β5(race/ethnicity) it  + β6(marital status) it + Β7(age) it  + β8(region) it  + 
β9(insurance type) it + β10(general health status) it + β11(practice type) it  + 𝑢it 
A secondary analysis is conducted using individual patient-centered attributes from the provider 
and patient perspective.  This analysis aims to identify any specific attributes that may drive 
overall findings. 
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Sensitivity analyses 
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted to estimate the robustness of results.  First, to 
address concerns of item non-response, multiple methods for addressing missing values were 
conducted.  In addition to the main analysis, which imputes responses for 2 provider- and 2 
patient-perspective variables, listwise deletion was conducted to drop all survey responses with 
missing values in any pertinent question.  A third analysis re-categorizes patients who reported “I 
don’t know” in response to survey questions asking about availability of providers after regular 
hours either in person or by phone.  In this sensitivity analysis, these respondents were 
categorized as not having any difficulty reaching their providers after hours, since it assumed 
these respondents did not need to reach their providers during non-traditional office hours. 
Finally, models also compared ED use among respondents who knew about accessibility 
compared to those that did not know.   
Sensitivity analyses regarding the definition of the PCMH attributes and categorization 
into low/medium/high patient-centered facilities were also conducted.  A linear relationship 
using number of total attributes was conducted, along with a binary indicator for patient-
centeredness based on facilities who report at least two-thirds of all PCMH attributes, as was 
described in the PCMH index used by Rittenhouse et al. 34  Furthermore, the MEPS 
questionnaire for provider practices asks practices whether or not they are a certified PCMH.  
This measure was used to compare findings based on PCMH practice attributes to certification.  
Findings using the certification as opposed to attributes were similar but weaker both in terms of 
magnitude of the estimate and statistical significance.   
Due to similarity of concepts among questions asking patients about their experiences 
reaching a provider during regular or after hours, a separate sensitivity analysis was conducted 
using a composite patient-perceived access measure.  This measure was defined as having easy 
access if the patient responded positively to either being able to reach their provider easily during 
regular office hours by phone, after hours by phone, or that the office offers extended office 
hours.  While the composite measure masked differences in concordance between provider 
characteristics and patient perceptions, it was found to be significantly associated with both ED 
use and expenditures (details described in Results section below). 
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RESULTS 
 While most certified PCMHs were considered high patient-centered facilities based on 
their reported attributes (58.2%), 18% of certified PCMHs reported having less than half of the 
patient-centered attributes, leaving them in the low-patient centered category.     
More than one-third (35.5%) of all practices in the top tertile of patient-centered 
attributes report having all possible patient-centered attributes (Table 1-1).  The other practices in 
the top tertile report having all but one attribute, with the most likely attribute to be missing 
being a multi-specialty practice with 60.5% of practices reporting positively to this question.  
However, this far outpaced the 9.0% of low patient-centered practices reporting to be part of a 
multi-specialty practice.  While at least 88.0% of providers in all categories reported reserving 
time for same day appointments and having a primary care provider on staff, less than three-
quarters of low patient-centered providers reported use of any other PCMH attribute.  Patient 
characteristics, such as age, race/ethnicity, and insurance type were largely similar between all 
three groups, although Medicaid patients were slightly more likely to be in medium or high 
patient-centered practices.  This may indicate a tendency for these patients to use federally-
qualified health centers (FQHCs) as their usual source of care, as these providers were early 
adopters of PCMH principles.36,37  I do not identify practice type by insurance status in this 
analysis; however, it is evident that low patient-centered facilities are disproportionately 
independent practices (37.1% vs 13.6% of high patient-centered), whereas, high patient-centered 
practices are disproportionately government or non-profit practices, such as an FQHC (20.2% vs 
4.1% of low patient-centered) (see table 1-1.) 
The mean age of patients ranged from 39.2 year in low patient-centered practices to 42.4 
years in high patient-centered practices.  Private insurance was the most commonly reported 
insurance for all groups.  Finally, region varies somewhat among the three groups, with patients 
in the South more likely to receive care in facilities with a low number of patient-centered 
attributes (43.4%), whereas, patients in the West and Midwest regions were more likely to 
receive care in high patient-centered practices (25.3%% and 25.1%, respectively).  This may 
indicate availability of patient-centered practices by region and prevalence of local PCMH health 
systems, such as Kaiser Permanente in the Western region that is known for its unique medical 
home structure.38  Income level was largely consistent between groups, ranging from 409.2% 
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FPL in the high patient-centered practice group to 403.5% FPL in the low patient-centered 
group.  Low-income patients may be under-represented in this sample, as low-income patients 
are more likely to use the ED as a usual source of care, which is not included in the MEPS 
Medical Organization Survey.   
Patient and provider perspective concordance 
Index 
 Aside from extended office hours, little congruence is found between the patient and 
provider perspectives of patient-centeredness.  In fact, as shown in table 1-2, if any other 
association is found, it is that patients in high patient-centered practices are less likely to be able 
to reach their provider by phone during regular hours, but slightly more likely to reach them after 
hours (p<0.10).  This could be a reflection of how these facilities are structured.  For instance, if 
high patient-centered facilities tend to rely heavily on electronic means of communication, they 
may be less likely to respond to phone calls unless immediate after hours response is required.  
Extended office hours, however, is the main area of concordance between perspectives, with 
each additional tertile of patient-centered attributes increasing the likelihood of offering extended 
hours (0.30, p< 0.01 for medium patient-centered; 0.47, p< 0.01 for high-patient-centered).   
Overall, the likelihood of patients reporting that their usual source of care offers extended office 
hours increased 47% for patients in high patient-centered practices (p< 0.01).  
Attributes 
 To determine whether any single provider attribute was most strongly correlated with 
patient experiences, additional regression models that substituted the PCMH index with binary 
indicators for each of the attributes were estimated.  Findings from these models suggest that the 
main practice attribute driving the association between practice and patient perceived patient-
centeredness (especially in regards to offering extended hours) is whether or not the practice 
hires nurse practitioners (NPs) or physician assistants (PAs) (0.27, p< 0.01) (see table 1-3).  
However, NPs and PAs are also associated with a decrease in the likelihood that patients report 
the practice be easy to reach by phone after hours (-0.18, p< 0.05), while presence of case 
managers increased this likelihood (0.16, p< 0.05).  Multi-specialty practices are less likely to be 
reachable during office hours (-0.24, p< 0.05), but more likely to ask patients about other care 
they may be receiving (0.19, p< 0.05).  Finally, practices using quality report cards to evaluate 
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provider performance was associated with a decreased likelihood of patients reporting being 
included in treatment decisions (-0.30, p< 0.05).  This may be due to incentives to provide care 
that is measured on report cards rather than what may be in line with patient goals, as has been 
shown in prior studies on provider behavior following report card implementation.39 
Emergency department use and expenditures 
Indices 
In terms of patient outcomes, the number of PCMH attributes a practice has is not found 
to be associated with a reduction to overall expenditures.  There is also no association found 
between the patient’s perspective of patient-centeredness and cost of care.  Only weak 
associations were found between patient-centeredness of provider and emergency department 
use.  In fact, compared to patients using low patient-centered practices, patients using medium 
patient-centeredness were found to have slightly higher ED use (0.15, p< 0.10).  However, when 
looking from the patient perspective of care, both medium and high patient-centered usual 
sources of care were associated with fewer ED visits (-0.16, p< 0.10; -0.15, p< 0.10, 
respectively) (shown in table 1-4).  A deeper analysis of the specific attributes that may be 
driving these findings suggests that only practices that offer same day appointment are strongly 
associated with ED use, and interestingly, I find that patients with providers who report offering 
same day appointments were associated with an increased risk of ED utilization.  It is possible 
that this finding suggests a limitation with cross-sectional data and that patients who have 
required ED use in the past, may choose a usual source of care that offers same day 
appointments.  Furthermore, only 4% of the usual sources of care surveys say they do not offer 
same day appointments, limiting the sample size of these providers.  Therefore, with a limited 
sample size, conclusions should not be drawn from this finding. 
Attributes 
A number of characteristics, both provider-reported and patient-perceived, were 
associated with expenditures.  In terms of reducing costs, providers reporting having a case 
manager and practices that patients were able to easily reach by phone both contributed to lower 
expenditures (-0.01, p< 0.05; -0.01, p< 0.05, respectively).  However, using EHRs to assist in 
reminding providers of standards of care and asking patients about other treatment received both 
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were associated with increased costs (0.01, p< 0.05; 0.03, p< 0.01, respectively) (as shown in 
table 1-5). 
Composite 
While individual attributes for patient perceived access were only weakly associated with 
outcomes, the composite measure for patient-perceived access was found to be strongly 
correlated with both the likelihood of having an ED visit and expenditures.  Among patients who 
perceived their providers to be easy to reach after or during regular hours, the likelihood of an 
ED visit decreased (-0.32, p< 0.01) compared to those who perceived access to providers to be 
more difficult.  Expenditures for these patients were 2% percentage points lower (p= 0.02) than 
their counterparts reporting poorer access to providers (see table 1-6). 
Sensitivity analysis 
Knowledge of availability of provider after regular hours could influence patient’s 
decisions to go to an ED as opposed to contacting their usual source of care.  Analyses looking at 
whether or not a patient knew whether or not a provider was easy to reach after hours indicated 
that patients who reported providers were difficult to reach after hours were the most likely to 
have an ED visit compared to those who reported easy access or that they did not know if they 
were accessible (easy to reach -0.19, p=0.03, unknown -0.24, p< 0.01).  However, no difference 
in overall expenditures was identified (see appendix 1-4). 
It may be expected that sicker patients have more exposure to providers or have different 
experiences with their usual source of care than people with fewer health problems.  For this 
reason, models were stratified by self-reported health status.  Findings for the healthier patients 
were consistent with estimates from the main analyses.  Few associations were found between 
provider/respondent congruence or patient outcomes for respondents reporting fair or poor 
health.  The exception to this is that patients in poorer health who reported being asked about 
other therapies they were receiving also had higher expenditures (0.10, p < 0.01 (see appendix 1-
2 and 1-3)). This may indicate that providers appreciate the complexity of these patients, and 
how various treatments may interact with one another, potentially requiring expensive alternative 
treatments.  However, the fact that healthier patients appear to be more consistent with findings 
from the main analysis suggest that this population is driving results.  This may be simply due to 
the size of the healthy population, with 96% of the sample reported good or better health. 
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DISCUSSION 
PCMH criteria is selected with the intention of improving quality of care and reducing 
expenditures.  However, I find that simply having PCMH practice attributes is not associated 
with patients perceiving their care to be patient-centered, nor it is associated with fewer ED visits 
or lower expenditures.  There are, however certain attributes that may be more important than 
others, both in terms of the patient experience and in terms of outcomes.  Of all the various 
measures of patient-centeredness, both in terms of specific provider characteristics and in terms 
of patient perceptions of care, the patient’s overall perception of provider accessibility (estimated 
using a composite measure) seems to be most highly correlated with both a lower likelihood of 
an ED visit and lower expenditures.  The perception of accessibility, rather than the provider 
reporting attributes such as using email to communicate with patients or offering same day 
appointments, is a key factor for how likely a patient is to use the ED or have other high cost 
care.  It should be noted, that perception of accessibility was associated with a few provider-
reported attributes that may be key areas of focus for future research.  Notably, having a case 
manager was associated with patients perceiving their provider to be easy to reach after hours, 
and was itself directly associated with lower expenditures.  Additionally, patients were more 
likely to believe their USC offered extended hours if the practice staffed nurse practitioners or 
physician assistants; however, patients also reported these facilities to be harder to reach by 
phone after hours.   
Prior studies on PCMHs have found little effect of certification on expenditures.  My 
findings on specific attributes suggest that this may be because while some PCMH attributes are 
associated with decreased costs, other are actually associated with increased expenditures.  
Specifically, having a case manager and being easy to reach by phone are associated with 
decreased total expenditures, while using electronic reminders for standards of care and 
discussing treatments received outside of the physician’s care are associated with increased 
costs.  With attributes both positively and negatively associated with costs, when looking only at 
total count of PCMH attributes, I found no change in expenditures.  More nuanced findings were 
washed out.  With variable PCMH definitions and simple attestation of adherence to criteria, it is 
important to not only assess whether or not the certification itself has an impact on patient 
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outcomes, but which attributes drive these findings.   Through further analysis into specific 
attributes, more tailored and evidence-based PCMH accreditation can be established. 
Limitations 
This analysis has several limitations.  First, multiple imputation methods were used to 
impute missing values.  While analyses were completed to asses for patterns in missingness, it is 
possible that values were not missing at random, which would introduce bias into imputed 
estimates.  To address such concerns, sensitivity analyses were conducted around methods of   
dealing with missing values.  In addition to imputations, general listwise deletion methods were 
used.  A third analysis re-categorized patient-reported “I don’t know” responses for ease of 
reaching a provider after hours and extended office hours to “not easy to reach” and “no 
extended hours” as opposed to imputed.  Models also compared ED use among respondents who 
knew about accessibility compared to those that did not know.  Findings were robust to various 
methods for addressing missing values.  
Another limitation of this study is that causality cannot be attributed.  It is possible that, 
for instance, patients with ED visits select into usual sources of care with certain attributes.  
Models estimating concordance between provider-reported attributes and patient perception are 
not impacted by potential endogeneity; however the models estimating the correlations with 
patient outcomes (ED use and expenditures) may be.  To the extent that healthier patients select 
into high PCMH practices, estimates may be over-stated.  However, other indications suggest 
that is it unlikely that healthier patients are selecting into these facilities.  First, it should be noted 
that self-reported health status was similar among respondents at all practice categories.  Second, 
medium and high PCMH-like practices had a disproportionate number of Medicaid beneficiaries, 
who tend to have more complex health needs than patients with other insurance types.40  While 
endogeneity concerns are not eliminated in these models, based on these indications of health 
status, selection of healthier patients into high PCMH USCs is unlikely to be occurring.  
However, further analysis of this topic should include the use of longitudinal data to address 
these temporal constraints.  Estimates on the concordance between patient and provider 
perceptions of patient-centered care do not suffer from the same limitations, as the questions of 
patients are specifically asked in regards to care received at their matched usual source of care.    
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Finally, as present in all studies using survey data, reporting error may be present.  For 
instance, while providers may report using email to communicate with patients, that does not 
mean this practice actually occurs.  It may not occur simply because providers have the 
capability but choose not to use it, or it may have been reported in error.  For this reason, I 
discuss “provider-reported” or “provider-perceived” attributes and patient perceptions.  
Perception, however, is the important component in this study.  The mismatch between what 
providers believe they offer and what patients experience is the question of concordance. 
Conclusion 
Findings suggest that, in general, provider-reported PCMH attributes are not highly 
correlated with patients’ perception of care.  This lack of correlation is problematic, suggesting 
that while many providers may report use of various services, patients may not actually be 
experiencing these services as intended.  Implementation of services may be inadequate or 
focused in ineffective areas.  PCMH accrediting entities may benefit from considering 
implementation of criteria in addition to certifying practices have capability.  Further analysis 
into why patients do not experience services providers report using should be conducted 
While overall concordance between provider and patient perceptions of patient-
centeredness may be weak, there are some key areas where associations are found, specifically in 
the area of perceived accessibility.  This areas is critical in that patient perception of accessibility 
was also strongly correlated with both reduced likelihood of an ED visit and a 2 percentage point 
reduction in expenditures.  Therefore, the concordance between patient and provider perspectives 
in terms of accessibility should be noted.  The attributes with some concordance in terms of 
accessibility include practices that report having a case manager and practices reporting staffing 
a nurse practitioner or a physician assistant.  These additional personnel may play a key role in 
patients’ belief that they are able to easily access a provider, and should be further researched in 
order to provide recommendations on their use.  Accrediting entities may choose to emphasize 
criteria focuses on accessibility, including the use of case managers in future iterations of PCMH 
criteria.   
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Table 1-1. Characteristics of practices and patients by patient-centered index 
  Low Patient-Centered 
Medium Patient-
centered High Patient-centered 
  N = 2,991 N = 4,502 N = 4,634 
  % SE % SE % SE 
Certified PCMH 18.02% (0.014) 37.38% (0.020) 58.17% (0.022) 
Practice Attributes             
Same day appointments 89.00% (0.009) 97.30% (0.004) 99.60% (0.002) 
Uses email for communication 30.40% (0.015) 79.80% (0.011) 96.60% (0.004) 
Multi-specialty practice 9.00% (0.008) 21.90% (0.013) 60.50% (0.018) 
Has NPs or PAs 43.80% (0.017) 70.30% (0.015) 95.50% (0.006) 
Has a PCP 88.90% (0.010) 96.50% (0.005) 99.40% (0.002) 
Has a Case Manager 13.20% (0.010) 41.10% (0.017) 90.90% (0.009) 
Sends preventive care 
reminders 71.40% (0.013) 95.00% (0.007) 99.50% (0.001) 
Follow-up within 48 hours of 
hospital discharge 41.60% (0.017) 74.50% (0.016) 95.00% (0.008) 
EHR send guideline reminders 
to provider 38.90% (0.017) 86.20% (0.010) 98.20% (0.004) 
Provider receive quality of care 
report cards 66.60% (0.014) 94.70% (0.006) 99.60% (0.002) 
Type of usual source of care 
practice          
Independent 37.10% (0.013) 24.20% (0.012) 13.60% (0.010) 
Hospital or academic medical 
center 10.60% (0.012) 23.50% (0.017) 27.20% (0.019) 
Government or non-profit 4.10% (0.006) 9.60% (0.008) 20.20% (0.011) 
Other or unknown 48.20% (0.015) 42.70% (0.015) 39.00% (0.018) 
Patient Attributes             
Age (mean) 39.244 (0.874) 40.01 (0.797) 42.384 (0.760) 
Male 46.10% (0.012) 44.50% (0.009) 43.30% (0.009) 
Race/Ethnicity          
Non-Hispanic White  62.60% (0.019) 64.20% (0.017) 65.70% (0.016) 
 Non-Hispanic Black 11.20% (0.011) 11.50% (0.009) 10.00% (0.009) 
Hispanic 16.70% (0.013) 16.20% (0.013) 15.60% (0.014) 
Non-Hispanic Asian  5.40% (0.008) 4.50% (0.006) 4.10% (0.005) 
Other 4.10% (0.006) 3.50% (0.005) 4.70% (0.006) 
Marital status          
Married 36.30% (0.014) 39.10% (0.014) 43.60% (0.012) 
Separated/Widowed/Divorced 17.70% (0.011) 16.90% (0.008) 17.60% (0.008) 
Never married 17.60% (0.010) 15.70% (0.008) 17.30% (0.008) 
Not applicable (under 16) 28.40% (0.016) 28.30% (0.014) 21.50% (0.011) 
Education          
Less than high school 28.00% (0.012) 27.50% (0.011) 24.30% (0.009) 
High school 19.50% (0.011) 20.50% (0.010) 22.20% (0.010) 
Some college 17.30% (0.012) 16.50% (0.008) 18.60% (0.008) 
Bachelor degree or more 21.70% (0.013) 22.40% (0.012) 25.00% (0.012) 
Not applicable (under 5) 13.40% (0.010) 13.10% (0.009) 9.90% (0.008) 
Region of residence          
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Northeast 18.40% (0.018) 20.40% (0.025) 19.60% (0.017) 
Midwest 17.80% (0.018) 18.20% (0.015) 25.10% (0.026) 
South 43.40% (0.024) 40.60% (0.023) 30.00% (0.018) 
West 20.40% (0.014) 20.80% (0.017) 25.30% (0.017) 
Income as percent of federal 
poverty level (mean) 403.488 (12.753) 407.393 (12.145) 409.195 (12.206) 
Self-reported health          
Poor 2.90% (0.004) 3.80% (0.005) 3.10% (0.004) 
Fair 9.40% (0.007) 10.60% (0.007) 11.20% (0.006) 
Good 25.40% (0.011) 24.90% (0.010) 29.10% (0.011) 
Very good 31.50% (0.013) 30.70% (0.012) 32.60% (0.011) 
Excellent 30.80% (0.014) 30.00% (0.012) 24.00% (0.010) 
Insurance type          
Uninsured 3.50% (0.005) 2.80% (0.004) 3.30% (0.004) 
Medicaid  16.90% (0.011) 18.80% (0.012) 18.60% (0.012) 
Medicare 13.00% (0.010) 13.40% (0.008) 13.80% (0.009) 
Private 65.80% (0.015) 63.90% (0.014) 62.80% (0.016) 
Other 0.80% (0.002) 1.20% (0.003) 1.50% (0.003) 
Note: SE= standard errors
 39 
Paper 1: Concordance between provider and patient-reported characteristics of patient-centered medical homes 
 
Table 1-2. Concordance between provider practice index and patient perceived patient-centered care 
  
Easy to reach by 
phone during 
regular hours 
Extended office 
hours 
Easy to reach by 
phone after hours 
Provider shows 
respect for 
treatment 
decisions 
Provider includes 
patient in 
decision-making 
Provider explains 
treatment options 
Provider asks 
about other 
treatments 
received 
  Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Patient-centered 
practice (ref = low)                            
Medium -0.20* (0.11) 0.30*** (0.09) 0.11 (0.08) -0.08 (0.16) -0.04 (0.11) -0.26 (0.18) 0.08 (0.10) 
High -0.22* (0.12) 0.47*** (0.10) 0.15* (0.09) 0.06 (0.16) 0.17 (0.10) -0.19 (0.20) 0.09 (0.11) 
Age -0.01 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01* (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01** (0.00) 
Income as percent of 
federal poverty level 
(mean) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Male -0.03 (0.06) 0.05 (0.05) -0.08 (0.06) -0.06 (0.09) 0.00 (0.06) 0.10 (0.10) 0.04 (0.06) 
Race/Ethnicity (ref = 
Non-Hispanic white)                             
Non-Hispanic black 0.22* (0.12) 0.32*** (0.10) 0.29*** (0.09) 0.53*** (0.14) 0.60*** (0.12) 0.38** (0.17) 0.11 (0.09) 
Hispanic 0.22* (0.12) 0.29** (0.12) 0.39*** (0.11) 0.01 (0.17) -0.06 (0.13) 0.55*** (0.20) 0.04 (0.10) 
Asian 0.31 (0.22) 0.38* (0.20) 0.35* (0.18) -0.01 (0.28) -0.14 (0.19) 0.01 (0.28) -0.23 (0.17) 
Other 0.49** (0.24) 0.16 (0.20) 0.13 (0.18) 0.55* (0.31) 0.40 (0.26) 0.65** (0.28) 0.06 (0.23) 
Region of residence 
(ref = Northeast)                             
Midwest 0.21 (0.15) -0.44*** (0.14) -0.45*** (0.13) -0.24 (0.19) 0.26 (0.16) 0.02 (0.24) -0.26** (0.12) 
South 0.18 (0.14) -0.83*** (0.13) -0.60*** (0.12) -0.10 (0.18) 0.05 (0.16) -0.23 (0.22) 0.05 (0.13) 
West -0.21 (0.13) -0.70*** (0.13) -0.78*** (0.14) -0.79*** (0.16) 0.21 (0.15) -0.48** (0.20) -0.28** (0.13) 
Marital status (ref = 
Married)                             
Separated/Widowed/ 
Divorced 0.13 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) -0.03 (0.10) -0.11 (0.12) -0.02 (0.11) -0.53*** (0.19) -0.41*** (0.11) 
Never married -0.00 (0.11) -0.07 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.07 (0.16) -0.12 (0.11) 0.03 (0.19) -0.46*** (0.12) 
Not applicable (under 
16) -0.02 (0.19) -0.11 (0.16) 0.59*** (0.14) 0.06 (0.28) 0.11 (0.20) -0.09 (0.27) -0.45*** (0.16) 
Education (ref = less 
than HS)                             
High school 0.07 (0.12) -0.03 (0.10) 0.03 (0.11) -0.14 (0.16) 0.02 (0.10) -0.22 (0.17) 0.00 (0.10) 
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Some college -0.14 (0.13) -0.04 (0.12) -0.11 (0.12) -0.22 (0.16) 0.22* (0.12) 0.02 (0.19) 0.28** (0.11) 
Bachelor degree or 
more -0.16 (0.16) -0.19* (0.11) 0.03 (0.12) -0.04 (0.19) 0.21* (0.12) -0.32* (0.19) 0.53*** (0.12) 
Not applicable (under 
5) 0.16 (0.17) -0.29*** (0.11) 0.12 (0.12) -0.05 (0.22) -0.05 (0.17) -0.11 (0.32) -0.13 (0.14) 
Insurance type (ref = 
uninsured)                             
Medicaid  0.09 (0.26) -0.11 (0.16) -0.31 (0.20) -0.09 (0.24) -0.41** (0.19) -0.13 (0.28) 0.05 (0.15) 
Medicare 0.37 (0.25) 0.13 (0.18) 0.29 (0.19) -0.00 (0.26) -0.14 (0.21) -0.24 (0.29) -0.10 (0.18) 
Private 0.40 (0.26) 0.21 (0.14) 0.35** (0.16) 0.20 (0.23) -0.12 (0.19) 0.04 (0.28) 0.10 (0.14) 
Other 1.15** (0.46) -0.01 (0.37) 0.34 (0.32) -0.68 (0.43) -0.11 (0.32) 1.28* (0.77) 0.73** (0.30) 
Self-reported health 
(ref = poor)                             
Fair 0.30** (0.14) 0.06 (0.17) -0.03 (0.16) 0.39* (0.21) 0.13 (0.18) 0.27 (0.25) -0.09 (0.17) 
Good 0.61*** (0.16) 0.30* (0.16) 0.09 (0.15) 0.65*** (0.21) 0.30* (0.18) 0.40* (0.24) -0.05 (0.16) 
Very good 0.81*** (0.16) 0.29* (0.17) 0.19 (0.15) 0.56** (0.22) 0.44** (0.19) 0.41 (0.26) -0.22 (0.16) 
Excellent 0.95*** (0.17) 0.38** (0.18) 0.36** (0.16) 0.84*** (0.25) 0.64*** (0.19) 0.48* (0.29) -0.19 (0.17) 
Type of usual source 
of care practice (ref = 
independent)                             
Hospital or academic 
medical center -0.18 (0.15) -0.36*** (0.12) -0.19* (0.11) -0.32* (0.18) -0.06 (0.14) -0.07 (0.27) 0.18 (0.12) 
Government or non-
profit -0.34** (0.16) -0.18 (0.12) -0.46*** (0.11) -0.06 (0.19) 0.02 (0.13) -0.00 (0.24) -0.10 (0.12) 
Other or unknown -0.09 (0.12) 0.08 (0.08) 0.11 (0.08) -0.02 (0.14) 0.04 (0.10) -0.02 (0.18) 0.01 (0.10) 
Note: SE= standard error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1-3. Concordance between practice attributes and patient perspective of patient-centeredness 
  
Easy to reach by 
phone during 
regular hours 
Extended office 
hours 
Easy to reach by 
phone after hours 
Provider shows 
respect for 
treatment 
decisions 
Provider includes 
patient in decision-
making 
Provider 
explains 
treatment options 
Provider asks about 
other treatments 
received 
  Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
Offers same day appointments 0.14 (0.23) 0.27 (0.17) 0.20 (0.18) 0.33 (0.28) 0.09 (0.18) 0.53 (0.36) -0.18 (0.21) 
Uses email or electronic means 
of communication with patients -0.15 (0.13) 0.06 (0.08) 0.04 (0.09) -0.21 (0.15) 0.01 (0.11) -0.16 (0.16) 0.01 (0.11) 
Multi-specialty practice -0.24** (0.10) 0.10 (0.08) -0.10 (0.08) 0.14 (0.12) 0.04 (0.10) -0.13 (0.16) 0.19** (0.08) 
Has nurse practitioners or 
physician assistants -0.19 (0.12) 0.27*** (0.09) -0.18** (0.08) 0.15 (0.16) 0.06 (0.10) -0.07 (0.18) 0.00 (0.08) 
Has a primary care provider -0.25 (0.23) 0.09 (0.18) -0.00 (0.15) -0.09 (0.24) 0.04 (0.24) -0.26 (0.29) -0.37* (0.20) 
Has a case manager 0.10 (0.12) 0.12 (0.08) 0.16** (0.08) 0.11 (0.14) 0.05 (0.09) -0.00 (0.15) 0.05 (0.08) 
Sends preventive care 
reminders 0.17 (0.13) -0.21 (0.14) 0.21* (0.12) -0.01 (0.18) 0.17 (0.15) 0.03 (0.22) -0.05 (0.16) 
Follows up with patients within 
72 hours of hospital discharge 0.06 (0.10) 0.12 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08) -0.08 (0.12) 0.13 (0.09) -0.20 (0.14) 0.09 (0.09) 
Uses electronic reminders of 
guidelines and standards of care -0.03 (0.13) 0.12 (0.10) 0.07 (0.11) 0.10 (0.16) -0.07 (0.11) 0.01 (0.22) -0.09 (0.11) 
Uses quality report cards for 
providers -0.20 (0.16) 0.15 (0.10) -0.01 (0.12) -0.34 (0.23) -0.30** (0.14) 0.09 (0.26) -0.00 (0.14) 
Note: All models are adjusted for age, gender, race/ethnicity, income level, marital status, education, region of residence, health status, type of health insurance and type of 
practice. SE = Standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1-4. Patient outcomes by provider and patient-level patient centeredness 
 ED use Total expenditures 
 Coef SE Coef SE 
Patient-centered practice (ref = low)         
Medium 0.15* (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 
High 0.04 (0.08) 0.00 (0.01) 
Patient-centered from patient perspective (ref = low)      
Medium -0.16* (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 
High -0.15* (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 
Age 0.01 (0.00) 0.00*** 0.00  
Income as percent of federal poverty level (mean) -0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** 0.00  
Male -0.17*** (0.06) -0.02*** 0.00  
Race/Ethnicity (ref = Non-Hispanic, white)      
Non-Hispanic black 0.12 (0.09) 0.06*** (0.01) 
Hispanic 0.12 (0.08) 0.01 (0.01) 
Asian -0.41** (0.18) -0.02** (0.01) 
Other 0.51** (0.25) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Region of residence (ref = Northeast)      
Midwest -0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.01) 
South -0.23** (0.10) -0.02*** (0.01) 
West -0.26** (0.11) 0.00 (0.01) 
Marital status (ref = Married)      
Separated/Widowed/Divorced 0.30*** (0.09) 0.01* (0.01) 
Never married 0.09 (0.12) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Not applicable (under 16) -0.07 (0.23) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Education (ref = less than HS)      
High school 0.13 (0.11) 0.01 (0.01) 
Some college 0.06 (0.12) 0.02** (0.01) 
Bachelor’s degree or more 0.12 (0.11) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Not applicable (under 5) 0.79*** (0.15) -0.01 (0.01) 
Insurance type (ref = uninsured)      
Medicaid  0.23 (0.19) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Medicare -0.06 (0.21) 0.12*** (0.01) 
Private -0.28 (0.18) 0.10*** (0.01) 
Other -0.20 (0.37) 0.07*** (0.03) 
Self-reported health (ref = poor)      
Fair -0.60*** (0.14) -0.08*** (0.01) 
Good -1.06*** (0.14) -0.15*** (0.01) 
Very good -1.44*** (0.14) -0.20*** (0.01) 
Excellent -1.60*** (0.14) -0.24*** (0.01) 
Type of usual source of care practice (ref = independent)      
Hospital or academic medical center 0.03 (0.10) 0.01 -0.01 
Government or non-profit -0.07 (0.11) -0.02** -0.01 
Other or unknown -0.04 (0.08) 0 -0.01 
Note: SE = Standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1-5. Patient outcomes by provider attributes and patient perceived characteristics 
 ED Use Total expenditures 
  Coef SE Coef SE 
Provider attributes      
Offers same day appointments 0.43*** (0.17) 0.01 (0.01) 
Uses email or electronic means of 
communication with patients -0.09 (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 
Multi-specialty practice -0.02 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 
Has nurse practitioners or physician 
assistants 0.10 (0.08) -0.00 (0.01) 
Has a primary care provider -0.04 (0.16) 0.00 (0.01) 
Has a case manager -0.08 (0.06) -0.01** (0.00) 
Sends preventive care reminders 0.06 (0.15) -0.00 (0.01) 
Follows up with patients within 72 hours 
of hospital discharge -0.11 (0.07) -0.00 (0.01) 
Uses electronic reminders of guidelines 
and standards of care 0.11 (0.10) 0.01** (0.01) 
Uses quality report cards for providers 0.12 (0.11) -0.00 (0.01) 
Patient perception      
Easy to reach by phone during regular 
hours -0.14 (0.10) -0.01** (0.01) 
Extended office hours 0.05 (0.08) -0.01 (0.01) 
Easy to reach by phone after hours -0.12 (0.09) -0.00 (0.01) 
Provider shows respect for treatment 
decisions -0.17 (0.12) -0.00 (0.01) 
Provider includes patient in decision-
making -0.06 (0.10) -0.00 (0.01) 
Provider explains treatment options 0.18 (0.15) 0.00 (0.01) 
Provider asks about other treatments 
received 0.15* (0.08) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Note: All models are adjusted for age, gender, race/ethnicity, income level, marital status, education, region of 
residence, health status, type of health insurance and type of practice. SE = standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1
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Table 1-6 Patient outcomes with composite for patient-perceived accessibility 
  ED Use Total expenditures 
  Coef SE Coef SE 
Provider attributes         
Offers same day appointments 0.44*** (0.17) 0.01 (0.01) 
Uses email or electronic means of communication with patients -0.09 (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) 
Multi-specialty practice -0.01 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 
Has nurse practitioners or physician assistants 0.11 (0.08) -0.00 (0.01) 
Has a primary care provider -0.04 (0.16) 0.00 (0.01) 
Has a case manager -0.07 (0.06) -0.01** (0.00) 
Sends preventive care reminders 0.06 (0.15) -0.00 (0.01) 
Follows up with patients within 72 hours of hospital discharge -0.11 (0.07) -0.00 (0.01) 
Uses electronic reminders of guidelines and standards of care 0.11 (0.10) 0.01** (0.01) 
Uses quality report cards for providers 0.11 (0.11) -0.00 (0.01) 
Patient perception         
Composite accessibility measure -0.32*** (0.11) -0.02** (0.01) 
Provider shows respect for treatment decisions -0.16 (0.11) -0.00 (0.01) 
Provider includes patient in decision-making -0.08 (0.10) -0.00 (0.01) 
Provider explains treatment options 0.18 (0.15) 0.00 (0.01) 
Provider asks about other treatments received 0.15* (0.08) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Covariates         
Age 0.01* (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
Income as percent of federal poverty level (mean) -0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
Male -0.17*** (0.06) -0.02*** (0.00) 
Race/Ethnicity (ref = Non-Hispanic, white)      
Non-Hispanic black -0.00 (0.08) -0.05*** (0.01) 
Hispanic -0.12 (0.09) -0.06*** (0.01) 
Asian -0.52*** (0.17) -0.09*** (0.01) 
Other 0.39 (0.24) 0.01 (0.01) 
Region of residence (ref = Northeast)      
Midwest -0.02 (0.12) -0.00 (0.01) 
South -0.24** (0.11) -0.02*** (0.01) 
West -0.28** (0.11) -0.00 (0.01) 
Marital status (ref = Married)      
Separated/Widowed/Divorced 0.32*** (0.09) 0.01** (0.01) 
Never married 0.11 (0.12) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Not applicable (under 16) -0.03 (0.23) 0.04*** (0.01) 
Education (ref = less than HS)      
High school 0.14 (0.11) 0.00 (0.01) 
Some college 0.06 (0.12) 0.02** (0.01) 
Bachelor’s degree or more 0.10 (0.11) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Not applicable (under 5) 0.80*** (0.15) -0.01 (0.01) 
Insurance type (ref = uninsured)      
Medicaid  0.23 (0.19) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Medicare -0.05 (0.20) 0.12*** (0.01) 
Private -0.28 (0.18) 0.10*** (0.01) 
Other -0.22 (0.37) 0.07** (0.03) 
Self-reported health (ref = poor)      
Fair -0.59*** (0.14) -0.08*** (0.01) 
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Good -1.04*** (0.14) -0.15*** (0.01) 
Very good -1.42*** (0.14) -0.19*** (0.01) 
Excellent -1.58*** (0.15) -0.23*** (0.01) 
Type of usual source of care practice (ref = independent)      
Hospital or academic medical center 0.02 (0.10) 0.00 (0.01) 
Government or non-profit -0.09 (0.12) -0.02** (0.01) 
Other or unknown -0.04 (0.08) 0.00 (0.01) 
Note: SE = Standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2 Hospital Value-Based Purchasing and Staff Budgeting 
Decisions 
ABSTRACT 
Background: Medicare Hospitals Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) aims to improve patient 
outcomes and increase efficiency in use of resources.  However, numerous studies to date have 
failed to demonstrate meaningful changes in patient outcomes following implementation.  While 
many have taken this to mean that hospitals are not responding to incentives, whether because 
the financial incentive is too small or because the performance metrics are numerous and varied, 
few studies have looked at hospital responses as opposed to patient outcomes.  This study uses 
staffing changes as an early indicator of shifting financial priorities to assess internal hospital 
responses to incentives. 
Methods: Data come from the Virginia Health Information Hospital Detail Reports 2010-2017 
and Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Impact files for hospital-specific HVBP 
adjustments. Generalized linear models were used to identify associations between HVBP 
penalties or bonuses with number of provider-specific full-time equivalents (FTEs).  Measures 
were direct patient care and administrative hours, in addition to clinician types such as 
physicians, nurse practitioners, registered nurses and nursing aides.  Reliance on Medicare 
funding as a measure of proportion of patient revenue tied to Medicare was also estimated as a 
potential moderating factor. 
Results: Hospitals receiving penalties responded by reducing the numbering of physician FTEs 
(-0.35, p< 0.01) and nursing aide FTEs (-0.29, p< 0.01) in the following year.  In hospitals 
receiving bonuses, staff were added.  In particular, administrative staff (0.30, p< 0.01), registered 
nurses (0.22, p=0.03), and other staff (0.19, p< 0.01) all had increased FTEs in the year 
following the bonus. 
Discussion: Findings are consistent with expected behaviors if hospitals are responding to 
incentives by aiming to both improve quality and reduce costs.  For instance, hospitals aiming to 
improve quality may add registered nurses, a provider type with staffing ratios tied to numerous 
quality metrics, and may hire additional administrative staff to assist with quality improvement 
initiatives.  However, reductions in physicians and nursing aides are likely results of efforts to 
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reduce expenses.  Hospitals may choose to reduce physician FTEs, since they are the most costly 
providers.  Nursing aides, while not costly, are not necessary for hospitals to function; therefore, 
they may be seen as a luxury.  Overall, findings are consistent with hypotheses that hospitals are 
responding internally to incentives, even if changes do not results in changes in patients 
outcomes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, provider payment in the United States healthcare system has largely been 
fee-for-service based or volume driven.41  This method, however, has led to unnecessary services 
that often result in little benefit, even potentially harming patients.42  The fee-for-service model 
has also contributed to exceptionally high health expenditures not seen in health systems that use 
other payment models.5  Efforts to curb excessive health spending in primary and specialty 
outpatient care have resulted in models such as managed care in the 1990’s, medical homes (as 
described in chapter 1), accountable care organizations, and a multitude of additional alternative 
payment models established through the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act 
(MACRA) of 2015.9,43–46  Each model has a distinct set of measures, structures, and aims. 
 While efforts to reform payment models in the outpatient setting have been numerous 
and varied, efforts on the inpatient side have been somewhat more uniform.  Although hospitals 
and states have had some flexibility in establishing unique models, by far the largest payment 
reform programs were initiated by Medicare and are mandatory for nearly all acute care 
hospitals.  In an effort to incentivize healthcare providers to deliver higher quality and cost-
efficient care, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program in 2012 as an initiative of the ACA.  Medicare 
hospital costs were specifically targeted in part due to their size and expense, since hospital costs 
contribute to nearly one-third of all healthcare expenditures, despite only about 7% of the 
population having an inpatient stay.47,48 
While the initiative itself is uniform across hospitals nationally, the individual measures 
vary greatly.  Initially, HVBP quality measures were focused on care processes.  To some extent, 
the focus on these measures is evident in recent comparative reports that show that while the 
United States ranks at the bottom of overall healthcare system performance, we perform best on 
care processes, with a ranking of 5th out of 11 industrialized countries.5  Since 2012, the VBP 
program has expanded to incorporate numerous additional quality measures, ranging from 
patient satisfaction with care to patient safety indicators.  Most recently, in fiscal year (FY) 2018, 
hospitals were ranked on their performance in 4 domains: patient experience and care 
coordination, safety, clinical care and cost efficiency.49  However, the weight of these domains 
for payment purposes varies by year, as do the specific measures.   
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Now, more than five years into the HVBP program, several evaluations have been 
published indicating minimal effect on health outcomes.50,51  Although hospital acquired 
conditions have declined by more than 17 percent since initiation of the program,52 studies 
comparing VBP hospitals to control hospitals suggest that improvements in healthcare are 
demonstrative of overall trends as opposed to specific payment system reforms.50,51,53  This 
conclusion is consistent with findings from the prior Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration (Premier HQID), an early value-based purchasing pilot for a limited number of 
medical conditions, that was found to have little effect on mortality or costs.53,54   
Despite academic literature that suggests the current inpatient HVBP program is largely 
ineffective,7 value-based purchasing programs more broadly have and are likely continue to 
expand both in the hospital and outpatient settings.44,55  Therefore, in order for health policy 
research to be an effective tool in shaping public policy, researchers must begin to study not just 
whether or not VBP impacts outcomes, but focus on why the programs are or are not working, so 
that improvements to the program can be made.  To date, the cause of the failure of HVBP to 
show results is still speculative.  Many researchers blame the insufficient size of the incentive, 
believing that without adequate consequences, hospitals are unlikely to make any systematic 
changes.7,56  In fact, the percent of a hospital’s overall payment at-risk based on HVBP 
performance is small, beginning with 1% of base Medicare MS-DRG payments in FY 2013 and 
capping out at 2% in FY 2017.57  Other explanations have focused on the numerous quality 
measures that may lead to confusion among clinicians and administrative burden.1,7,56,58  
Although little research has investigated “quality improvement overload” as a driver of 
ineffective improvement strategies, it has quickly become a popular explanation for disjointed, 
poorly executed quality improvement initiatives.7,59  This study aims to begin the investigatory 
process into the evidence behind these two explanations by identifying changes in internal 
budgeting decisions among hospitals in which the incentive is a considerable component of 
overall revenue compared to those in which it is a not.  By studying an internal response as 
opposed to an outcome, I can conclude whether or not incentives are too small to cause a 
response, or if the response is simply not resulting in improved patient outcomes.  Additionally, 
this study measures administrative FTEs separately from other FTEs to see if hospitals are 
responding to an increase in administrative burden. 
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When CMS modified inpatient payments in the past with the Balanced Budget Act 
(BBA) of 1997, evidence suggested that hospitals responded with changes in nurse staffing ratios 
proportional to the size of their payment cut.60  Later, as margins again increased and evidence 
grew regarding the association between staffing ratios and quality of care, hospitals again began 
increasing their staffing levels.61  With nearly 60 percent of a hospital’s budget dedicated to staff 
expenses, responses to changes in reimbursement are often first evident among staffing 
changes.60,62  Therefore, in order to investigate whether HVBP incentives are large enough to 
invoke hospital system-level changes, staffing decisions are an early indicator.  Using hospital 
cost reports combined with individual HVBP adjustments, this study examines how hospital 
staffing decisions change in response to HVBP incentives. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
With a growing number of VBP programs implemented in various settings, Damberg et 
al. at RAND Corporation developed a framework for evaluating these programs.63  The 
framework is adapted for this study, and aims to identify not only the theoretical basis in which 
incentives may affect behavior of providers and healthcare entities, but also identify potential 
confounding factors.  The original RAND VBP model (figure 2-1) illustrates how the VBP 
approach, with specific design features, may result in specific responses, which ultimately may 
lead to both intermediate effects and long-term outcomes.  Additionally, this framework 
addresses how external factors such as competing polices, fiscal environment, and organizational 
culture may influence how entities respond to incentives. 
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Figure 2-1. RAND Value-Based Purchasing Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Current literature on the HVBP program has largely been focused at the end of the 
potential pathway, finding few changes in long-term outcomes.  However, it should not be 
assumed that simply because effects of the HVBP program are not seen at the end of the pathway 
that no there is no response to incentives.  In order to improve our understanding of why 
incentives have not resulted in changes in outcomes, this study shifts the focus from long-term 
outcomes to the earliest stages of entity response, or responses to VBP programs.  As such, the 
model is adapted to include the outcomes evaluated in this study – changes in staffing full-time 
equivalents (FTEs) – in the “responses to VBP programs,” while both intermediate and long-
term outcomes are not evaluated in this study (see figure 2-2). 
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Figure 2-2. Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program Conceptual Framework (modified from RAND VBP 
framework) 
 
 
Note: Concepts in grey are not included in study 
Using an approach adapted from the RAND VBP model, the “design features” of the 
Medicare HVBP program include the goals of the HVBP program, which is to improve 
adherence to care standards, patient safety, patient experience and efficient use of resources.  The 
definitions of each of these goals fluctuates by year as domains and measures change, another 
pertinent feature of the program.  The “response” of interest in this study is staffing changes, 
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which may be expected to vary in a number of ways described in more detail below (see 
Hypotheses section).  
As indicated in the model, the response to the HVBP incentive is influenced by other 
“external factors” and “hospital characteristics.”  External factors, as described by Damberg et 
al., include contextual factors that may influence how an entity responds to the incentive.  For 
instance, other conflicting or complimentary payment policies for Medicare or other payers.  One 
example of a complimentary payment policy is the Medicare hospital readmissions reduction 
program (HRRP), which was implemented in a similar timeframe but unlike HVBP, evidence 
suggests that changes in patient outcomes may be attributable to payment policy.64  Since this 
study aims to investigate why patient outcomes are not responsive to HVBP policy, it is critical 
to account for policies such as HRRP to avoid inaccurate interpretation due to confounding 
factors. 
Characteristics that Damberg et al. refer to as “characteristics of providers and practice 
settings” are specific to the entity being incentivized, in this case, hospitals (therefore, these are 
referred to as “hospital characteristics” in the model above).  Of key importance for this study is 
the proportion of the hospital’s revenue that is based on Medicare dollars.  Hospitals with 
relatively larger Medicare populations will receive a proportionally larger financial incentive to 
perform well on HVBP performance measures.  With many researchers hypothesizing that the 
limited size of the incentive is the reason that few changes in patient outcomes are seen, it is 
important to distinguish between hospitals with relatively larger incentives compared with 
smaller incentives to identify variation in responsiveness to HVBP policy.7  
Hypotheses 
Financial and performance incentives are not new to hospitals.65  Over the last two 
decades, various payment reforms have required hospitals to respond to changing financial and 
political environments, with each policy incentivizing slightly different behavior.65,66  For 
instance, the BBA, which resulted in significant budget cuts, led hospitals to reduce costs largely 
by reducing their workforce.60  On the other hand, hospitals responded to quality report cards by 
investing in additional resources necessary to improve outcomes.67  The HVBP program has both 
a financial and quality component.  The program is intended to incentivize hospitals to improve 
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their quality and efficiency of resource use by assigning penalties or bonuses based on hospital 
performance on quality metrics, one of which specifically includes efficiency of resources.   
With both financial- and quality-based incentives, hospitals may respond to HVBP 
incentives through four different mechanisms.  First, hospitals could respond purely to the 
financial incentives.  If this is the case, one would expect hospitals to respond in a manner 
similar to that of the BBA response – hospitals will cut FTEs if they receive a penalty.60  Second, 
hospitals could aim to improve quality of care.  Like investments made to improve CABG 
outcomes following Medicare’s public release of report cards, hospitals could choose to invest in 
FTEs that are associated with improved outcomes for various HVBP metrics.67  The third 
mechanism through which hospitals could respond to HVBP incentives would be to aim to 
address both efficiency of resources and quality of care.  An example of this would be to 
substitute costly FTEs with lower cost FTEs seen as providing similar quality of care.  Finally, 
hospitals could not respond to HVBP incentives at all, at least as seen through workforce 
modifications.  This study aims to evaluate these competing hypotheses to determine which of 
the four mechanism is supported by hospital behavior. 
Mechanism 1: Hospitals respond to financial pressure only 
H1: Hospitals receiving HVBP penalties will decrease their FTEs.  
H2: Hospitals with a high proportion of Medicare patients will be more likely to adjust their 
staffing FTEs in response to HVBP than hospitals with a small proportion of their budget tied to 
Medicare payments. 
Similar to responses seen in prior Medicare payment cuts, such as the BBA, hospitals 
may indiscriminately reduce FTEs, especially those staffed at high numbers, such as registered 
nurses.60,68  Hospitals have been found to reduce FTEs as an early response to changes in 
financial pressure associated with Medicare policy, with hospitals with greater reliance on 
Medicare responding more aggressively to incentives.60,69,70  These reductions in FTEs have 
occurred despite associated reductions in quality as a result of increased workloads.71,72 
Mechanism 2: Hospitals respond to HVBP incentives by improving quality 
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H3: Hospitals receiving penalties will increase the number of direct care FTEs, especially those 
FTEs correlated with improved patient outcomes, such as registered nurse (RN) FTEs. 
 In the HVBP context, as opposed to the BBA, payment penalties are directly tied to 
quality outcomes.  In order to avoid or reduce such penalties, quality of care may be improved in 
a number of ways through workforce modifications.  For instance, there is a large body of 
evidence demonstrating that quality of care is directly related to nurse staffing levels.  Higher 
nurse staffing ratios are associated with lower mortality rates for a variety of conditions, 
increased patient experience scores on HCAHPS surveys, fewer hospital-acquired infections, 
fewer patient falls, higher compliance to standards of care, and a variety of other patient outcome 
measures.61,72–83  Aside from nurses, other direct patient care staff FTEs have also been found to 
be associated with outcomes, which hospitals may use to avoid HVBP penalties.84,85   
Mechanism 3: Hospitals respond to HVBP incentives by addressing both resource efficiency and 
quality of care 
H4: Hospitals will increase the number of administrative FTEs following VBP implementation.  
This mechanism through which hospitals may respond to HVBP incentives – by 
containing costs and maintaining or improving quality – is the overall goal of the HVBP 
program.  However, how this is effectuated may take varying forms, and the combination of 
multiple hypotheses may be required to suggest mechanism 3 is utilized.  For instance, one 
possible way a hospital may respond to pressure to improve quality of care efficiently is through 
designating project management personnel.59  As opposed to incresaing direct care FTEs as one 
might expect if the hospital responded by improving quality alone, hospitals may instead 
increase their administrative staff, as reported by hospital associations.86  In an environment with 
rotating quality metrics and changing benchmarks, such as that in HVBP, hospitals must 
efficiently target quality improvement strategies and align metrics and resources.  Unlike other 
payment reforms, the HVBP program has the added complexity of numerous, potentially 
burdensome quality monitoring and reporting requirements.  Therefore, hospitals may require 
additional administrative personnel to assist the hospital in meeting program requirements 
efficiently and effectively.58,63,87  This response has become increasingly cited in popular, 
anecdotal literature, though has not been evaluated to date.86   
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H5: Hospitals receiving HVBP penalties will substitute low-cost FTEs for high-cost FTEs that 
provide similar functions with similar quality. 
Finally, hospitals aiming to address resource efficiency while maintaining quality of care 
could choose to shift costs from more expensive personnel to less expensive personnel seen as 
equivalent in quality and skill.  For instance, hospitals may shift FTEs away from physicians and 
increase FTEs among nurse practitioners (NPs) or physician assistants (PAs), provider types 
demonstrated to be cost-effective replacements for physicians in many settings, including acute 
care hospitals.88–90  As discussed in the Harvard Review, a recent survey by the Medical Group 
Management Association found that hospitals with higher ratios of non-physician providers, such 
as NPs and PAs had higher profitability than hospitals with lower ratios.91  Over the last few 
decades, NPs have increasingly been used to substitute for junior physicians, and even senior 
physicians, in acute inpatient settings.92  Nearly 10% of all NPs are now certified to practice in 
an inpatient setting, with more than 90% reporting current employment.93  NPs and PAs may 
function in similar roles as physicians in a variety of capacities, both administratively and 
clinically in inpatient settings.  A recent survey of certified acute care nurse practitioners 
(ACNPs) indicated that critical care was the most common specialty among those currently 
employed in an inpatient setting.93  In fact, the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) reports that there are nearly as many critical care nurse practitioners as critical care 
physicians, with a 73% expected growth rate in the field.94  Nurse anesthetists, frequently used as 
the sole anesthesia provider in rural areas, now outnumber anesthesiologist.95,96  In addition to 
ACNPs and PA substituting for physicians, other clinicians may have substitutes.  For instance, 
registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPNs) generally fulfill similar roles in 
hospitals.  Nurse aides, while unable to fulfil all duties of  nurses may act as a partial substitute 
by reducing the staffing levels required to maintain quality of care through reductions in nursing 
workload.60,76,97 
Mechanism 4: No response 
H6: There are no changes in FTEs for any provider type following an HVBP penalty or bonus. 
It is feasible that hospitals do not respond specifically to HVBP incentives.  In fact, many 
researchers finding no change in patient outcomes assume this is the case.7  Indeed, hospitals 
report not knowing how to respond due to the shifting nature of the measures and relatively small 
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financial incentive attached to performance.1  This study is structured to eliminate this hypothesis 
if one of the competing hypotheses described above is supported.  However, failure to eliminate 
this hypothesis should not be interpreted as supporting it, since finding no changes in FTEs 
following HVBP bonuses or incentives does not mean that hospitals did not respond in other 
ways.  Supporting one of the other mechanisms of response does eliminate the hypothesis of no 
response. 
METHODS 
Data 
Data come from 2010-2017 Virginia Health Information (VHI) Hospital Detail Reports 
and CMS Impact Files.  VHI collects financial records and produces cost reports for all hospitals 
in Virginia.  Records include information on hospital expenditures and revenues, including labor 
expenses by clinician type and administrative and direct patient care full-time equivalents 
(FTEs).  While national datasets, such as the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual 
survey have estimates of nursing ratios, VHI is more suitable to address the research questions in 
this study because it offers more granular information on types of roles and hours as well as 
information on employees beyond nursing, such as physicians and even non-clinical personnel.  
Furthermore, in AHA data, full-time equivalent employment (FTEEs) are very roughly estimated 
and do not distinguish the number of hours worked within full-time and part-time staff, so that a 
nurse working 8 hours per week is counted the same as a nurse working 30 hours per week, as 
both are seen as part-time.81  In addition to these more precise estimates of FTEs, VHI also 
distinguishes between administrative hours and direct patient care hours for all clinician types.  
This precision is important when studying the impact of HVBP, as the types of hours may shift 
between types of clinicians and between direct patient care and administrative hours depending 
on the focus of the hospital or response to either administrative overload, an effort to improve 
quality of care, attempts to decrease costs, or all of the above.1,60,98   
All 75 acute adult general hospitals in Virginia eligible to receive HVBP payments are 
included in the sample, for a total of 501 observations.  While the time span includes 2010 to 
2017, the sample is constructed as a cross-section of seven 2-year panels in which the HVBP 
adjustment in year 1 is regressed onto the number of FTEs in year 2.  HVBP-exempt hospitals 
excluded from the sample include children’s hospitals, PPS-exempt cancer hospitals, critical 
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access hospitals, long term care facilities, rehabilitation hospitals, and inpatient psychiatric 
facilities.  Hospitals cited for deficiencies posing immediate danger to patients during their 
baseline performance period, hospitals not participating in the Hospital Inpatient Quality 
Reporting program, and hospitals with too few patients in specific quality measurement 
categories are not eligible for HVBP payments.  In Virginia, 5 adult acute hospitals (for a total of 
8 observations) did not participate in the HVBP program in at least 1 year for reasons 
unspecified.  HVBP adjustments for each hospital are publicly available through CMS archives.  
Adjustments were first announced in 2012, with the first year of bonus payments and penalties 
taking effect in 2013.   
FTEs 
FTEs are categorized by clinician type: 1) physician, 2) NP or PA, 3) RN, 4) LPN, 5) 
nurse aide, 6) other staff.  Both contract and direct employee hours are included.  Hours are 
divided between direct patient care and administrative responsibilities.  FTEs cannot be parsed 
out by hours spent on specific activities.  Therefore, clinicians whose positions include both 
administrative and direct care roles are categorized by where the staff member spends the 
majority of his or her hours.  For instance, while a nurse quality improvement coordinator would 
be considered administrative, a bedside nurse who serves part-time on a quality improvement 
committee is categorized as direct patient care in terms of FTEs.  Future FTEs are also likely 
dependent on past FTEs.  For this reason, all models include a control variable to adjust for the 
prior year’s number of FTEs for any given provider-type. 
HVBP adjustment 
HVBP adjustment is reported by CMS as a percent adjustment to the hospital’s Medicare 
MS-DRG inpatient payments.  CMS presents the adjustments as 1.0 if no adjustment is made, 
meaning the hospital receives 100% of their MS-DRG payments. If the adjustment is greater 
than 1.0, then the hospital receives a bonus.  If the adjustment is less than 1.0, than the hospital 
receives a penalty.  For this study, a hospital is categorized as receiving a null adjustment if the 
adjustment is between 0.999 and 1.001.  All other adjustments are categorized as either negative 
or positive.  Since hospitals may be more inclined to protect against losses than to aim for bonus 
payments, a binary indicator for having received a payment cut versus no payment cut is created 
as well.1  Similarly, a dummy is created to identify those hospitals receiving a bonus vs no 
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change or a penalty.  Finally, hospitals may not react to one or two years of penalties or bonus 
payments, but may instead respond to an accumulation of penalties.  For sensitivity analyses, two 
variables were created to address potential effects seen as a result of accumulation of penalties.  
The first variable is linear and includes the number of years the hospitals has received a penalty.  
The second variable flags hospitals that have received a penalty at least 3 times. 
Medicare Reliance 
HVBP incentive payments are likely to have varying effects on hospitals according to the 
fiscal pressure they represent.60  Hospitals whose margins are more dependent on Medicare 
dollars are more likely to respond to changes in Medicare payment incentive structures.  
Hospitals that care for few Medicare patients, are less likely to respond to minimal changes in 
single insurance policies.  Therefore, to identify the extent to which a hospital relies on Medicare 
for funding, I calculate net Medicare revenue and divide this by net patient service revenue.  This 
provides me with the proportion of net revenue attributable to Medicare payments.  A binary 
indicator for hospitals in the top tertile for dependence on Medicare dollars is used in the 
analyses, as these are considered the hospitals most likely to experience treatment effects.  
Covariates 
All models are adjusted for additional variables that may impact hospital staffing for 
reasons other than the HVBP program.  Hospital volume is accounted for by including total 
number of inpatient days per year.  The resources of the hospital location are adjusted for using 
both the rurality of the area as well as the general region of the state based on the five health 
planning regions, as defined by the Virginia Department of Health.  Hospital ownership is also 
included in all models and defined as either non-profit or proprietary.  Virginia has two state 
hospitals that do not report cost information to VHI and are excluded from analyses.  Affiliation 
with a large health system, defined as having at least 3 hospitals in Virginia or Virginia 
Commonwealth University and University of Virginia System hospitals, are also identified since 
hospitals in a large system may have additional global resources that could influence how 
payment changes effect individual hospitals within the system.  CMS provider type is also 
included to distinguish between hospitals that CMS views as potentially vulnerable or unique 
compared to typical inpatient prospective payment (IPPS) hospitals.  These provider types 
include IPPS hospitals, sole community hospitals, Medicare dependent hospitals, and rural 
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referral centers.  The CMS definition of Medicare-dependent hospital is based on hospital 
rurality and size of facility and is not based on reliance on Medicare financing as interpreted 
through cost reports.  For this reason, provider type could not be used as the moderating variable 
for analyses purposes, but is included as a covariate.  Other covariates include the CMS case mix 
index from the CMS Impact Files for each hospital to account for patient severity, prior year 
operating margins to address financial health and capacity to respond to financial incentives, and 
adjustments to Medicare payments due to the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program.  
Statistical Analyses 
 Seven two-year panels were constructed, in which the HVBP adjustment from year 1 
was matched to the number of FTEs for a given provider-type in year 2.  By creating a cross 
section of 2-year panels, endogeneity associated with the staffing decisions is reduced.  While 
the dataset consists of 2-years per panel, the hospital has 3 years to makes staffing decisions.  
HVBP adjustments are announced the year prior to implementation, implementation then occurs 
over the following year, and finally, FTEs are measured on year 3.  This ensures adequate time 
for hospitals to respond to budgetary modifications if desired. 
Generalized linear models are used to estimate the number of FTEs for each provider 
type (administrative, direct patient care, MD, PA/NP, RN, LPN, nurse aide, other staff).  Due to 
significant skewness of FTE distribution, all models were log-transformed.  High reliance on 
Medicare financing was included as a moderating variable and interacted with an indicator for 
hospitals who received a VBP penalty or bonus.  Panel fixed effects were included to address 
potential variation in staffing decisions overtime not explained by other covariates.  Errors were 
clustered by facility to account for inter-relatedness of staffing decisions within any given 
hospital. 
Eight individual models were estimated, one for each type of provider. All models 
measure the extent to which penalties assessed in year one lead to changes in staffing decisions 
in year two.  The moderating variable of Medicare reliance is included based on the assumption 
that hospitals with heavy reliance on Medicare funding may be more likely to change staffing as 
a result of their proportionately larger incentive.  Using direct patient care FTEs as an example, 
the generalized linear model is presented below: 
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Ln[direct patient care FTEs]it = α + β1(HVBP penalty) it-1 + β2(Medicare reliance) it-1 + 
β3(HVBP penalty * Medicare reliance) it-1 + β4(direct care FTEs) it-1 + β5(rurality) it  + 
β6(region) it  + β7(non-profit) it + Β8(system) it  + β9(patient days) it  + β10(operating 
margin) it-1 + β11(case mix index) it + β12(HRRP adjustment) it-1 +  η(panel) + 𝑢it 
A secondary analysis was performed to assess the effect of bonus payments on FTEs as opposed 
to penalties.  Eight individual models were similarly estimated replacing penalty with bonus 
payment. 
Sensitivity analyses 
Several sensitivity analyses were performed to ensure robustness of results.  In addition 
to analyzing the data as cross-sections of 2-year panels, a full panel dataset was constructed 
using 75 individual hospitals over 7 years.  A panel fixed effects model was estimated for each 
FTE type.  Findings were generally similar in direction to the main model; however, statistical 
significance was greatly reduced.   
A second set of sensitivity analyses tested the hypothesis that effects of penalties or 
bonuses are cumulative as opposed to annual.  For this sensitivity analysis, two separate methods 
were used.  First, a linear variable accounting for the number of penalties accumulated was 
created and replaced the binary indicator.  The second method used a cutoff of 3 penalties or 
bonuses over time.  Three penalties or bonuses was selected since nearly all hospitals 
experiencing at least 1 penalty or bonus also received a second.  However, the number 
dramatically declined to 10% of the total sample when three penalties were assessed.   
Additional sensitivity analyses included grouping all nurses who share similar 
responsibilities together (RNs and LPNs) and nurses with nursing aides.  These provider types, 
while differing in expense, share similar roles.  As nursing care makes up the largest proportion 
of FTEs, varying definitions of these categories were estimated to ensure that all practical 
groupings were assessed.   
Sensitivity analyses were also performed around the use of individual covariates.  
Specifically, while prior year’s operating margins were included in the main model, since this is 
the margin associated with patient care activities, sensitivity analyses were conducted using total 
margins instead.  Hospitals’ overall financial stability is the result of both revenue and expenses 
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related to patient care, but also the revenue and expenses outside of patient care.  As opposed to 
operating margins, total margins may account for other revenue sources outside of patient care 
activities that could supplement the financial stability of the institution.  Sensitivity analyses 
using total margins resulted in similar findings as the main model (see appendix 2-28 and 2-29).  
Full results of all sensitivity analyses are shown in appendices 2-4 through 2-29. 
RESULTS 
Of the 501 observations, 93 received penalties while 110 received bonuses, 298 hospitals 
received no adjustment (83 in years following implementation).  In nearly all categories of 
provider-types, mean FTEs were higher among hospitals receiving penalties than in those that 
received either no adjustment or received a bonus.  This is especially true for FTEs devoted to 
direct patient care activities (1,052.8 vs 888.5 or 706.4), physicians (56.9 vs 28.3 or 11.5), 
physician assistants/nurse practitioners (21.3 vs 12.1 or 5.7) and staff in the “other” category 
(865.0 vs 782.9 or 615.2) (see table 2-1).  Staff in the “other” category may include FTEs for 
positions such as nutrition, social work, behavioral health clinicians, and janitorial staff.  Nursing 
aides are the only staff type who are fairly equally represented in hospitals receiving penalties as 
they are in hospitals receiving bonuses (85.4 vs 89.8).  The higher number of unadjusted FTEs 
among providers receiving penalties may be due to the fact that larger hospitals were more 
represented in the penalty category than the bonus category, although hospitals receiving no 
adjustment were similar in size to those receiving a penalty.  The average number of patient days 
among hospitals receiving a penalty was 51,394 compared to 51,115 in the null category and 
43,828 in the bonus category.  In addition to size, ownership of hospitals is also associated with 
HVBP adjustment.  While 80.7% of hospitals receiving penalties are not-for-profit, only 65.5% 
of hospitals receiving bonuses are not-for-profit, suggesting that for-profit hospitals are more 
successful at securing bonuses. Table 2-1 provides hospitals characteristics among each HVBP 
adjustment category. 
The base analytic models (see tables 2-2 and 2-3) assess the relationship between either 
an HVBP penalty or a bonus and FTEs in the following year, controlling for the effect of 
Medicare reliance.  These models do not allow for any moderating relationship between 
Medicare reliance and HVBP payment incentive.  Based on these models, hospitals receiving 
penalties are associated with a reduction in physician FTEs (-0.35, p< 0.01) and nurse aide FTEs 
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(-0.29, p< 0.01).  Interestingly, these reductions are among some of the most and least costly 
FTEs (see table 2-2).  In hospitals receiving bonuses, staff are added.  In particular, 
administrative staff (0.30, p< 0.01), registered nurses (0.22, p=0.03), and other staff (0.19, p< 
0.01) all have increased FTEs (see table 2-3).  Shifting the comparator to hospitals receiving no 
adjustment results in similar estimates, hospitals receiving penalties continue to have fewer 
physician and nursing aide FTEs, while hospitals receiving bonuses have increased 
administrative, nursing, and other FTEs in the following year (see appendix 2-1).    
Hypothesis 2 suggests that hospitals with a heavy reliance on Medicare funding may be 
more prone to respond to HVBP incentives due to the relative size of the incentive.  However, 
the moderating variable was not statistically significant in any model, suggesting that responses 
seen to HVBP incentives are not based on the size of the incentive (see appendix 2-2 and 
appendix 2-3).  The moderated models instead show similar results to the non-moderated models 
for hospitals less reliant on Medicare.  In the moderated models, hospitals receiving penalties 
(less reliant on Medicare) continue to have fewer physician and nurse aide FTEs following a 
penalty, and continue to increase FTEs for administrative staff, registered nurses and other staff. 
Licensed practical nursing FTEs also had increased FTEs following receipt of a bonus payment.  
Since reliance on Medicare was not found to be a contributing factor to hospitals’ response to 
HVBP incentives either through statistical significant in the model or through a post-test F-test, 
the non-moderated models are considered to be the main analytic models for this analysis.  
Results from moderated models may be found in the appendices (appendices 2-2 through 2-3) 
along with results from other sensitivity analyses.  
Sensitivity analyses were conducted using panel data, as well as measuring penalties and 
bonuses as either a threshold effect (at least 3 penalties or bonuses) or an accumulation effect.  
Results of the sensitivity analyses largely mirrored those of the main analyses, showing declines 
in physician FTEs following a penalty and increases in nursing and administrative staff FTEs 
following bonuses.  Full results from these sensitivity analyses may be found in appendices 2-4 
through 2-23.  Further sensitivity analyses for hypothesis 4 and 5, investigating whether 
hospitals’ responses are demonstrative of aiming to both improve resource efficiency and address 
quality concerns, were conducted using both a pre/post analysis of the HVBP implementation 
period and a ratio of high-cost providers to low cost providers.  For the latter, a ratio of 
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physicians to NP/PAs was created as well as a ratio of RNs to LPNs and RNs to nursing aides.  
Supporting findings from main analyses, the ratio of physicians to NP/PAs declined following 
HVBP implementation period.  Furthermore, the ratio of nurses to nursing aides increased 
following a bonus, while the number of LPNs to registered nurses (a less costly substitute) 
increased following a penalty (see appendices 2-24 to 2-27).  
DISCUSSION 
Findings indicate that receiving an HVBP penalty is associated with a decrease of one-
third of a physician FTE (about 14 hours) and about one-quarter of a nurse aide FTE (about 11 
hours).  These reductions are similar in magnitude to reductions seen in nursing staff following 
implementation of BBA.60  While the payment cute was more significant following the BBA, 
hospital responses seem to be of similar magnitude.  The difference in the reductions following 
the two policies seem to be the types of FTEs reduced.  Whereas the BBA cut payments in 
general, the HVBP program also incentivizes quality of care.  This may be why hospitals appear 
to be strategically reducing certain staff and not others.  For instance, while the BBA mainly cut 
RN and LPN FTEs, since they are by far the largest proportion of hospital staff, reductions 
following HVBP penalties are focused in physician and nurse aide FTEs, while RN and LPN 
FTEs remain unchanged.60 
Based on the findings from this study, hospitals appear to behave in a way most 
consistent with entities aiming to both improve efficiency and maintain quality at the same time.  
If hospitals responded incentives solely through reducing expenses, then FTEs should have 
decreased overall following penalties and hospitals with larger financial incentives would have 
cut FTEs at a greater rate.  My findings are not consistent with this hypothesis.  Only physician 
and nurse aide FTEs were cut, the most and least expensive, and hospitals with heavy reliance on 
Medicare funding were no more or less likely to respond to incentives than other hospitals.  
However, the reductions in physician and nurse aide personnel do suggest some sensitivity to 
financial penalties.  Potential explanations for the reductions among these two roles specifically 
may be due to the high cost in the case of the physician, and the non-essential, luxury good 
nature of the nurse aide.  Nurse aides are generally used to augment the role of the RN or LPN 
by assisting in basic care, such as transporting patients, and assisting in activities of daily living, 
like baths and brushing patient’s teeth.99  These activities, if not otherwise completed by a nurse 
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aide, would be added to the workload of the patient’s nurse.  However, nurse aides cannot give 
medications to patients, so cannot act as a full substitute for LPNs or RNs.  Therefore, with a 
more limited scope of practice, unlike a RN or LPN, nurse aides are not a required part of patient 
care, but instead may promote high quality care and job satisfaction by decreasing burdens on the 
nurse’s time and enabling faster attention to patient needs.  When hospital budgets are reduced, 
these staff are among the first to experience decreases in FTEs.  This suggests the HVBP 
program may result in the unintended consequence of increasing nurse workload, and potentially 
decreasing the quality of her work. 
 Reductions in FTEs were not the only response identified among hospitals following 
HVBP implementation.  Hospitals also responded to incentives by shifting FTEs following 
receipt of a bonus.  In these instances, hospitals increased several types of FTEs, including 
registered nurses, administrative staff, and other personnel not otherwise specified.  The addition 
of this type of staff is most consistent with responses related to mechanism 2: responding to 
HVBP incentives by improving quality (or the quality component of mechanism 3).  Hospitals 
have frequently reported that VBP programs require the hiring of additional administrative 
personnel to establish, monitor, and report on quality improvement initiatives.59,86  Additionally, 
RN FTEs are likely one of the most cost-efficient FTEs directly associated with quality of 
care.74,76  These positions take a significant investment, but are high priorities for hospital 
management.  The roles that experience increases in FTEs are roles that may support hospital-
specific initiatives, including quality improvement initiatives. Such programs may not be 
necessary for daily activities, but may be high priority investments for hospitals when additional 
funding, such as those achieved through HVBP, are available. 
The hypothesis that hospitals do not respond to HVBP incentives at all is not supported 
by my findings.  While the HVBP program may not have resulted in significant changes to 
patient outcomes, that is not equivalent to hospitals not responding to incentives at all.  However, 
the hypothesis that HVBP has not resulted in significant changes in patient outcomes because the 
incentive is too small requires further investigation.  Findings suggest that the hospitals likely to 
experience significant risk due to the proportion of revenue attributable to Medicare do not 
respond to incentives more than hospitals with low reliance.  In fact, hospitals with little 
dependence on Medicare funding seem to be the drivers of overall response seen among 
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hospitals.  This may be because hospitals highly dependent on Medicare funding respond more 
strongly to other larger Medicare payment incentives such as general fee-for-service, DRG 
payments, or other quality initiatives such as HRRP.  Hospitals with less reliance on Medicare 
may be more receptive to HVBP programming because they may be preparing for similar VBP 
initiatives with other payers.    
Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is its limited generalizability.  This study is conducted 
on hospitals in the state of Virginia and may not be generalizable outside of the state.  Hospitals 
within the state may have similar practice patterns and management styles as other nearby 
hospitals.  Staffing availability may also be similar for hospitals practicing within the state and 
facilities may compete for labor.  While the effects of the ebb and flow of staff availability is 
minimized through the panel fixed effects and regional and rurality controls, hospital 
management styles and staff availability may reduce generalizability.  Furthermore, the limited 
sample size may have resulted in inadequate power to identify moderating effects of Medicare 
reliance. 
Another limitation is the potential endogeneity of staffing and performance on HVBP 
metrics.  Nursing staffing ratios are a well-documented contributor to quality metric 
performance.78  To minimize this risk, HVBP adjustment was regressed on to the following year 
FTEs.  Additionally, prior year FTEs were controlled for, as future FTEs are likely dependent on 
past year FTEs.  While this does not eliminate the risk of endogeneity, it reduces it.   
Lastly, while this study aims to identify the type of response hospitals have to HVBP 
incentives, this study cannot ascribe reasons behind actions.  Additional qualitative analyses may 
assist is attributing the “why” behind hospital behaviors.  For instance, while hospitals clearly 
increase their administrative and other staff FTEs, possible explanations for this behavior are 
based on known practices consistent with the response, but actual reasons may vary by hospital.  
Conclusion 
While prior literature has not found meaningful changes in patient outcomes, hospitals 
are responding to HVBP payment incentives, regardless of the size of the incentive in proportion 
to their overall revenue.  Hospitals respond to HVBP penalties in a similar fashion as previous 
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payment cuts, by reducing staff.60  In fact, the magnitude of reductions are similar to those seen 
following the BBA.60  Most notably, the first staff to see reductions are expensive physicians and 
relatively inexpensive nursing aides, whose role reduces work burden on nurses, but cannot 
replace the function of other personnel, in essence, making them additional expenses to nursing 
FTEs.  However, the hospital response to HVBP incentives is more complex than simply 
reducing staff, as might be expected based on the additional complexity of the program itself.  
Hospitals receiving payment bumps from the HVBP program seem to respond to the program not 
just by reducing costs, but seem to aim to reduce costs while maintaining or improving quality of 
care.  This is demonstrated by the increase their FTEs for nursing, administrative and other staff 
following a bonus.  These may be positions that aid the hospital in achieving the quality metrics 
necessary to avoid future penalties and achieve additional bonuses.  These additions may occur 
when bonuses are achieved because while hospitals may have wanted to hire or increase these 
FTEs, they likely had competing priorities that were reduced when additional funding was 
realized.  While hospital responses to HVBP adjustments may not result in desired clinical 
outcomes, that does not mean that hospitals are not responding.  Contrary to this assumption, 
hospitals appear to respond to incentives in a manner consistent with staff changes that would 
both reduce costs and maintain or improve quality.  Future studies should investigate the 
pathway between identified internal responses to HVBP adjustments and clinical outcomes. 
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Table 2-1 Hospital characteristics by VBP adjustment category 
 Penalty Null Bonus 
 N= 93 N=298 N= 110 
  % % % 
Total FTEs (mean)    
Patient care 1,052.8 888.5 706.4 
Administration 307.8 228.9 228.2 
Physician 56.9 28.3 11.5 
Physician assistant/nurse practitioner 21.3 12.1 5.7 
Registered nurse 475.8 415.7 334.1 
Licensed practical nurse 29.4 27.4 22.2 
Nursing aide 85.4 89.1 89.8 
Other 865.0 782.9 615.2 
    
Medicare reliance 39.8 27.9 42.7 
Rural 29.0 37.9 30.0 
Region    
Central 18.3 19.1 15.5 
Eastern 14.0 23.2 33.6 
Northern 12.9 13.4 10.9 
Northwest 25.8 12.4 11.8 
Southwest 29.0 31.9 28.2 
Provider type    
IPPS 68.8 71.1 68.2 
Rural referral center (RRC) 7.5 3.7 0.9 
Medicare dependent hospital 3.2 9.7 3.6 
Sole community hospital (SCH) 10.8 12.4 22.7 
SCH/RRC 9.7 3.0 4.6 
Not-for-profit 80.7 78.2 65.5 
Health system 74.2 75.8 82.7 
Total patient days 51,394.2 51,115.4 43,828.3 
Prior year total margins 5.2 4.6 6.6 
Prior year operating margins 4.1 3.9 5.9 
HRRP adjustment (mean) 0.993 0.998 0.994 
Case mix index (mean) 1.5 1.4 1.5 
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Table 2-2 Adjusted regressions for HVBP penalties on FTEs (not moderated) 
 
Direct 
patient 
care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Penalty -0.054 -0.050 -0.348*** -0.169 -0.017 -0.048 -0.268*** -0.026 
 (0.043) (0.225) (0.116) (0.133) (0.042) (0.066) (0.097) (0.041) 
High Medicare reliance 0.021 0.010 0.618** 0.212*** -0.002 -0.011 0.132 -0.049 
 (0.053) (0.080) (0.263) (0.078) (0.044) (0.063) (0.091) (0.049) 
Rural -0.366** -0.525*** -1.951 -0.680** -0.486*** -0.153 -0.757*** -0.389*** 
 (0.156) (0.164) (1.904) (0.316) (0.151) (0.155) (0.224) (0.132) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.017 0.187 -1.688** -1.171** -0.179 0.072 0.091 0.158* 
 (0.082) (0.154) (0.744) (0.456) (0.174) (0.110) (0.173) (0.087) 
Northern -0.263** -0.006 -1.472*** -0.800*** -0.215*** -1.094*** -0.001 -0.083 
 (0.116) (0.206) (0.221) (0.219) (0.061) (0.340) (0.140) (0.150) 
Northwest 0.200*** 0.201 -0.787 0.164 0.163** -0.046 0.079 0.308*** 
 (0.070) (0.406) (0.765) (0.305) (0.066) (0.084) (0.166) (0.067) 
Southwest 0.121* 0.087 -1.046*** -0.080 0.011 0.082 -0.043 0.319*** 
 (0.063) (0.196) (0.371) (0.332) (0.063) (0.107) (0.246) (0.079) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)         
Rural referral center (RRC) 0.238 0.427 0.947 1.003*** 0.249 0.206 0.451 0.332** 
 (0.160) (0.436) (2.430) (0.385) (0.160) (0.179) (0.419) (0.134) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) -0.470 0.266 -6.862*** -3.753** -0.219 -0.395 -0.026 -0.158 
 (0.336) (0.268) (2.656) (1.545) (0.329) (0.265) (0.319) (0.284) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) -0.027 0.364 -0.480 -0.390** 0.015 -0.091 0.200 0.161 
 (0.142) (0.295) (0.435) (0.171) (0.131) (0.246) (0.175) (0.125) 
SCH and RRC 0.166 0.534*** 0.573 0.216 0.122 0.335** 0.286*** 0.355*** 
 (0.125) (0.176) (0.457) (0.321) (0.103) (0.135) (0.108) (0.106) 
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Not-for-profit 0.270*** 0.340 2.941*** 2.001*** 0.108 0.131 -0.024 0.354*** 
 (0.086) (0.208) (0.811) (0.439) (0.105) (0.118) (0.121) (0.103) 
Health system affiliation -0.031 0.043 2.956*** 0.549*** 0.024 -0.057 0.061 -0.016 
 (0.055) (0.228) (0.981) (0.101) (0.069) (0.056) (0.091) (0.069) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margin 0.408 1.758*** -13.379*** -8.109*** 0.778* -0.517 0.087 1.059*** 
 (0.384) (0.678) (3.758) (1.868) (0.460) (0.441) (0.545) (0.376) 
Case mix index 0.735*** 0.333 0.737 1.218** 0.627*** 0.697** 0.448** 0.638*** 
 (0.172) (0.369) (1.298) (0.615) (0.231) (0.277) (0.191) (0.180) 
Readmission penalty 0.022 -0.137 1.344* 0.324 -0.045 0.095 0.222*** -0.055 
 (0.062) (0.101) (0.710) (0.382) (0.072) (0.077) (0.069) (0.047) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Note: All models include panel fixed effects (not shown).  See appendix for full results. *p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 2-3 Adjusted regressions for HVBP bonuses on FTEs (not moderated) 
 
Direct 
patient 
care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Bonus 0.121 0.302*** 0.026 0.089 0.090** 0.102 0.026 0.192*** 
 (0.076) (0.078) (0.429) (0.274) (0.042) (0.062) (0.062) (0.054) 
High Medicare reliance 0.009 -0.021 0.594* 0.218** -0.012 -0.020 0.141 -0.065 
 (0.055) (0.078) (0.329) (0.107) (0.044) (0.061) (0.097) (0.045) 
Rural -0.351** -0.469*** -1.552 -0.646* -0.471*** -0.139 -0.811*** -0.359*** 
 (0.155) (0.137) (2.960) (0.357) (0.146) (0.148) (0.266) (0.117) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.014 0.145 -1.579** -1.157** -0.187 0.061 0.134 0.141* 
 (0.078) (0.137) (0.803) (0.467) (0.169) (0.104) (0.171) (0.082) 
Northern -0.275** -0.048 -1.823*** -0.882*** -0.227*** -1.101*** -0.011 -0.099 
 (0.112) (0.189) (0.324) (0.214) (0.063) (0.330) (0.161) (0.139) 
Northwest 0.191*** 0.191 -0.545 0.169 0.163** -0.055 0.041 0.307*** 
 (0.064) (0.356) (0.976) (0.337) (0.065) (0.078) (0.200) (0.066) 
Southwest 0.123* 0.073 -1.198** -0.061 0.010 0.076 -0.029 0.313*** 
 (0.064) (0.189) (0.500) (0.352) (0.063) (0.103) (0.261) (0.077) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)         
Rural referral center (RRC) 0.229 0.403 1.496 0.992** 0.241 0.199 0.365 0.323** 
 (0.162) (0.410) (3.845) (0.417) (0.159) (0.182) (0.476) (0.133) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) -0.481 0.266 -6.829* -3.907** -0.221 -0.398 0.010 -0.159 
 (0.344) (0.247) (3.873) (1.687) (0.331) (0.263) (0.316) (0.289) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) -0.056 0.256 -0.606 -0.429** -0.012 -0.112 0.269 0.090 
 (0.145) (0.233) (0.660) (0.212) (0.125) (0.233) (0.198) (0.113) 
SCH and RRC 0.161 0.517*** 0.603 0.166 0.123 0.317** 0.247* 0.347*** 
 (0.116) (0.125) (0.430) (0.319) (0.094) (0.132) (0.132) (0.084) 
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Not-for-profit 0.287*** 0.406** 3.337*** 2.034*** 0.131 0.149 -0.072 0.395*** 
 (0.085) (0.188) (1.119) (0.428) (0.103) (0.117) (0.135) (0.100) 
Health system affiliation -0.036 0.039 3.002* 0.560*** 0.027 -0.056 0.006 -0.012 
 (0.051) (0.177) (1.725) (0.107) (0.065) (0.052) (0.081) (0.060) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margin 0.323 1.616*** -12.548*** -8.358*** 0.749 -0.542 0.320 0.967** 
 (0.390) (0.619) (4.329) (2.151) (0.470) (0.441) (0.535) (0.387) 
Case mix index 0.707*** 0.331 -0.341 1.126* 0.627*** 0.682*** 0.457** 0.639*** 
 (0.166) (0.358) (1.367) (0.654) (0.220) (0.259) (0.191) (0.178) 
Readmission penalty 0.025 -0.136 1.183 0.343 -0.032 0.087 0.193*** -0.038 
 (0.055) (0.084) (0.763) (0.400) (0.065) (0.079) (0.071) (0.035) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Note: All models include panel fixed effects (not shown).  See appendix  for full results. *p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Chapter 3 Unintended Consequences of Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing: Charity Care  
ABSTRACT 
Background:  The Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program was implemented in 
2013 and provides hospitals with bonuses or penalties based on hospital performance on quality 
metrics compared to national benchmarks.  Such payment incentives could lead to unintended 
consequences such as reductions in charity care as hospitals aim to minimize losses.  These 
reductions could come in two forms 1) reductions among higher income patients, if hospitals 
protect against losses while maintaining community benefits; or 2) reduction among lower 
income patients, if hospitals select healthier, less resource-intensive patients. This study aims to 
evaluate charity care provision following HVBP to identify unintended consequences for low 
income patients. 
Methods: Data come from the Virginia Health Information Hospital Cost reports for 2013 to 
2017 linked to CMS Impact Files for hospital-specific HVBP adjustments.  Charity care is 
measured as net charity care costs (in 2017 dollars), cost of charity care provided to patients 
under 100% FPL, cost of charity care provided to patients between 100-200% FPL and total 
uncompensated care costs.  Using a regression discontinuity model, I estimate the effect of 
HVBP incentives on hospitals just above and just below the HVBP bonus threshold.  A 
secondary analysis is conducted using a generalized linear model to identify any moderating 
effect of local uninsured rates.    
Results: Hospitals receiving a bonus provided $16 million less in charity care on average (p< 
0.01).  The largest proportion of the reduction was among patients with incomes below 100% 
FPL ($12 million, p= 0.04).  Charity care among those in the higher income bracket was 
somewhat more stable.  Hospitals receiving penalties tended to reduce their charity care among 
the higher income bracket first, unless the hospital was in an area with high uninsured rates, in 
which case all levels of charity care were decreased. 
Discussion: Findings suggest that hospitals successful in the HVBP program are learning to 
cream-skim healthier, wealthier patients in order to achieve bonus payments.  However, hospitals 
performing poorly in the HVBP program are also reducing charity care, but among less needy 
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individuals first.  This discrepancy may be a result of variance in hospital missions, especially in 
terms of tax status, as for-profit hospitals are more likely to receive a bonus than not-for-profit 
hospitals.  It may also be a result goal gradient cognitive bias that suggests hospitals starting 
from a lower baseline performance may not  believe they can achieve a bonus, even though 
cream skimming, so instead may respond to incentives simply by avoiding additional costs.
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INTRODUCTION 
As described in chapter 2, evaluating the Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 
Program (HVBP) requires a broader focus than patient clinical outcomes alone.  While literature 
to date has largely concluded that HVBP has little effect on patient outcomes, that does not mean 
that the program has no effect overall.7,50,51,53  Chapter 2 shifted the focus of analysis from 
patient outcomes to internal hospital responses.  This chapter broadens that lens to include 
unintended consequences of the HVBP program, specifically changes in charity care provision. 
The HVBP program was not established in a vacuum, but instead was one part of the 
larger Affordable Care Act (ACA) health reform initiative.  As originally written, the ACA 
required states to increase Medicaid eligibility to 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL).100  
This provision, though seemingly unrelated to HVBP, provided hospitals with budgetary stability 
by decreasing their uncompensated care costs associated with the uninsured.  When paired with 
Medicaid expansion, the uncertainty inherent in a pay-for-performance program such as HVBP 
is minimized by ensuring a new funding source through Medicaid.  However, in 2012, before 
states were set to expand, the Supreme Court ruled that the Medicaid expansion be voluntary, 
allowing states to locally decide the eligibility of their Medicaid programs.101 
As a result of the Supreme Court ruling, many states chose to forego Medicaid expansion.  
As of January 2019, 33 states and the District of Columbia had chosen to expand, while 17 states 
had not.102  Hospitals in states that did not expand lacked the financial stability associated with 
increased Medicaid revenue and instead mainly experienced the ACA policies that resulted in 
greater financial uncertainty, such as HVBP.  Indeed, as might be expected, Medicaid expansion 
has led to lower uncompensated care costs for hospitals, with estimates ranging from -21% to -
41% in expansion states.103,104  However, for hospitals in states like Virginia that did not expand 
Medicaid until 2019, uncompensated care needs remained high in the years following HVBP 
implementation and for a broader range of income levels.103  The continued need for charity care 
in non-expansion states contributes to the additional financial burden experienced by these 
hospitals, as demonstrated by the higher levels of hospital closures and lower revenues in non-
expansion states, especially in rural areas and areas with high rates of uninsured.105,106  By 
uncoupling the revenue support of Medicaid expansion from the uncertainty of the HVBP 
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program, states that have not expanded Medicaid can more precisely measure the effect of the 
HVBP program on uncompensated care.   
Hospitals could respond to HVBP incentives in one of three ways: 1) hospitals under 
financial pressure could reduce their provision of charity care, starting with the least needy to 
minimize losses while protecting the most vulnerable members of the community; 2) hospitals 
could aim to achieve bonuses and avoid reductions by cherry-picking healthier patients; and 3) 
hospitals could make no changes to their provision of charity care.   
It may be expected that hospitals under financial pressure or in times of uncertainty 
would reduce their provision of charity care.  Charity care is the provision of care for which 
hospitals expect no reimbursement, so a struggling hospital may very well forego such 
community services and instead focus on profitable services.  In fact, this response has been seen 
following previous payment reductions or in areas with high financial pressure.107–109  However, 
hospitals are unlikely to eliminate this type of care entirely.  Hospital are required to stabilize 
patients regardless of ability to pay as part of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA) of 1986.  Furthermore, non-profit hospitals have community benefit standards they 
are required to meet.  Therefore, since hospitals cannot eliminate these expenses, they may 
choose to reduce them strategically.  A hospital wanting to reduce their financial vulnerability 
while continuing to serve their community may, for instance, choose to reduce their charity care 
for patients in higher income brackets while focusing their community service contributions on 
the most needy.110  This would be an efficient use of their charity care resources in terms of 
serving the community need while minimizing their losses.   
Hospitals could also respond to HVBP incentives by aiming to achieve bonuses and 
reduce risk of penalties through selecting healthier, less resource intensive patients.  This 
practice, referred to as cream-skimming or cherry-picking, is a well-documented phenomenon in 
which hospitals reduce admittance of more complex patients to artificially elevate performance 
on quality metrics, such as those in the HVBP program.67,111,112  Like the first potential response, 
this practice would also result in reduction in charity care.  However, it would most likely result 
in greater reduction in care among the poorest community members rather than those in higher 
income brackets.113  Uninsured, very low income patients tend to have more complex medical 
and social needs, and are therefore, more resource intensive, requiring additional resources for 
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these needs to avoid poor outcomes.105,113,114  Therefore, it can be expected that if hospitals 
respond to incentives through cream-skimming, it will result in greater reductions in care among 
the lowest income individuals, and may occur in hospitals even if they are not experiencing as 
high financial stressors. 
Lastly, it is feasible that hospitals will not change their charity care provision as a result 
of HVBP.  In fact, the response may differ by region as a result of need.  One study found that in 
in areas where the market had high demand for charity care, hospitals continued to provide these 
services at high rates, regardless of financial pressure.115   
The Commonwealth of Virginia is uniquely situated to examine the question of the effect 
of HVBP on uncompensated care for a variety of reasons.  Not only did it not expand Medicaid 
until 2019, which reduces noise in analyses of HBVP payment incentives, but it also has a 
mandatory reporting system in which all hospitals in the state must provide annual cost reports 
that detail charity care expenses at a variety of income levels.116  This allows differentiation 
between hospitals that are reducing all charity care, and strategic decisions by hospitals to reduce 
charity care among those with higher or lower income.  While findings may be focused on 
Virginia hospitals, performance on HVBP measures has been roughly average in Virginia 
hospitals compared to nationwide performance, and uninsured rates are similar to those in other 
states.117,118  Therefore, while findings will be specific to Virginia, conclusions may be 
informative when considering other non-expansion states.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Following the conceptual framework model referenced in chapter 2, this study uses a 
modified version of the Damberg et al. RAND Corporation framework for evaluating VBP 
programs.  The RAND framework addresses the various pathways in which a VBP program may 
produce internal provider responses, intermediate responses such as unintended consequences, 
and long-term outcomes, which tend to be the focus of other literature on HVBP.  The original 
RAND framework is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 78 
Paper 3 of 3: Unintended Consequences of Hospital Value-Based Purchasing: Charity Care   
 
Figure 3-1. RAND Value-Based Purchasing Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Chapter 2 aims to evaluate the HVBP program by identifying internal responses to the 
HVBP incentives, specifically changes in staffing.  This chapter shifts the focus from responses 
to the program to the intermediate effects portion of the framework to identify possible 
unintended consequences of the HVBP program.  The modified framework (shown in Figure 2), 
describes how the program design, HVBP responses and external factors may lead to unintended 
consequences.  In this case, changes in charity care, while an inadvertent effect of the program, 
may occur as a result of the payment system. 
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Figure 3-2. Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program Conceptual Framework (modified from RAND VBP 
framework) 
  
 
Note: Concepts in grey not included in study 
Using an approach adapted from RAND, the unintended consequence of changes in 
charity care are influenced by internal hospital responses, such as changes in admitting practices, 
more stringent requirements for patients to qualify for charity care, or being more aggressive in 
collecting bad debt.111,115  Evidence from numerous other payment system policies, such as the 
initiation of the inpatient prospective payment system, have found that hospitals frequently 
reduce charity care when under financial pressure, or will cherry pick healthier patients when 
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resource efficiency or performance on quality measures will lead to higher profit 
margins.111,112,119  Unintended consequences, such as reductions in charity care, are also 
influenced by hospital characteristics and external factors, such as other programs that may 
provide financial stability or increase uncertainty and uninsured rates in the local hospital area.   
Hypotheses 
As described above, in terms of charity care provisions, hospitals may respond to HVBP 
incentives by either reducing their charity care or by not responding at all.  Hospitals reducing 
their charity care may do so for different reason, with somewhat different results.  First, hospitals 
could reduce their charity care out of financial necessity (such as due to receipt of penalties), but 
aim to minimize harm to their community through strategically eliminating or reducing charity 
care to the least needy individuals in their community – those with the highest income.  Hospitals 
could also respond to incentives through cream-skimming, or selecting healthier, less resource 
intensive patients for admissions.  While this response would also result in reductions to charity 
care, it would take a slightly different turn.  As opposed to being inextricably linked to financial 
instability, like reductions based on the first option would be, cream-skimming may occur even 
among hospitals receiving bonuses (or under less financial pressure), and reductions in charity 
care would be targeted at lower income individuals likely to be the most complex.  However, it is 
also feasible that hospitals do not reduce their charity care at all.  As prior studies have found, 
local uninsured rate may be a key factor in whether or not hospitals reduce their charity care, 
since hospitals with high uninsured rates have been found to maintain levels of charity care 
despite poor financial well-being.110,120  This study aims to identify hospital response by 
evaluating these competing hypotheses.   
H1: Hospitals will respond to HVBP incentives by reducing charity care provision. 
 H1a: Hospitals will minimize harm to community members by selectively reducing 
charity care among patients with highest income levels. 
H1b: Hospitals will cream-skim to achieve higher bonus payments, reducing charity care 
among the patients with the lowest income levels. 
H2: Hospitals will not change their provision of charity care. 
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H2a: Local uninsured rates will moderate the effect of HVBP penalties on charity care 
provision. 
METHODS 
Data 
 Data come from the Virginia Health Information (VHI) Hospital Detail Reports, years 
2013-2017.  HVBP incentives were first implemented in 2013.  Virginia mandates that cost 
reports be submitted annually by all private hospitals in the state.  This data is then validated 
with intermittent auditing.  The VHI Hospital Detail Reports are especially unique data in that 
hospitals distinguish between charity care provided to patients below 100% FPL, between 100% 
and 200% FPL and above 200% FPL.  This level of precision is not available through national 
databases including the Hospital Cost Report Information System (HCRIS).  VHI data is linked 
to CMS Impact Files for archived hospital-specific HVBP adjustments.  Uninsurance rates are 
estimated using 5-year averages as provided by the American Community Survey. Total sample 
size is 354 observations of 74 unique hospitals.  All HVBP-eligible hospitals are included.   
Charity care 
 Charity care is defined as care provided for which no payment is expected or received.  
Hospitals report the amount of charity care provided based on the patient’s gross household 
income as a percentage of the federal poverty level (FPL).  Charity care provided to patients 
under 100% FPL is estimated separately, as is charity care for patients with incomes between 
100% and 200% FPL.  Net charity care is also estimated as the sum of all charity care provided 
to patients of all income levels.  Finally, since hospitals may include charity care as bad debt, or 
care provided for which payment was expected but not received, a fourth variable is constructed 
to include all uncompensated care, defined as net charity care plus bad debt.  VHI reports charity 
care reductions as charges, which are converted to expenses using the American Hospital 
Association method for calculating cost-to-charge ratios.121  All expenses are adjusted to 2017 
dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) medical component.122 
Uninsurance rate   
 County-level American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates for years 2012-2017 
are linked to the VHI data for the same years.  In Virginia, cities have their own FIPS codes, and 
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are considered adjacent to, but distinct from the counties within which they reside.  As opposed 
to including FIPS or county codes, VHI data indicates hospital location by the city or township 
listed on the hospital address.  While many larger cities are included in ACS as counties, some 
smaller townships in the VHI data are not included in ACS data.  Where there are discrepancies 
or a town or city is not present in ACS, the United States Census Bureau QuickFacts Database is 
used to determine the surrounding county of the hospital’s township.  The uninsured rate for 
civilian non-institutionalized residents of all ages and incomes is included in the sample.  While 
children’s hospitals are excluded from HVBP eligibility, Virginia only has 2 pediatric-specific 
hospitals.  Therefore, in the majority of the state, children frequent general acute hospitals and 
would contribute to uncompensated care if uninsured or underinsured.  Tertiles were calculated 
to determine “high” levels of uninsurance in a local area.  Areas with an uninsured rate of at least 
14.4% were in the top third of the Commonwealth, and therefore considered areas of high 
uninsurance. 
HVBP adjustment 
The HVBP program is budget neutral, meaning that for some hospitals to receive 
bonuses, others must receive penalties.  The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
reports annual HVBP adjustments as a percentage change to the hospital’s annual inpatient MS-
DRG market basket update.  A hospital receiving no change to their update based on 
performance would receive an adjustment of 1.000, or 100% of normal payment.  Hospital 
earning a bonus receive an adjustment greater than 1.000, whereas a hospital receiving a cut 
would see an adjustment less than 1.000.  For the regression discontinuity model, this adjustment 
is re-centered around zero as a null adjustment.  Binary indicators for having received a penalty 
or otherwise and a bonus or otherwise are also created.  It should be noted that hospitals received 
notice of their HVBP adjust in the year prior to implementation.  In other words, in 2012, 
hospitals were alerted of their adjustment that would be implemented in 2013.  Therefore, 
hospitals have time to react to notices of upcoming adjustments. 
Covariates 
Models estimating the moderating effect of high uninsured rates on charity care are 
adjusted for a number of hospital characteristics that may influence a hospital’s response to 
HVBP incentives.  For instance, financial stability as measured by the prior year’s total margin is 
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included as well as the proportion of revenue attributable to Medicare.  Hospital volume is 
measured through the number of inpatient days per year.  While individual hospital size may 
contribute to quantity of resources, system affiliation, even for smaller hospitals may provide 
financial stability and reduce negative effects of HVBP on charity care.  For this reason, system 
affiliation is included as a control variable.  Finally, hospital ownership may have a significant 
impact on charity care.  Not-for-profit hospitals may be motivated by different incentives than 
for-profit hospitals.  For instance, not-for-profit hospitals have charity care requirements to 
maintain their tax-exempt status and meet certificate of public need criteria if wanting to expand 
services.123,124  Charity care may also be a part of their organization’s mission.  For-profit 
hospitals may not inherently value charity care the same way as not-for-profit hospitals, and 
therefore, could be more inclined to reduce it in times of financial instability, to avoid penalties, 
or to achieve bonuses. 
Regional variation is another key factor that may influence hospital resources and culture.  
Virginia is a large state geographically, with mountains, ports, urban areas and rural areas.  Five 
major regions as defined by the Virginia Department of Health are included to account for 
geographic variation in setting.  To further adjust for the barriers associated with rural settings, 
rurality, as defined by CMS for IPPS payment purposes is also included. 
Statistical analysis  
 The Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program exogenously assesses 
adjustments based on hospital performance compared to national benchmarks, with a sharp 
cutoff between hospitals who receive a penalty compared to those receiving a bonus.  This 
design feature enables use of the regression discontinuity (RD) model.  Because the HVBP 
program is budget-neutral, hospitals behaving in the exact same way and achieving exact same 
scores on performance measures over several years may be assigned differing adjustments based 
on the performance of other hospitals any given year.  While hospitals have some influence on 
generally where they fall on their performance measures, they cannot determine their precise 
assignment around a null adjustment. RD models reduce endogeneity associated with unobserved 
factors by narrowly focusing on the difference between hospitals on either side of the threshold, 
which are assumed to differ only by their arbitrary threshold (appendix 3-1 provides hospital 
characteristics within the bandwidth surrounding the cutoff).   
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Using a the Lee and Lemieux (2010)125 and the Jacob et al (2012)126 approaches to RD model 
specification, my model is specified as follows:  
ϒi = α + β1(χi – x0) + β2(ϕi) + β3(χi – x0)* ϕi + 𝑢i 
Where ϒi is the amount of charity care provided in 2017 dollars, χi is the VBP score received by 
the hospital as demonstrated by the percent adjustment, and x0 is the threshold at which the 
adjustment changes from a penalty to a bonus (1.0). “Treatment” defined has having received a 
bonus, is indicated by ϕi.  The error term is represented by 𝑢i. 
RD models estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE), comparing hospitals just 
above to just below the cutoff.  If there is a discontinuous effect, meaning that hospitals just 
above the null threshold behave differently than hospitals just below the threshold, then it can be 
concluded that the HVBP adjustment is influencing the behavior of otherwise similar hospitals in 
terms of charity care provision.  RD models may be sensitive to functional form, appearing to 
have discontinuous jumps when in fact the function is mis-specified.  To address these concerns, 
polynomials up through the 4th order were tested to ensure appropriate form.  Fourth order was 
selected as the best fit model.  Bandwidth for the model is selected using mean squared error 
(MSE)-optimal choice using the CCT method.127  Models are estimated using a local linear 
regression approach with rectangular kernel weights.  Sensitivity analyses around the bandwidth 
were conducted as were analyses using 2-year cross-sections to ensure appropriate temporal 
assumptions.  In this analysis, VBP adjustment in year 1 was measured against its effect on 
charity care in year 2, to ensure hospitals had adequate time to make decisions.  All sensitivity 
analyses are described in the Sensitivity Analyses section.  Finally, in addition to net charity care, 
models were estimated to identify the effect of HVBP on charity care for patients under 100% 
FPL, between 100-200% FPL and all uncompensated care, which includes bad debt. 
A second model is estimated to identify the extent to which hospital charity care differs 
by local uninsured rate.  In order to include the moderating factor, a generalized linear model 
(GLM) is estimated, using log-transformed charity care expenses to account for skewed costs. 
Six observations associated with 4 distinct hospitals were excluded due to negative charity care 
expenses.  High uninsured rate is interacted with a dummy indicating a hospital having received 
an HVBP bonus.  Four models are estimated to measure the effect on charity care below 100% 
FPL, between 100-200% FPL, net charity care, and uncompensated care costs.  All models 
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include year fixed effects with standard errors clustered by facility to ensure errors are corrected 
for collinearity of multiple observations of the same hospitals.  Models are adjusted for region, 
rurality, prior year total margin, system affiliation, total number of patient days, ownership, CMS 
provider type, and Medicare Hospital Readmissions and Reduction Program (HRRP) payment 
adjustment.  The secondary model specification is as follows: 
Ln[net charity care]i = α + β1(VBP penalty)i + β2(uninsured rate) i + β3(VBP penalty * 
uninsured rate) it-1 + β4(rurality)it  + β5(region)i  + β6(non-profit)i + β 7(system) i  + 
β8(patient days)i  + β9(prior year total margin)i + β10(case mix index)i + β11(HRRP 
adjustment)i + β12(high Medicare reliance)i + β13(CMS provider type)i + η(year) + 𝑢it 
Similar to the primary model, a sensitivity model using a cross-section of 2-year panels was 
estimated.  This was again intended to ensure adequate time for hospitals to make policy 
decisions.  Additional sensitivity analyses included exclusion of safety net facilities.  Sensitivity 
analyses are described below in the Sensitivity Analyses section 
Sensitivity Analyses 
A variety of analyses were conducted to ensure the RD model was appropriately applied. 
One way to check appropriate application of the RD model is to vary the bandwidth measured to 
identify discontinuity.  The main bandwidth of 0.001 was selected using the CCT method for 
MSE-optimal choice.  Cross-validation was also used to determine best bandwidth for the 
discontinuity measurement.  In addition to bandwidth, the assumption of the sharp threshold 
should be assessed.  The main model estimates a sharp RD, meaning that the threshold of a null 
adjustment is absolute, and all hospitals above the threshold receive a bonus and all hospitals 
below the threshold receive a penalty.  While this is factual, the size of the penalty or bonus 
immediately surrounding the threshold may be very slight and differ based on the proportion of 
the hospital’s pay attributable to Medicare.  A fuzzy RD model allows for a less precise cutoff.  
Therefore, with potentially slight “treatment effects, a fuzzy RD model was estimated as an 
additional sensitivity analysis.  With a fuzzy RD, the estimates from the sharp RD model, the 
expected charity care, is used as an instrument.  Lastly, as described above, while the primary 
model uses cross-sectional data, an additional analysis was conducted using a cross-section of 2-
year panels.  This was to ensure that hospitals had time to make decisions on admitting patients 
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requiring charity care.  Because estimates were similar in both models, the simpler model, the 
cross-sectional model, was selected as the main model. 
Unlike RD models which compare hospitals within bandwidths to each other, GLM 
models or OLS models are potentially more sensitive to outliers within the dataset.  Therefore, in 
order to test the robustness of results for the secondary model, hospitals with unique charity care 
expectations are excluded.  In Virginia, two hospital systems – the University of Virginia (UVA) 
and Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) – provide roughly 20% of all uncompensated 
care in the state.  These hospitals are the main safety net providers and receive disproportionate 
share hospital (DSH) payments to compensate them for the high volume of charity care they 
provide.  Despite desire to reduce charity care, these hospitals may be constrained in their ability 
to responds to incentives.  In order to ensure that UVA and VCU are not the only drivers of 
findings, these two hospitals are excluded in a sensitivity analysis. 
For all models, charity care and uncompensated care expenses were estimated both as 
costs and as percentages of total operating expenses.  This analysis is intended to ensure size of 
hospital and therefore costs is not driving findings. 
As described for the main model, a cross-section of 2-year panels was used to estimate 
effects of HVBP incentives in an additional sensitivity analysis.  This was to ensure that 
hospitals had adequate time to respond to impending incentives. 
RESULTS 
In total, HVBP eligible hospitals provided $3.84 billion in charity care during the study 
period, just over half of which ($1.97 billion) was provided to community members with 
incomes under 100% FPL.  When including bad debt to account for all uncompensated care 
costs, hospitals provided more than $20 billion in care over the study period.  On average, this 
accounted for 6.3% of operating expenses. 
All hospitals in Virginia provide at least some level of charity care every year, ranging 
from $111,990 in a rural, for-profit, sole community hospital (2017) to $110 million at the state’s 
largest safety net hospital (2014).  Over the study period, more than half of all charity care was 
provided to patients under 100% FPL (51.3%).  On average, the uninsured rate was similar in 
areas surrounding hospitals receiving a penalty (12.7%) and areas surrounding hospitals 
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receiving bonuses (12.4%).  Hospitals receiving penalties (or below the HVBP null threshold) 
have significantly greater charity care expenses compared to hospitals receiving the bonus 
incentive (see table 1).  However, while charity care expenses for patients with incomes under 
100% FPL is dramatically lower among hospitals receiving a bonus than a penalty ($1.6 million 
vs $11.4 million), charity care for patients with a somewhat higher income level was roughly 
similar between hospitals receiving bonuses and penalties.  In other words, hospitals receiving a 
bonus provide less charity care for very low income patients compared to other hospitals, but 
similar levels of charity care for patients of somewhat higher income levels.   
Findings from the regression discontinuity model suggest that hospitals receiving bonuses 
reduce their charity care, especially among the very poor (less than 100% FPL).  Figure 1 
illustrates the discontinuous nature in which hospitals provide charity care.  The x-axis shows the 
HVBP adjustment, with the bonus or penalty applied at the 0% null adjustment threshold.  The y-
axis is the amount of charity care provided.  As demonstrated in Figure 1, hospitals above the 
cutoff (or receiving a bonus) are much more aggregated or similar in their response to one 
another.  Hospitals to the left of the cutoff (those receiving penalties) are much less homogenous 
in their response to HVBP incentives.  There is a considerable discontinuous jump in charity care 
when crossing the 0% threshold, as seen in Figure 1 panels A and B, and D, representing total 
charity care, charity care for patients with incomes under 100% FPL, and total uncompensated 
care.  In other words, hospitals reduce their charity care, especially their charity care among the 
very poor.  However, charity care for people of higher incomes (panel C) is largely consistent 
regardless of relation to the threshold.  A small discontinuous decline may be present, but the 
majority of the overall decrease is among the charity care for the neediest individuals.  In 
addition, it is evident that hospitals receiving penalties respond in much less uniform fashion 
than those receiving bonuses.  
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Figure 3-3 Regression discontinuity, effect of HVBP incentives on charity care 
 
Hospitals receiving bonuses provided on average $16 million less in net charity care 
compared to hospitals just below the HVBP adjustment threshold (p< 0.01).  The majority of this 
decline was among charity care provided to patients with incomes below 100% FPL ($12 
million, p=0.04).  An additional $5.7 million in reductions to charity care were for patients 
between 100%-200% FPL (p=0.03) (see table 3-2).  Findings were robust to changes in 
bandwidth and exclusion of the 2 safety net hospitals.  The only exception to this is the model 
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estimating the provision of charity care for patients under 100% FPL.  In this model, excluding 
the two main safety providers resulted in a change of significance from a p-value of 0.04 in the 
main model to 0.06 in the sensitivity analysis, although directionality remained constant (see 
appendix 3-2).  It is probable that effects remain, however, removing the 2 hospitals (a total of 10 
observations) may have reduced power of the analysis to underestimate actual effects.  Results, 
however, were not all robust to a change in measurement unit.  When assessing charity care 
expenses as a percent of percentage of total operating expenses, significant findings for two 
types of charity care remain.  Overall charity care is reduced by about 1% with borderline 
statistical significance (p=0.07).  Additionally, the only evident discontinuous jump that remains 
graphically is the provision of charity care among patients with incomes under 100% FPL.  In 
this model, I find that hospitals just above the threshold decrease charity care for these patients, 
but as hospitals receive larger and larger bonuses, they tend to increase their charity care again to 
levels equivalent to those below the threshold (see appendix 3-3).  
The secondary analysis incorporates the effect of local uninsured rate into the analysis.  
As opposed to the RD model that compares hospitals just above the cutoff to those just below the 
cutoff capitalizing on exogenous assignment, the GLM regression controls for specific defined 
characteristics, including local uninsured rate.  With this analysis, consistent with findings from 
the RD analysis, the direction (although not statistically significant) of the relationship between 
bonuses and charity care is negative in all cases except charity care for patients with higher 
incomes (100%-200% FPL) (see table 3-3).  Hospitals receiving penalties, however, are 
associated with reductions in charity care exactly among this population, the higher income 
bracket (-0.37, p < 0.01) along with total uncompensated care (-0.06, p=0.05) (see table 3-4).  
When accounting for any moderating effect of local uninsured rate, hospitals receiving bonuses 
have little response (see table 3-5).  However, hospitals in areas with high uninsured rates have 
significantly lower charity care provision and uncompensated care in all categories when 
receiving a penalty (see table 3-6).  Results are robust to use of panel data, however, statistical 
significance decreases as may be expected due to reductions in power in panel analyses when 
compared to cross-sectional analyses. Models excluding the two major safety net providers in the 
state continue to demonstrate that hospitals located in areas with high uninsurance rates reduce 
net charity care when a bonus is received  
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DISCUSSION 
I find evidence that hospitals both respond to HVBP incentives in a manner consistent 
with cream-skimming behaviors and with behaviors aimed at minimizing financial pressure 
while maintaining community benefits.  While these behaviors may seem at odds with one 
another, hospitals in different financial positions may make different budgetary decisions.  Both 
hypotheses are supported. 
Hospitals receiving bonuses tend to demonstrate a learned behavior of cream-skimming, 
as evident by their greater reductions in charity care targeted at patients most likely to have the 
highest complexity levels: the lowest income patients.  Charity care among the less complex 
patients, those with higher income, stays relatively stable regardless of the HVBP incentive 
received.  This finding is consistent with hospitals learning to perfect cream-skimming behaviors 
in order to achieve HVBP bonuses in future years.  At the same time, there was some evidence, 
although not causal evidence, that hospitals receiving penalties in areas with high uninsured rates 
are seen to have reductions in charity care among members with the highest incomes first.  These 
hospitals, by definition under financial pressure due to receipt of penalties and local uninsured 
rates, may be responding in a manner consistent with responsibility to maintain community 
benefit.  One possible explanation for the differences between these behaviors may be related to 
the ownership of the hospitals that tend to receive penalties compared to those that receive 
bonuses. 
Both in prior literature, and in the study sample, for-profit hospitals have been found to 
be more likely to receive bonuses for HVBP than not-for profit hospitals.  The inherent 
differences between these two types of institutions may explain why both hypotheses, cream-
skimming and community responsibility, may both occur at the same time.110  HVBP incentives 
may exaggerate the pre-disposition of hospitals to behave in one manner or another. For profit 
hospitals tend to be more prone to cream-skimming behaviors, while not-for profits, and 
especially safety net hospitals may continue to provide charity care at the expense of potentially 
continuing to perform poorly on HVBP measures.110,120  In Virginia, not-for-profit hospitals have 
a base requirement for charity care provision in order to comply with certificate of public need 
regulations.123,124  For-profit hospitals do not have those constraints.123  However, even in those 
cases, hospitals could choose to reduce in the higher income brackets first.   
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Cream-skimming is a well-documented phenomenon in which hospitals may attempt to 
avoid admitting potentially costly patients in systems in which payment is not directly tied to 
cost of care.111,112,128  This enables hospitals to maximize profit by reducing risk and costs.  
Under the HVBP program, the potential cost of the low-income patient is two-fold.  First, there 
are guaranteed costs associated with providing charity care, care for which, by definition, 
hospitals do not expect to recoup costs.  Second, low-income patients tend to have more complex 
health needs, which may prove detrimental for hospital HVBP scores.129  In the HVBP program, 
hospitals receive scores for patient outcomes, which may be harder to achieve if patients are on 
the more complex side of the risk-adjusted strata. Additionally, in recent years, hospitals receive 
scores for efficient use of resources.  If a hospital’s patient load tends to be more complex, it 
likely will take additional resources to achieve similar patient outcomes.  For these reasons, more 
complex patients pose a significant threat to hospital financial well-being under the HBVP 
program.  Patients in the lowest income brackets are therefore likely to be riskiest.111  At the 
same time, many hospitals, especially not-for-profit hospitals may see charity care as a central 
part of their mission.110  For these hospitals, we see charity care reduced during times of financial 
pressure, with reductions targeted at the least needy in the community.  It should be noted, 
however, that the evidence supporting findings of cream-skimming are more suggestive of a 
causal relationship due to the RD model, meaning that evidence is stronger that hospitals 
receiving bonuses engage in cream-skimming activities.  Evidence that hospitals receiving 
penalties aim to maintain community benefits is suggestive of correlation and causal inferences 
should not be made. 
I also find evidence through the RD models that hospitals respond in a less consistent 
manner when receiving a penalty rather than a bonus.  This may be an indication that the 
cognitive bias of goal gradient is present.  Research on provider incentives suggests that 
providers who are further from a target quality threshold may not believe that they can achieve a 
desired effects, and so are less likely to respond to incentives than providers beginning from 
higher performance scores.1  Therefore, hospitals receiving bonuses may be more likely to 
respond directly to incentives, since they believe they can achieve them, while hospitals 
receiving penalties may not have confidence that changing behavior will result in avoiding a 
penalty or achieving a bonus.  This is consistent with the finding that these hospitals respond 
instead to community responsibility rather than the HVBP incentive directly.  
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Evidence supports the hypotheses that the HVBP policy has resulted in the unintended 
consequence of reduction in charity care.  Policy-makers aiming to implement similar programs 
or adjust the current HVBP program may consider incorporating social determinants of health 
into risk-adjustment policies.  While the national debate about how to execute such a risk-
adjustment has been ongoing, findings such as those in this study support the need find a viable 
method of doing so.  By including social determinants of health into a risk-adjustment formula, 
hospitals providing care to low-income, resource intensive patients will not be penalized twice 
for their care (once through financial losses in the form of charity care, and a second through 
penalties associated with HVBP payment adjustments).  Inclusion of these factor would decrease 
the incentives for hospitals to avoid caring for the neediest in the community, and promote the 
intended goals of programs such as HVBP: to improve the quality and efficiency of care for the 
population. 
Limitations 
Data in this study are limited to 2017 and earlier.  With the expansion of Medicaid in 
Virginia, it may be expected that hospitals will modify their assessment of which patients pose 
the greatest risk to their financial well-being.  Patients under 100% FPL will largely be eligible 
for Medicaid beginning in 2019.  Therefore, these patients, while previously costly and 
medically complex, may become less costly and less complex with new health coverage for 
paying inpatient bills, but also covering outpatient services to improve management of chronic 
conditions. Therefore, in future years, hospitals may find that the 100%-200% FPL income 
bracket becomes higher risk than the very low-income, as more of these patients may remain 
uninsured or less able to access health resources.  Future research should assess the extent to 
which hospitals shift their patient-mix in terms of charity care. 
Another limitation of the study is potential complications with temporality.  Hospitals 
receive notice of their HVBP adjustment amount the year prior to implementation.  The Virginia 
Hospitals and Healthcare Association has reported (internally) that hospitals were well prepared 
and fully informed of their HVBP adjustment amount well-before implementation and with 
sufficient time for hospitals to make budgetary and internal policy adjustments.  However, to the 
extent to which hospitals delayed response to payment incentives, additional years of 
implementation may be necessary to identify full causal effect.  Sensitivity analyses using panel 
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data to follow hospitals over the study period helps ensure robustness of results to issues of 
temporality.  These findings suggest that cross-sectional data is likely sufficient for study 
purposes. 
Finally, sample size is limited due to the focus on Virginia hospitals and five year time 
period, potentially reducing power necessary to fully capture present effects.  The limited power 
may explain why some robustness checks showed mixed results.  Specifically, when measuring 
charity care as a percent of total operating costs, much of the statistical significance disappeared, 
although directionality remained the same.  Percentages inherently reduce variation compared to 
costs.  This loss of variation in a limited sample size may lead to underestimation of effect.  
Future studies should aim to include additional non-expansion states if similarly detailed charity 
care information is available.  
Conclusion 
Findings from this study are consistent with prior literature that demonstrate that 
hospitals respond to quality or efficiency-based payment incentives through selecting healthier, 
wealthier patients, also known as cream-skimming or cherry picking.111,112,128  However, these is 
also some evidence that hospitals under financial pressure may minimize financial losses through 
reducing charity care, but do so in a manner consistent with community benefit goals.130   
Through both potential responses, evidence from this study support the hypotheses that HVBP 
has resulted in an unintended consequence of reductions in their charity care.  For some, the 
findings suggest that hospitals respond to the bonus by learning to cherry-pick healthier, 
wealthier patients while still maintaining charity care obligations through servicing patients in 
higher income brackets.  For other hospitals, findings demonstrate the behavior of reducing 
charity care to the least needy when finances become limited due to penalties.  Even hospitals in 
areas with high uninsured rates respond to the financial pressure associated with penalties, in fact 
they respond more consistently than hospitals in areas of low uninsured rates.  Hospital mission 
may play a role in the manner in which a hospital responds to HVBP incentives, especially in 
relation to the mission of for-profit compared to not-for-profit and safety net hospitals.  Findings 
may not be generalizable, however, to places that have expanded Medicaid, since the calculus of 
the risk-score of certain populations likely shifts with expansion of Medicaid eligibility.  Further 
analysis should be conducted to identify other potential unintended consequences of the HVBP 
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initiative and the effect on low-income patients specifically.  Policy makers aiming to decrease 
these unintended consequences should consider including social determinants of health in risk-
adjustment methodologies. 
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Table 3-1 Hospital characteristics by relation to HVBP threshold 
 
Hospitals below 
adjustment 
threshold (penalty) 
Hospitals above 
adjustment 
threshold (bonus) 
 N = 145 N = 194 
  % % 
Uninsured rate (mean) 12.7 12.5 
Rural 31.1 28.9 
Region   
Central 20.0 17.0 
Eastern 17.2 30.9 
Northern 12.4 12.9 
Northwest 22.8 11.3 
Southwest 27.6 27.8 
Not-for-profit 80.7 68.0 
Health system 78.6 83.0 
Provider type   
IPPS 74.5 71.1 
Rural referral center (RRC) 5.5 1.0 
Medicare dependent hospital 4.1 5.2 
Sole community hospital (SCH) 9.7 18.6 
SCH/RRC 6.2 4.1 
High Medicare reliance 31.7 34.0 
Total patient days (mean) 62,039 43,840 
Prior year operating margins 5.5 6.2 
HRRP penalty 86.9 89.7 
Case mix index (mean) 1.5 1.5 
Net charity care  $16,500,000 $7,365,372 
Charity care for patients under 100% FPL $11,400,000 $1,626,110 
Charity care for patients 100% - 200% FPL $5,777,191 $5,248,589 
All uncompensated care $23,600,000 $11,900,000 
Uncompensated care as percent of total 
operating expenses 6.8 5.9 
Charity care for patients under 100% FPL as 
percent of total operating expenses 2.3 1.0 
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Table 3-2 Regression discontinuity estimates 
  Coef ($) SE P 
Net charity care -16,000,000 5,400,000 < 0.01 
Charity  care for patients < 100% FPL -12,000,000 6,000,000 0.04 
Charity  care for patients between 100%- 200% FPL -5,700,000 2,600,000 0.03 
Uncompensated care -21,000,000 6,600,000 < 0.01 
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Table 3-3 GLM regression estimates, effect of bonuses on charity care provision (not moderated) 
 
Net Charity 
Care 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
under 100% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
100%-200% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Uncompensated 
Care 
(SE) 
Bonus -0.010 -0.100 0.216 -0.012 
 (0.096) (0.226) (0.196) (0.057) 
High uninsured rate 0.057 0.067 -0.046 0.063 
 (0.098) (0.092) (0.094) (0.077) 
High Medicare reliance -0.146* -0.227*** -0.110 -0.103 
 (0.081) (0.082) (0.175) (0.082) 
Rural -0.389*** -0.707 -0.570 -0.408*** 
 (0.122) (0.448) (0.472) (0.091) 
Region (ref= Central)     
Eastern -0.043 -3.863*** 0.672*** 0.118 
 (0.149) (1.224) (0.216) (0.117) 
Northern -0.293* -0.650* -0.248 -0.248* 
 (0.154) (0.332) (0.220) (0.128) 
Northwest 0.368*** 1.074*** -0.057 0.349*** 
 (0.112) (0.306) (0.196) (0.090) 
Southwest -0.074 0.453*** -3.968*** 0.095 
 (0.102) (0.097) (1.131) (0.071) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)     
Rural referral center 0.117 1.485* -1.798 0.037 
 (0.122) (0.778) (1.747) (0.123) 
Medicare-dependent hospital -0.970*** 0.280 -4.335*** -0.880*** 
 (0.258) (0.477) (1.305) (0.083) 
Sole community hospital 0.071 0.905*** -0.694 -0.024 
 (0.161) (0.250) (0.588) (0.112) 
Sole community hospital and rural 
referral center 0.301* 0.559 0.736 0.269** 
 (0.165) (0.603) (0.517) (0.115) 
Not-for-profit 1.227*** 1.254*** 1.204*** 0.982*** 
 (0.140) (0.260) (0.290) (0.132) 
Health system affiliation -0.001 -0.427*** 0.641** -0.051 
 (0.103) (0.070) (0.266) (0.073) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year total margin 1.036* 5.062*** -0.598 0.925** 
 (0.611) (1.501) (0.872) (0.456) 
Case mix index 1.554*** 1.855*** 0.945* 0.985*** 
 (0.372) (0.590) (0.521) (0.269) 
Readmission penalty 0.210* 0.352 0.058 0.225*** 
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 (0.116) (0.602) (0.086) (0.067) 
Year  (ref = 2013)     
2014 -0.057 -0.334*** 0.112** -0.039 
 (0.052) (0.077) (0.056) (0.026) 
2015 -0.167** -0.493*** 0.033 -0.138*** 
 (0.069) (0.088) (0.078) (0.039) 
2016 -0.267*** -0.297*** -0.402* -0.206*** 
 (0.080) (0.094) (0.234) (0.060) 
2017 -0.485*** -0.477*** -0.670** -0.343*** 
 (0.109) (0.165) (0.283) (0.076) 
Note: SE = standard errors, *p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p>0.01
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Table 3-4 GLM regression estimates, effect of penalties on charity care provision (not moderated) 
 
Net Charity 
Care 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
under 100% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
100%-200% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Uncompensated 
Care 
(SE) 
Penalty -0.052 -0.066 -0.367*** -0.064** 
 (0.048) (0.086) (0.097) (0.033) 
High uninsured rate 0.065 0.067 -0.078 0.073 
 (0.094) (0.087) (0.093) (0.076) 
High Medicare reliance -0.122 -0.182** -0.027 -0.078 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.132) (0.080) 
Rural -0.363*** -0.533 -0.517 -0.380*** 
 (0.121) (0.458) (0.385) (0.090) 
Region (ref= Central)     
Eastern -0.061 -4.023*** 0.669*** 0.097 
 (0.149) (1.247) (0.180) (0.114) 
Northern -0.275* -0.694** -0.096 -0.228* 
 (0.149) (0.326) (0.182) (0.124) 
Northwest 0.383*** 1.166*** 0.080 0.369*** 
 (0.113) (0.339) (0.209) (0.094) 
Southwest -0.079 0.471*** -3.909*** 0.091 
 (0.099) (0.096) (1.098) (0.069) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)     
Rural referral center 0.163 1.732* -1.746 0.087 
 (0.125) (0.975) (1.724) (0.125) 
Medicare-dependent hospital -0.937*** 0.527 -4.152*** -0.880*** 
 (0.240) (0.627) (1.555) (0.092) 
Sole community hospital 0.040 0.852*** -0.692 -0.061 
 (0.154) (0.287) (0.471) (0.105) 
Sole community hospital and rural referral 
center 0.296* 0.460 0.754* 0.264** 
 (0.160) (0.579) (0.416) (0.109) 
Not-for-profit 1.236*** 1.267*** 1.148*** 0.993*** 
 (0.115) (0.229) (0.234) (0.122) 
Health system affiliation 0.003 -0.450*** 0.572** -0.043 
 (0.100) (0.075) (0.227) (0.073) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year total margin 0.880 4.659*** -0.613 0.773* 
 (0.618) (1.803) (0.749) (0.427) 
Case mix index 1.573*** 1.791*** 1.075** 1.007*** 
 (0.360) (0.566) (0.447) (0.258) 
Readmission penalty 0.218** 0.243 0.116 0.234*** 
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 (0.110) (0.617) (0.091) (0.062) 
Year  (Ref = 2013)     
2014 -0.045 -0.323*** 0.189* -0.025 
 (0.057) (0.082) (0.109) (0.029) 
2015 -0.135* -0.441*** 0.134 -0.105*** 
 (0.074) (0.108) (0.124) (0.037) 
2016 -0.255*** -0.279*** -0.252* -0.191*** 
 (0.072) (0.089) (0.144) (0.050) 
2017 -0.459*** -0.435*** -0.475*** -0.314*** 
 (0.104) (0.146) (0.163) (0.070) 
Note: SE = standard errors, *p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p>0.01
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Table 3-5 GLM regression estimates, effect of bonuses on charity care provision - moderated by local uninsured rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Net Charity 
Care 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
under 100% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
100%-200% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Uncompensated 
Care 
(SE) 
          
Bonus -0.056 -0.050 0.193 -0.049 
 (0.126) (0.222) (0.195) (0.078) 
High uninsured rate 0.034 0.072 -0.066 0.043 
 (0.101) (0.093) (0.133) (0.079) 
Bonus*High uninsured 0.101 -0.336 0.046 0.086 
 (0.103) (0.290) (0.155) (0.088) 
High Medicare reliance -0.145* -0.224*** -0.113 -0.103 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.176) (0.079) 
Rural -0.413*** -0.685 -0.583 -0.428*** 
 (0.119) (0.447) (0.472) (0.090) 
Region (ref= Central)     
Eastern -0.040 -3.788*** 0.672*** 0.119 
 (0.145) (1.187) (0.218) (0.114) 
Northern -0.307** -0.629* -0.263 -0.259** 
 (0.155) (0.328) (0.231) (0.130) 
Northwest 0.353*** 1.059*** -0.073 0.337*** 
 (0.114) (0.296) (0.219) (0.092) 
Southwest -0.074 0.456*** -3.977*** 0.098 
 (0.102) (0.100) (1.131) (0.071) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)     
Rural referral center 0.113 1.435* -1.804 0.033 
 (0.124) (0.755) (1.743) (0.125) 
Medicare-dependent hospital -0.972*** 0.273 -4.330*** -0.877*** 
 (0.262) (0.459) (1.298) (0.082) 
Sole community hospital 0.085 0.863*** -0.682 -0.012 
 (0.159) (0.258) (0.592) (0.109) 
Sole community hospital and rural 
referral center 0.328* 0.569 0.758 0.291** 
 (0.170) (0.578) (0.525) (0.116) 
Not-for-profit 1.245*** 1.145*** 1.208*** 0.993*** 
 (0.136) (0.266) (0.291) (0.133) 
Health system affiliation -0.008 -0.425*** 0.637** -0.059 
 (0.101) (0.071) (0.273) (0.070) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year total margin 1.060* 5.071*** -0.622 0.932** 
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 (0.624) (1.494) (0.895) (0.464) 
Case mix index 1.549*** 1.900*** 0.956* 0.987*** 
 (0.368) (0.590) (0.546) (0.269) 
Readmission penalty 0.224** 0.398 0.063 0.234*** 
 (0.112) (0.609) (0.093) (0.064) 
Year  (Ref = 2013)     
2014 -0.058 -0.333*** 0.114** -0.040 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.057) (0.027) 
2015 -0.165** -0.490*** 0.033 -0.137*** 
 (0.070) (0.087) (0.077) (0.040) 
2016 -0.267*** -0.297*** -0.406* -0.206*** 
 (0.079) (0.093) (0.241) (0.059) 
2017 -0.478*** -0.478*** -0.667** -0.337*** 
  (0.109) (0.166) (0.280) (0.076) 
Note: SE = standard errors, *p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p>0.01 
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Table 3-6 GLM regression estimates, effect of penalties on charity care provision - moderated by local uninsured rate 
 
Net Charity 
Care 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
under 100% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Charity Care,   
100%-200% 
FPL 
(SE) 
Uncompensated 
Care 
(SE) 
Penalty 0.120* 0.203* -0.188 0.063 
 (0.062) (0.121) (0.129) (0.043) 
High uninsured rate 0.173* 0.145** -0.001 0.150** 
 (0.093) (0.070) (0.086) (0.070) 
Penalty*High uninsured -0.293*** -0.362*** -0.455** -0.218*** 
 (0.070) (0.134) (0.231) (0.052) 
High Medicare reliance -0.106 -0.121 -0.052 -0.079 
 (0.070) (0.099) (0.125) (0.074) 
Rural -0.421*** -0.560 -0.585* -0.431*** 
 (0.120) (0.456) (0.345) (0.090) 
Region (ref= Central)     
Eastern -0.074 -3.639*** 0.628*** 0.092 
 (0.147) (1.239) (0.170) (0.111) 
Northern -0.338** -0.998*** -0.135 -0.270** 
 (0.155) (0.362) (0.177) (0.132) 
Northwest 0.296*** 0.966*** -0.037 0.315*** 
 (0.110) (0.306) (0.206) (0.089) 
Southwest -0.075 0.372*** -3.848*** 0.103 
 (0.087) (0.104) (1.076) (0.064) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)     
Rural referral center 0.088 1.664* -2.158 0.028 
 (0.127) (0.890) (1.618) (0.127) 
Medicare-dependent hospital -1.007*** 0.426 -4.317*** -0.924*** 
 (0.248) (0.583) (1.553) (0.088) 
Sole community hospital 0.046 0.750*** -0.655 -0.048 
 (0.144) (0.275) (0.451) (0.099) 
Sole community hospital and rural 
referral center 0.384** 0.606 0.917** 0.335*** 
 (0.156) (0.646) (0.378) (0.109) 
Not-for-profit 1.264*** 1.454*** 1.172*** 1.004*** 
 (0.111) (0.255) (0.222) (0.122) 
Health system affiliation -0.024 -0.451*** 0.536** -0.070 
 (0.089) (0.065) (0.213) (0.064) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year total margin 0.764 4.110*** -0.546 0.688 
 (0.630) (1.491) (0.749) (0.420) 
Case mix index 1.456*** 1.269** 1.121** 0.940*** 
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 (0.314) (0.609) (0.467) (0.236) 
Readmission penalty 0.222** 0.381 0.113 0.238*** 
 (0.108) (0.583) (0.094) (0.059) 
Year  (Ref = 2013)     
2014 -0.069* -0.316*** 0.163* -0.039* 
 (0.041) (0.080) (0.088) (0.022) 
2015 -0.123 -0.383*** 0.113 -0.100** 
 (0.076) (0.116) (0.105) (0.041) 
2016 -0.255*** -0.259*** -0.296* -0.185*** 
 (0.075) (0.091) (0.174) (0.056) 
2017 -0.397*** -0.340** -0.457*** -0.273*** 
  (0.085) (0.151) (0.170) (0.055) 
Note: SE = standard errors, *p<0.01, **p<0.05, ***p>0.01
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1-1 
Survey Questions Modifications 
Provider Practice  
Of the physicians working at the practice, how 
many are primary care physicians. 
Categorized as binary for any or none. 
Approximately how many nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants work at the practice. 
Categorized as binary for any or none. 
Is this a multi-specialty group practice. N/A 
If the practice uses an electronic records system, 
does it routinely provide reminders for either 
guideline-based interventions or screening tests. 
If practice did not use an EHR, then 
practice categorized as “no.” 
If the practice uses an electronic records system, 
is it routinely used for exchanging secure 
messages with patients. 
If practice did not use an EHR, then 
practice categorized as “no.” 
Does the practice regularly give reports to 
physicians on the clinical quality of care they 
individually provide. 
N/A 
Does the practice routinely set time aside for 
same-day appointments. 
N/A 
Does the practice routinely send patients 
reminders for preventative  
care or follow-up care. 
N/A 
Does the practice use case managers whose 
primary job is to coordinate patient care. 
N/A 
When patients are discharged from the hospital, 
does someone from the practice usually contact 
the patient within 48 hours. 
N/A 
Is the medical practice owned by physicians in 
the practice or another physician group. Type of 
practice.  
In two separate questions for 2016, 
combined to permit for consistency in 
options across years. 
Patient Usual Source of Care  
How difficult is it to contact {a medical person 
at} {PROVIDER} during regular business hours 
over the telephone about a health problem? 
Categorized as binary for very difficult 
and somewhat difficult vs not too difficult 
and never difficult. 
Does {PROVIDER} have office hours at night or 
on weekends? 
N/A 
How difficult is it to contact {a medical person 
at} {PROVIDER} after their regular hours in case 
of urgent medical needs? 
Categorized as binary for very difficult 
and somewhat difficult vs not too difficult 
and never difficult. 
Does {someone at} {PROVIDER} usually ask 
about prescription medications and treatments 
other doctors may give them? 
Categorized as binary for never and 
sometimes vs usually and always 
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Thinking about the types of medical, traditional 
and alternative treatments that (READ NAME(S) 
BELOW) (is/are) are happy with, how often does 
{a medical person at} {PROVIDER} show 
respect for these treatments? 
Categorized as binary for never and 
sometimes vs usually and always 
If there were a choice between treatments, how 
often would {a medical person at} {PROVIDER} 
ask (READ NAME(S) BELOW) to help make the 
decision? 
Categorized as binary for never and 
sometimes vs usually and always 
Does {a medical person at} {PROVIDER} 
present and explain all options to (READ 
NAME(S) BELOW)? 
Categorized as binary for never and 
sometimes vs usually and always 
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APPENDIX 1-2 
Concordance between patient and provider perspectives among respondents in fair to poor health 
 
 
Easy to reach by 
phone during 
regular hours 
Extended 
office hours 
Easy to reach 
by phone 
after hours 
Provider 
shows respect 
for treatment 
decisions 
Provider 
includes patient 
in decision-
making 
Provider 
explains 
treatment 
options 
Provider asks 
about other 
treatments 
received 
  (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Patient-centered practice (ref = low)        
Medium -0.17 -0.26 0.11 0.87 -0.03 0.43 0.33 
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.34) (0.54) (0.39) (0.58) (0.46) 
High 0.21 -0.30 0.56 0.38 0.27 0.79 -0.04 
 (0.54) (0.51) (0.41) (0.60) (0.44) (0.69) (0.41) 
Age -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Income as percent of federal poverty 
level  0.00 
0.00 
0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male 0.06 -0.38 -0.13 0.39 0.62 -0.31 0.06 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.40) (0.47) (0.42) 
Race/Ethnicity        
Black non-Hispanic 0.48 0.37 0.27 -0.73 -0.87** -0.17 -0.50 
 (0.41) (0.95) (0.34) (0.50) (0.43) (0.65) (0.50) 
Hispanic -0.02 0.13 -0.43 -0.32 -0.72* -0.59 0.25 
 (0.34) 0.42  (0.36) (0.49) (0.41) (0.50) (0.37) 
Asian -0.22 0.07 -0.58 -1.54* -2.11*** -2.08** -1.38 
 (0.86) (0.74) (0.91) (0.84) (0.76) (0.84) (0.84) 
Other 0.52 0.43 -0.07 0.27   -0.16 
 (0.84) (0.35) (0.58) (1.18)   (1.01) 
Region of residence (ref = Northeast)  
  
 
   
Midwest 0.83 0.64 0.03 -0.58 0.08 1.26 0.45 
 (0.51) (0.55) (0.40) (0.72) (0.58) (0.86) (0.55) 
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South 0.03 -0.87* 0.12 0.01 -0.32 1.09* 0.32 
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.33) (0.63) (0.42) (0.59) (0.52) 
West -0.59 -1.26** -0.42 -0.59 0.35 0.28 0.08 
 (0.47) (0.52) (0.41) (0.71) (0.52) (0.60) (0.56) 
Marital status (ref = Married)  
  
    
Separated/Widowed/Divorced 0.31 -0.46 -0.10 0.16 -0.63 -0.25 -0.10 
 (0.35) (0.32) (0.31) (0.38) (0.43) (0.47) (0.35) 
Never married 0.36 0.13 -0.01 0.69 -0.55 -0.04 -0.24 
 (0.45) (0.49) (0.41) (0.53) (0.53) (0.57) (0.50) 
Education (ref = less than HS)     
   
High school -0.37 0.68* -0.30 0.52 -0.36 -0.67 0.41 
 (0.39) (0.40) (0.35) (0.55) (0.36) (0.54) (0.41) 
Some college 0.55 0.80* -0.37 0.30 -0.12 -0.79 0.33 
 (0.48) (0.05) (0.41) (0.62) (0.43) (0.60) (0.54) 
Bachelor degree or more -0.08 0.70 0.44 -0.54 0.41 -0.57 0.28 
 (0.55) (0.53) (0.60) (0.57) (0.51) (0.71) (0.59) 
Insurance type (ref = uninsured)     
   
Medicaid  0.62 -0.20 0.28 -1.44 0.02 0.03 -0.27 
 (0.71) (0.59) (0.61) (0.88) (0.87) (0.83) (0.68) 
Medicare -0.05 0.13 0.37 -1.97** -0.66 -0.07 -0.36 
 (0.69) (0.56) (0.62) (0.85) (0.80) (0.83) (0.63) 
Private -0.07 -0.62 0.26 -0.86 -0.10 -0.45 -0.36 
 (0.73) (0.61) (0.60) (0.87) (0.81) (0.80) (0.63) 
Other -0.63  0.49 -0.36    
 (0.51)  (1.42) (0.59)    
Type of usual source of care practice   
(ref = independent)  
  
    
Hospital or academic medical center -0.86 -0.54 -0.03 0.01 -0.33 0.14 -0.30 
 (0.55) 0.49  (0.41) (0.61) (0.55) (0.88) (0.48) 
Government or non-profit -0.50 -0.52 -1.45 -0.04 -1.12** -0.13 -0.26 
 (0.39) (0.55) (0.58) (0.48) (0.51) (0.63) (0.51) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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APPENDIX 1-3 
Patient and provider perspectives and patient outcomes among respondents with fair to poor 
health 
 
ED use 
Total 
expenditures 
 (SE) (SE) 
Patient-centered practice (ref = low) 0.56* 0.04 
Medium (0.32) (0.03) 
 0.08 0.11 
High (0.35) (0.03) 
 0.45 0.43 
Patient-centered from patient 
perspective (ref = low) -0.34 0.05** 
Medium (0.35) (0.02) 
 0.34 0.01 
High (0.35) (0.02) 
 0.10 0.13 
Age -0.00 0.00** 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Income as percent of federal poverty 
level  -0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Male -0.23 -0.02 
 (0.28) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity   
Black non-Hispanic 0.40 -0.03 
 (0.40) (0.03) 
Hispanic -0.34 -0.00 
 (0.33) (0.02) 
Asian -1.63 -0.08** 
 (1.06) (0.03) 
Other -0.90 -0.00 
 (0.80) (0.04) 
Region of residence (ref = Northeast)   
Midwest 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.41) (0.04) 
South -0.49 -0.05 
 (0.35) (0.04) 
West -0.04 -0.07* 
 (0.40) (0.04) 
Marital status (ref = Married)   
Separated/Widowed/Divorced 0.35 -0.00 
 (0.30) (0.02) 
Never married -0.08 -0.00 
 (0.40) (0.02) 
Education (ref = less than HS)   
High school 0.10 0.04 
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 (0.35) (0.03) 
Some college 0.43 0.05** 
 (0.36) (0.03) 
Bachelor degree or more 0.39 0.05 
 (0.60) (0.03) 
Insurance type (ref = uninsured)   
Medicaid  -0.36 0.06 
 (0.58) (0.04) 
Medicare -0.47 0.14*** 
 (0.48) (0.03) 
Private -0.62 0.11*** 
 (0.49) (0.03) 
Other  0.28*** 
 
 (0.05) 
Type of usual source of care practice   
(ref = independent)   
Hospital or academic medical center -0.31 -0.06*** 
 (0.38) (0.02) 
Government or non-profit -0.80* -0.07** 
 (0.45) (0.03) 
Other -0.71** -0.06*** 
 (0.32) (0.02) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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APPENDIX 2-1 
Adjusted regression with a categorical variable for HVBP adjustment (not moderated) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Direct 
patient 
care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
                  
HVBP Adjustment 
(ref= null)         
Penalty -0.031 0.153 -0.359*** -0.172 0.007 -0.010 -0.309*** 0.020 
 (0.035) (0.286) (0.112) (0.147) (0.040) (0.073) (0.094) (0.024) 
Bonus 0.106 0.393** -0.243 -0.042 0.093** 0.097 -0.098* 0.202*** 
 (0.072) (0.194) (0.274) (0.307) (0.041) (0.068) (0.058) (0.056) 
High Medicare reliance 0.010 -0.027 0.621** 0.214** -0.013 -0.019 0.145 -0.066 
 (0.055) (0.085) (0.247) (0.085) (0.044) (0.061) (0.092) (0.044) 
Rural -0.350** -0.473*** -2.173 -0.692** -0.470*** -0.141 -0.768*** -0.357*** 
 (0.153) (0.145) (1.923) (0.352) (0.147) (0.150) (0.226) (0.118) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.019 0.159 -1.715** -1.174** -0.186 0.060 0.105 0.145* 
 (0.081) (0.150) (0.748) (0.463) (0.172) (0.104) (0.172) (0.084) 
Northern -0.269** -0.036 -1.450*** -0.794*** -0.229*** -1.102*** 0.011 -0.102 
 (0.111) (0.199) (0.210) (0.226) (0.059) (0.332) (0.137) (0.139) 
Northwest 0.199*** 0.221 -0.791 0.162 0.162** -0.054 0.085 0.303*** 
 (0.068) (0.398) (0.801) (0.307) (0.064) (0.081) (0.164) (0.066) 
Southwest 0.123* 0.083 -1.052*** -0.079 0.010 0.077 -0.037 0.312*** 
 (0.064) (0.194) (0.371) (0.329) (0.063) (0.105) (0.245) (0.076) 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)         
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Rural referral center 
(RRC) 0.230 0.376 0.907 1.008** 0.240 0.201 0.463 0.320** 
 (0.160) (0.435) (2.230) (0.402) (0.159) (0.182) (0.418) (0.134) 
Medicare-dependent 
hospital (MDH) -0.477 0.288 -6.547** -3.740** -0.221 -0.398 -0.030 -0.159 
 (0.343) (0.268) (2.791) (1.532) (0.332) (0.262) (0.314) (0.290) 
Sole community hospital 
(SCH) -0.056 0.290 -0.360 -0.372* -0.011 -0.110 0.203 0.090 
 (0.140) (0.268) (0.483) (0.211) (0.126) (0.236) (0.176) (0.115) 
SCH and RRC 0.168 0.493*** 0.615 0.216 0.121 0.317** 0.299*** 0.344*** 
 (0.113) (0.152) (0.474) (0.328) (0.096) (0.132) (0.111) (0.086) 
Not-for-profit 0.290*** 0.426** 2.846*** 1.986*** 0.131 0.148 -0.043 0.394*** 
 (0.086) (0.199) (0.799) (0.433) (0.102) (0.117) (0.120) (0.100) 
Health system 
affiliation -0.031 0.061 2.940*** 0.548*** 0.027 -0.056 0.063 -0.014 
 (0.052) (0.196) (0.878) (0.102) (0.068) (0.052) (0.092) (0.061) 
Total number of 
patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating 
margin 0.340 1.645** -13.334*** -8.090*** 0.748 -0.545 0.117 0.969** 
 (0.395) (0.640) (3.605) (1.856) (0.474) (0.440) (0.545) (0.386) 
Case mix index 0.727*** 0.342 0.713 1.220** 0.625*** 0.688** 0.463** 0.627*** 
 (0.171) (0.363) (1.235) (0.614) (0.228) (0.274) (0.190) (0.175) 
Readmission penalty 0.031 -0.155* 1.265* 0.316 -0.033 0.088 0.213*** -0.040 
 (0.055) (0.090) (0.711) (0.395) (0.063) (0.080) (0.068) (0.035) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel fixed effects         
Panel 2 0.026 -0.052 0.132*** 0.073 0.070 0.073 0.001 -0.085** 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.029) (0.049) (0.044) (0.048) (0.024) (0.034) 
Panel 3 0.100 0.033 -0.043 0.138*** 0.004 0.046 -0.153 -0.034 
 (0.087) (0.043) (0.113) (0.051) (0.020) (0.074) (0.115) (0.024) 
Panel 4 0.016 -0.111 -1.043 -0.154 0.013 -0.078 -0.260** -0.047 
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 (0.061) (0.224) (0.714) (0.428) (0.059) (0.089) (0.122) (0.038) 
Panel 5 -0.061 -0.150 -0.697 -0.050 -0.035 -0.055 -0.088 -0.131*** 
 (0.052) (0.197) (0.637) (0.427) (0.058) (0.088) (0.101) (0.043) 
Panel 6 -0.054 -0.095 -1.324* -0.133 -0.040 -0.294** -0.253** -0.104** 
 (0.062) (0.138) (0.755) (0.433) (0.062) (0.121) (0.124) (0.050) 
Panel 7 -0.098 -0.196 -0.785 -0.008 -0.067 -0.342*** -0.109 -0.245*** 
 (0.076) (0.188) (0.658) (0.462) (0.064) (0.118) (0.112) (0.063) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-2 
HVBP penalty on provider FTEs (moderated) 
 
Direct 
patient care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
 P P P P P P P P 
                  
Penalty -0.049 -0.031 -0.302* -0.184 -0.016 -0.072 -0.297** -0.017 
 (0.044) (0.291) (0.160) (0.175) (0.050) (0.070) (0.127) (0.040) 
High Medicare reliance 0.030 0.025 0.707*** 0.174* -0.000 -0.034 0.108 -0.034 
 (0.058) (0.124) (0.260) (0.101) (0.059) (0.072) (0.102) (0.056) 
Penalty*High Medicare 
reliance -0.022 -0.038 -0.114 0.062 -0.004 0.091 0.129 -0.037 
 (0.049) (0.232) (0.180) (0.217) (0.078) (0.091) (0.191) (0.051) 
Rural -0.367** -0.526*** -2.293 -0.649* -0.487*** -0.155 -0.750*** -0.390*** 
 (0.156) (0.165) (1.905) (0.337) (0.152) (0.155) (0.225) (0.133) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.018 0.189 -1.718** -1.173** -0.179 0.076 0.094 0.160* 
 (0.081) (0.159) (0.739) (0.461) (0.175) (0.109) (0.171) (0.089) 
Northern -0.265** -0.005 -1.515*** -0.780*** -0.215*** -1.090*** 0.004 -0.078 
 (0.117) (0.204) (0.176) (0.253) (0.061) (0.341) (0.136) (0.152) 
Northwest 0.198*** 0.196 -0.831 0.195 0.163** -0.044 0.081 0.305*** 
 (0.070) (0.393) (0.677) (0.350) (0.066) (0.084) (0.164) (0.066) 
Southwest 0.120* 0.085 -1.073*** -0.056 0.011 0.085 -0.036 0.316*** 
 (0.063) (0.192) (0.344) (0.365) (0.063) (0.107) (0.242) (0.078) 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)         
RRC 0.239 0.424 0.806 0.955*** 0.249 0.209 0.457 0.334** 
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 (0.160) (0.439) (2.219) (0.370) (0.160) (0.179) (0.423) (0.134) 
MDH -0.477 0.256 -7.041*** -3.608** -0.220 -0.378 -0.015 -0.167 
 (0.335) (0.260) (2.613) (1.562) (0.327) (0.261) (0.322) (0.283) 
SCH -0.030 0.357 -0.504 -0.387** 0.014 -0.084 0.205 0.154 
 (0.140) (0.286) (0.421) (0.167) (0.130) (0.249) (0.179) (0.123) 
SCH and RRC 0.170 0.537*** 0.531 0.198 0.123 0.325** 0.269*** 0.361*** 
 (0.127) (0.168) (0.485) (0.311) (0.103) (0.138) (0.104) (0.107) 
Not-for-profit 0.269*** 0.337* 2.977*** 1.990*** 0.108 0.126 -0.019 0.350*** 
 (0.086) (0.205) (0.771) (0.438) (0.106) (0.118) (0.120) (0.104) 
Health system affiliation -0.032 0.036 3.022*** 0.551*** 0.024 -0.056 0.070 -0.020 
 (0.055) (0.224) (0.862) (0.099) (0.072) (0.056) (0.097) (0.071) 
Total number of patient 
days 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating 
margin 0.386 1.734*** -14.226*** -7.886*** 0.775* -0.475 0.092 1.021*** 
 (0.395) (0.651) (3.497) (1.895) (0.471) (0.429) (0.535) (0.363) 
Case mix index 0.737*** 0.327 0.773 1.216** 0.627*** 0.695** 0.447** 0.634*** 
 (0.172) (0.373) (1.178) (0.609) (0.235) (0.278) (0.191) (0.182) 
Readmission penalty 0.020 -0.140 1.442 0.307 -0.045 0.095 0.232*** -0.058 
 (0.062) (0.103) (0.916) (0.397) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073) (0.047) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel fixed effects         
Panel 2 0.026 -0.051 0.140*** 0.072 0.070 0.078 -0.002 -0.083** 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.027) (0.049) (0.044) (0.049) (0.025) (0.033) 
Panel 3 0.102 0.030 -0.049 0.140*** 0.005 0.051 -0.158 -0.033 
 (0.088) (0.045) (0.107) (0.047) (0.019) (0.074) (0.119) (0.023) 
Panel 4 0.052 0.036 -1.189 -0.159 0.046 -0.058 -0.328*** 0.010 
 (0.062) (0.167) (0.912) (0.409) (0.066) (0.085) (0.125) (0.044) 
Panel 5 -0.024 0.041 -0.872 -0.047 0.003 -0.023 -0.161* -0.072 
 (0.048) (0.128) (0.837) (0.414) (0.066) (0.082) (0.096) (0.048) 
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Panel 6 -0.012 0.081 -1.484 -0.136 -0.001 -0.257** -0.310** -0.036 
 (0.069) (0.151) (0.947) (0.411) (0.071) (0.113) (0.131) (0.058) 
Panel 7 -0.048 -0.001 -0.983 -0.002 -0.021 -0.313** -0.168 -0.161** 
 (0.072) (0.137) (0.857) (0.452) (0.072) (0.123) (0.106) (0.068) 
Constant 4.906*** 4.045*** -3.749** -2.101* 4.504*** 1.898*** 3.421*** 4.753*** 
 (0.265) (0.799) (1.843) (1.076) (0.404) (0.361) (0.279) (0.259) 
 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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APPENDIX 2-3 
HVBP bonus on provider FTEs (moderated) 
 
Direct 
patient care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
                  
Bonus 0.152* 0.402*** 0.425 0.224 0.119** 0.147** 0.016 0.236*** 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.716) (0.488) (0.048) (0.072) (0.078) (0.054) 
High Medicare reliance 0.027 0.022 0.540** 0.224** 0.009 0.016 0.130 -0.040 
 (0.054) (0.074) (0.226) (0.107) (0.047) (0.069) (0.094) (0.055) 
Bonus*High Medicare 
reliance -0.104 -0.267* -0.853 -0.232 -0.110 -0.156 0.035 -0.142 
 (0.089) (0.138) (1.249) (0.502) (0.070) (0.102) (0.151) (0.086) 
Rural -0.361** -0.503*** -1.121 -0.633* -0.483*** -0.166 -0.806*** -0.377*** 
 (0.157) (0.141) (0.973) (0.341) (0.152) (0.159) (0.272) (0.123) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.013 0.152 -1.405* -1.126** -0.182 0.059 0.134 0.141* 
 (0.078) (0.135) (0.793) (0.525) (0.170) (0.101) (0.171) (0.081) 
Northern -0.277** -0.047 -1.839*** -0.894*** -0.226*** -1.109*** -0.011 -0.105 
 (0.110) (0.184) (0.333) (0.217) (0.062) (0.328) (0.160) (0.133) 
Northwest 0.184*** 0.177 -0.131 0.182 0.156** -0.066 0.045 0.297*** 
 (0.066) (0.355) (0.850) (0.343) (0.066) (0.078) (0.201) (0.067) 
Southwest 0.123* 0.092 -1.104** -0.071 0.014 0.076 -0.030 0.314*** 
 (0.064) (0.189) (0.507) (0.351) (0.063) (0.103) (0.257) (0.075) 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)         
RRC 0.234 0.409 1.620 0.961** 0.246 0.222 0.366 0.331** 
 (0.167) (0.452) (2.216) (0.387) (0.165) (0.199) (0.472) (0.142) 
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MDH -0.478 0.247 -6.985** -3.935** -0.222 -0.380 0.015 -0.154 
 (0.339) (0.259) (3.041) (1.709) (0.324) (0.266) (0.305) (0.280) 
SCH -0.031 0.333 -0.457 -0.369 0.013 -0.081 0.265 0.132 
 (0.156) (0.213) (0.544) (0.231) (0.139) (0.255) (0.207) (0.135) 
SCH and RRC 0.163 0.554*** 0.997 0.153 0.127 0.331** 0.246* 0.352*** 
 (0.122) (0.147) (0.784) (0.333) (0.100) (0.143) (0.131) (0.091) 
Not-for-profit 0.293*** 0.418** 3.722*** 2.108*** 0.133 0.154 -0.073 0.400*** 
 (0.087) (0.184) (0.905) (0.519) (0.103) (0.116) (0.137) (0.100) 
Health system affiliation -0.037 0.049 3.123*** 0.553*** 0.024 -0.054 0.006 -0.013 
 (0.050) (0.171) (1.110) (0.107) (0.065) (0.053) (0.080) (0.058) 
Total number of patient 
days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating 
margin 0.311 1.471** -12.047*** -8.368*** 0.731 -0.523 0.330 0.943*** 
 (0.383) (0.590) (3.974) (2.155) (0.466) (0.434) (0.548) (0.366) 
Case mix index 0.695*** 0.318 -0.831 1.055 0.619*** 0.656** 0.458** 0.628*** 
 (0.161) (0.340) (1.262) (0.698) (0.220) (0.261) (0.193) (0.175) 
Readmission penalty 0.034 -0.111 1.258** 0.374 -0.023 0.070 0.191*** -0.028 
 (0.054) (0.076) (0.518) (0.447) (0.062) (0.078) (0.071) (0.032) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel fixed effects         
Panel 2 0.027 -0.047 0.132*** 0.088* 0.070 0.072 0.001 -0.084** 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.039) (0.050) (0.044) (0.049) (0.026) (0.034) 
Panel 3 0.102 0.033 0.095 0.173*** 0.005 0.046 -0.158 -0.034 
 (0.086) (0.045) (0.112) (0.034) (0.019) (0.074) (0.113) (0.024) 
Panel 4 0.002 -0.066 -1.118** -0.235 0.005 -0.065 -0.314** -0.051 
 (0.063) (0.153) (0.488) (0.466) (0.054) (0.090) (0.133) (0.037) 
Panel 5 -0.075 -0.059 -0.791* -0.156 -0.038 -0.042 -0.208* -0.129*** 
 (0.053) (0.070) (0.432) (0.463) (0.052) (0.085) (0.117) (0.043) 
Panel 6 -0.080 -0.040 -1.493*** -0.278 -0.043 -0.285** -0.397** -0.102** 
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 (0.064) (0.138) (0.562) (0.496) (0.058) (0.131) (0.195) (0.047) 
Panel 7 -0.112 -0.111 -0.882** -0.133 -0.069 -0.314** -0.260*** -0.242*** 
 (0.080) (0.106) (0.447) (0.471) (0.058) (0.126) (0.086) (0.061) 
Constant 4.935*** 3.948*** -2.726 -2.095* 4.482*** 1.917*** 3.508*** 4.688*** 
 (0.252) (0.688) (1.716) (1.230) (0.379) (0.343) (0.283) (0.250) 
 0.000 0.000 0.112 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 135 
Appendices  
 
APPENDIX 2-4 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on direct patient care FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.094* (0.056) 0.096 0.077** (0.031) 0.014           
High Medicare reliance 0.072 (0.062) 0.245 -0.036 (0.032) 0.262 0.045 (0.077) 0.561 0.024 (0.061) 0.693 
Penalty*High Medicare 
reliance -0.050 (0.064) 0.441 -0.098** (0.047) 0.037           
Cumulative penalty           -0.040 (0.043) 0.346      
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance           0.007 (0.038) 0.850      
At least 3 penalties                -0.120 (0.103) 0.243 
At least 3 penalties*High 
Medicare reliance                0.170* (0.092) 0.066 
Rural -0.239* (0.131) 0.067 -0.030 (0.044) 0.503 -0.247* (0.136) 0.069 -0.246* (0.139) 0.077 
Region (ref= Central)                     
Eastern -0.286*** (0.104) 0.006      -0.285*** (0.105) 0.007 -0.267*** (0.102) 0.009 
Northern -0.571*** (0.143) 0.000      -0.574*** (0.149) 0.000 -0.588*** (0.151) 0.000 
Northwest 0.147* (0.076) 0.055      0.152* (0.084) 0.072 0.143* (0.074) 0.053 
Southwest -0.025 (0.090) 0.783      -0.030 (0.091) 0.740 -0.021 (0.091) 0.814 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)                     
RRC 0.139 (0.149) 0.350 -0.139 (0.128) 0.277 0.145 (0.145) 0.319 0.142 (0.151) 0.349 
MDH -0.464 (0.305) 0.127 -0.193*** (0.062) 0.002 -0.443 (0.307) 0.149 -0.412 (0.294) 0.161 
SCH -0.166** (0.078) 0.033 0.049 (0.132) 0.710 -0.135 (0.087) 0.123 -0.101 (0.090) 0.258 
SCH and RRC 0.105 (0.104) 0.314 -0.039 (0.105) 0.707 0.070 (0.109) 0.519 0.061 (0.116) 0.598 
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Not-for-profit 0.571*** (0.146) 0.000 0.109 (0.119) 0.363 0.572*** (0.149) 0.000 0.566*** (0.152) 0.000 
Health system affiliation 0.044 (0.081) 0.585 -0.022 (0.038) 0.571 0.036 (0.080) 0.649 0.036 (0.081) 0.654 
Total number of patient 
days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.876* (0.522) 0.093 -0.557*** (0.154) 0.000 0.872* (0.508) 0.086 1.001* (0.520) 0.054 
Case mix index 1.039*** (0.250) 0.000 -0.156 (0.151) 0.301 1.025*** (0.265) 0.000 0.995*** (0.248) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -7.156 (4.495) 0.111 5.519*** (1.874) 0.003 -5.709 (4.190) 0.173 -4.292 (4.024) 0.286 
Panel fixed effects                     
Panel 2 0.036 (0.032) 0.270 0.023 (0.029) 0.418 0.035 (0.033) 0.283 0.034 (0.033) 0.306 
Panel 3 0.138 (0.104) 0.185 0.069** (0.029) 0.019 0.139 (0.105) 0.187 0.139 (0.103) 0.179 
Panel 4 0.172** (0.080) 0.032 0.075** (0.031) 0.016 0.150* (0.090) 0.095 0.146* (0.087) 0.094 
Panel 5 0.124* (0.074) 0.095 0.069** (0.032) 0.033 0.112 (0.084) 0.185 0.088 (0.087) 0.315 
Panel 6 0.093 (0.102) 0.361 0.127*** (0.038) 0.001 0.079 (0.105) 0.449 0.030 (0.107) 0.783 
Panel 7 0.058 (0.097) 0.550 0.122*** (0.040) 0.003 0.089 (0.121) 0.465 0.058 (0.114) 0.611 
Constant 11.266** (4.433) 0.011 0.386 (1.861) 0.836 9.859** (4.134) 0.017 8.484** (3.990) 0.033 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-5 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on direct patient care FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.118 (0.099) 0.231 0.015 (0.031) 0.626       
High Medicare reliance 0.063 (0.055) 0.254 -0.036 (0.033) 0.284 0.054 (0.051) 0.295 0.066 (0.051) 0.194 
Bonus*High Medicare 
reliance -0.107 (0.112) 0.342 -0.064 (0.044) 0.147       
Cumulative bonus       0.091* (0.053) 0.083    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.059 (0.052) 0.260    
At least 3 bonuses          0.383*** (0.135) 0.005 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.341** (0.144) 0.018 
Rural -0.236* (0.135) 0.080 -0.032 (0.044) 0.469 -0.224* (0.127) 0.078 -0.249* (0.131) 0.058 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.277*** (0.099) 0.005    -0.278*** (0.101) 0.006 -0.269*** (0.096) 0.005 
Northern -0.621*** (0.149) 0.000    -0.623*** (0.145) 0.000 -0.641*** (0.141) 0.000 
Northwest 0.115 (0.074) 0.121    0.126* (0.073) 0.084 0.109 (0.071) 0.123 
Southwest -0.037 (0.098) 0.701    -0.026 (0.103) 0.803 -0.055 (0.093) 0.556 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.133 (0.159) 0.403 -0.107 (0.129) 0.409 0.129 (0.156) 0.409 0.158 (0.154) 0.304 
MDH -0.461 (0.301) 0.125 -0.176*** (0.062) 0.005 -0.445 (0.293) 0.129 -0.452 (0.296) 0.127 
SCH -0.136 (0.092) 0.136 0.075 (0.135) 0.581 -0.171* (0.101) 0.089 -0.148 (0.104) 0.156 
SCH and RRC 0.066 (0.116) 0.568 -0.040 (0.106) 0.706 0.058 (0.101) 0.565 0.052 (0.110) 0.640 
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Not-for-profit 0.607*** (0.159) 0.000 0.100 (0.120) 0.404 0.662*** (0.172) 0.000 0.617*** (0.149) 0.000 
Health system affiliation 0.039 (0.078) 0.618 -0.012 (0.039) 0.761 0.041 (0.076) 0.586 0.046 (0.074) 0.533 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.817 (0.497) 0.100 -0.592*** (0.155) 0.000 0.869* (0.490) 0.076 0.742 (0.488) 0.129 
Case mix index 0.955*** (0.247) 0.000 -0.162 (0.151) 0.281 0.975*** (0.248) 0.000 0.915*** (0.235) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -6.664 (4.461) 0.135 5.198*** (1.885) 0.006 -5.615 (3.953) 0.155 -5.941 (4.205) 0.158 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.035 (0.031) 0.252 0.023 (0.029) 0.421 0.036 (0.031) 0.236 0.035 (0.030) 0.248 
Panel 3 0.142 (0.103) 0.170 0.069** (0.029) 0.020 0.140 (0.104) 0.179 0.143 (0.102) 0.160 
Panel 4 0.131 (0.094) 0.166 0.089*** (0.032) 0.006 0.135 (0.092) 0.141 0.143 (0.088) 0.103 
Panel 5 0.081 (0.092) 0.381 0.084** (0.033) 0.012 0.074 (0.094) 0.433 0.094 (0.083) 0.258 
Panel 6 0.020 (0.100) 0.841 0.139*** (0.038) 0.000 0.008 (0.102) 0.937 0.017 (0.095) 0.854 
Panel 7 0.004 (0.127) 0.975 0.146*** (0.043) 0.001 -0.011 (0.130) 0.935 0.014 (0.112) 0.904 
Constant 10.860** (4.389) 0.013 0.719 (1.872) 0.701 9.711** (3.929) 0.013 10.186** (4.182) 0.015 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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APPENDIX 2-6 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on administrative FTEs 
             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.065 (0.110) 0.555 -0.076 (0.098) 0.437       
High Medicare reliance -0.203 (0.163) 0.212 -0.192* (0.099) 0.052 -0.044 (0.195) 0.821 -0.044 (0.141) 0.758 
Penalty*High Medicare 
reliance 0.332** (0.152) 0.029 0.216 (0.146) 0.139       
Cumulative penalty       0.066 (0.087) 0.452    
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance       0.014 (0.088) 0.872    
At least 3 penalties          0.252 (0.161) 0.118 
At least 3 penalties*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.021 (0.224) 0.924 
Rural -0.770*** (0.230) 0.001 0.226 (0.138) 0.102 -0.759*** (0.229) 0.001 -0.739*** (0.218) 0.001 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern 0.407* (0.215) 0.058    0.408* (0.217) 0.060 0.374* (0.212) 0.077 
Northern 0.468** (0.228) 0.040    0.412* (0.234) 0.078 0.393* (0.226) 0.082 
Northwest 1.403*** (0.235) 0.000    1.279*** (0.241) 0.000 1.264*** (0.226) 0.000 
Southwest 0.307 (0.313) 0.327    0.304 (0.308) 0.324 0.274 (0.301) 0.363 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.435 (0.510) 0.393 0.307 (0.399) 0.443 0.342 (0.631) 0.588 0.308 (0.617) 0.617 
MDH 1.097*** (0.397) 0.006 0.200 (0.194) 0.302 0.901** (0.403) 0.025 0.854* (0.481) 0.076 
SCH 1.323*** (0.280) 0.000 -0.030 (0.412) 0.942 1.200*** (0.292) 0.000 1.181*** (0.273) 0.000 
SCH and RRC 0.354*** (0.128) 0.006 0.886*** (0.327) 0.007 0.409*** (0.117) 0.000 0.417*** (0.113) 0.000 
Not-for-profit 0.661** (0.257) 0.010 0.226 (0.371) 0.543 0.631** (0.253) 0.013 0.644** (0.257) 0.012 
Health system affiliation 0.559*** (0.157) 0.000 -0.083 (0.119) 0.488 0.517*** (0.169) 0.002 0.511*** (0.163) 0.002 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.002 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.004 0.000*** (0.000) 0.003 
Prior year operating margin 2.776** (1.095) 0.011 -0.829* (0.481) 0.086 2.585** (1.046) 0.013 2.621** (1.085) 0.016 
Case mix index 1.359*** (0.398) 0.001 -0.873* (0.471) 0.065 1.298*** (0.450) 0.004 1.314*** (0.408) 0.001 
Readmission penalty 12.395 (12.438) 0.319 6.074 (5.848) 0.300 9.424 (10.647) 0.376 9.124 (10.545) 0.387 
Panel fixed effects             
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Panel 2 -0.113** (0.056) 0.043 0.011 (0.089) 0.902 -0.107* (0.056) 0.057 -0.106* (0.056) 0.059 
Panel 3 -0.080 (0.052) 0.123 0.089 (0.091) 0.331 -0.074 (0.052) 0.156 -0.072 (0.052) 0.166 
Panel 4 -0.277* (0.157) 0.077 0.101 (0.097) 0.299 -0.199 (0.157) 0.205 -0.160 (0.177) 0.364 
Panel 5 -0.235 (0.174) 0.177 0.115 (0.101) 0.252 -0.285 (0.179) 0.112 -0.206 (0.173) 0.233 
Panel 6 -0.140 (0.090) 0.119 0.252** (0.117) 0.032 -0.194 (0.155) 0.211 -0.159 (0.111) 0.150 
Panel 7 -0.097 (0.089) 0.275 0.227* (0.126) 0.072 -0.250 (0.191) 0.190 -0.237* (0.123) 0.055 
             
Constant -10.920 (12.296) 0.374 -1.208 (5.813) 0.835 -7.767 (10.713) 0.468 -7.477 (10.524) 0.477 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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APPENDIX 2-7 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on administrative FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.352*** (0.117) 0.003 0.195** (0.095) 0.041       
High Medicare reliance -0.033 (0.103) 0.753 -0.147 (0.103) 0.153 -0.016 (0.107) 0.884 -0.036 (0.095) 0.702 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance -0.289** (0.145) 0.046 -0.035 (0.137) 0.800       
Cumulative bonus       0.182*** (0.053) 0.001    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.207*** (0.077) 0.007    
At least 3 bonuses          0.377** (0.182) 0.039 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.465* (0.248) 0.060 
Rural -0.765*** (0.196) 0.000 0.193 (0.135) 0.155 -0.828*** (0.209) 0.000 -0.801*** (0.216) 0.000 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern 0.342 (0.219) 0.118    0.358 (0.220) 0.104 0.377 (0.230) 0.101 
Northern 0.431* (0.226) 0.056    0.413* (0.217) 0.058 0.440* (0.231) 0.057 
Northwest 1.323*** (0.227) 0.000    1.316*** (0.226) 0.000 1.330*** (0.230) 0.000 
Southwest 0.258 (0.312) 0.409    0.258 (0.314) 0.411 0.278 (0.326) 0.394 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.393 (0.549) 0.473 0.243 (0.398) 0.541 0.476 (0.542) 0.380 0.458 (0.513) 0.372 
MDH 0.926* (0.473) 0.050 0.182 (0.192) 0.344 0.991** (0.405) 0.014 0.956** (0.440) 0.030 
SCH 1.183*** (0.235) 0.000 -0.093 (0.417) 0.823 1.280*** (0.247) 0.000 1.254*** (0.239) 0.000 
SCH and RRC 0.371*** (0.108) 0.001 0.847*** (0.326) 0.010 0.421*** (0.107) 0.000 0.404*** (0.103) 0.000 
Not-for-profit 0.700*** (0.260) 0.007 0.200 (0.370) 0.588 0.756*** (0.265) 0.004 0.680** (0.266) 0.010 
Health system affiliation 0.498*** (0.144) 0.001 -0.081 (0.119) 0.498 0.514*** (0.132) 0.000 0.505*** (0.143) 0.000 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.002 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001 0.000*** (0.000) 0.002 
Prior year operating margin 2.082** (1.032) 0.044 -0.838* (0.478) 0.081 2.081** (0.940) 0.027 2.257** (0.983) 0.022 
Case mix index 1.377*** (0.412) 0.001 -0.820* (0.467) 0.080 1.362*** (0.367) 0.000 1.382*** (0.382) 0.000 
Readmission penalty 6.407 (10.328) 0.535 5.753 (5.825) 0.324 8.380 (9.619) 0.384 9.777 (9.703) 0.314 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 -0.100* (0.058) 0.084 0.010 (0.089) 0.907 -0.100* (0.058) 0.088 -0.103* (0.059) 0.079 
 142 
Appendices  
 
Panel 3 -0.071 (0.047) 0.133 0.086 (0.091) 0.343 -0.070 (0.048) 0.150 -0.072 (0.049) 0.144 
Panel 4 -0.201 (0.192) 0.297 0.035 (0.099) 0.727 -0.175 (0.180) 0.330 -0.164 (0.178) 0.357 
Panel 5 -0.234 (0.191) 0.220 0.040 (0.102) 0.697 -0.214 (0.185) 0.248 -0.207 (0.184) 0.260 
Panel 6 -0.101 (0.171) 0.554 0.204* (0.116) 0.079 -0.098 (0.169) 0.563 -0.068 (0.153) 0.658 
Panel 7 -0.150 (0.143) 0.294 0.110 (0.132) 0.403 -0.119 (0.141) 0.397 -0.083 (0.116) 0.474 
Constant -4.950 (10.163) 0.626 -0.952 (5.788) 0.869 -6.989 (9.472) 0.461 -8.302 (9.575) 0.386 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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APPENDIX 2-8 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on physician FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.197 (0.185) 0.286 -0.046 (0.135) 0.733       
High Medicare reliance 0.751** (0.312) 0.016 -0.081 (0.183) 0.657 0.130 (0.770) 0.866 0.486 (0.567) 0.392 
Penalty*High Medicare reliance -0.172 (0.209) 0.409 0.102 (0.222) 0.647       
Cumulative penalty       -0.273* (0.153) 0.074    
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance       0.111 (0.240) 0.645    
At least 3 penalties          -0.341 (0.289) 0.239 
At least 3 penalties*High 
Medicare reliance          0.220 (0.461) 0.633 
Rural -2.377 (1.779) 0.182 -0.042 (0.210) 0.840 -0.946 (3.145) 0.763 -1.423 (4.563) 0.755 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern -2.353** (0.975) 0.016    -2.249** (1.035) 0.030 -2.177 (1.341) 0.104 
Northern -0.950*** (0.247) 0.000    -0.949*** (0.242) 0.000 -1.009** (0.446) 0.024 
Northwest 0.380 (0.341) 0.265    1.220 (0.915) 0.182 0.696 (1.050) 0.507 
Southwest -0.008 (0.233) 0.972    -0.126 (0.189) 0.504 0.008 (0.456) 0.986 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)             
RRC -0.267 (1.925) 0.890 0.350 (0.469) 0.457 1.530 (1.243) 0.218 0.767 (5.636) 0.892 
MDH -6.138** (2.528) 0.015 -0.217 (0.405) 0.593 -7.934*** (2.362) 0.001 -6.570 (4.772) 0.169 
SCH -0.872*** (0.232) 0.000 0.133 (0.476) 0.780 -0.260 (0.488) 0.594 -0.485 (0.515) 0.346 
SCH and RRC -0.038 (0.350) 0.914 0.271 (0.364) 0.457 -0.665 (0.894) 0.457 -0.310 (0.570) 0.586 
Not-for-profit 3.292*** (1.211) 0.007 -1.429*** (0.453) 0.002 5.177** (2.024) 0.011 3.519*** (1.313) 0.007 
Health system affiliation 3.487*** (0.760) 0.000 -0.064 (0.172) 0.712 3.147*** (0.927) 0.001 3.073 (2.353) 0.192 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001 -0.000 (0.000) 0.530 0.000** (0.000) 0.020 0.000 (0.000) 0.219 
Prior year operating margin -13.377*** (3.420) 0.000 -0.064 (0.982) 0.948 -12.617** (6.296) 0.045 -11.765** (5.385) 0.029 
Case mix index 2.211* (1.216) 0.069 0.062 (0.715) 0.931 1.039 (1.420) 0.464 1.518 (3.294) 0.645 
Readmission penalty 12.117 (11.134) 0.276 -3.283 (9.545) 0.731 48.935 (32.433) 0.131 55.572 (58.303) 0.341 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.101*** (0.023) 0.000 0.101 (0.133) 0.449 0.101** (0.042) 0.016 0.093*** (0.022) 0.000 
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Panel 3 -0.173 (0.120) 0.148 0.058 (0.138) 0.674 -0.083 (0.147) 0.572 -0.106 (0.287) 0.712 
Panel 4 0.072 (0.118) 0.542 -0.191 (0.145) 0.190 0.154 (0.127) 0.223 0.021 (0.305) 0.946 
Panel 5 0.385*** (0.148) 0.009 -0.061 (0.152) 0.689 0.451 (0.289) 0.119 0.253* (0.137) 0.065 
Panel 6 -0.114 (0.115) 0.322 0.097 (0.178) 0.587 0.304 (0.230) 0.186 -0.025 (0.325) 0.939 
Panel 7 0.223 (0.177) 0.209 0.090 (0.199) 0.651 0.932** (0.413) 0.024 0.528 (0.413) 0.202 
Constant -19.020 (12.099) 0.116 6.712 (9.444) 0.478 -55.695 (35.073) 0.112 -61.249 (63.382) 0.334 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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APPENDIX 2-9 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on physician FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.502 (0.496) 0.311 -0.020 (0.142) 0.887       
High Medicare reliance 0.562** (0.238) 0.018 -0.159 (0.192) 0.407 0.557** (0.234) 0.017 0.486 (0.567) 0.392 
Bonus*High Medicare 
reliance -1.507 (1.189) 0.205 0.304 (0.246) 0.218       
Cumulative bonus       0.399 (0.319) 0.211    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.678* (0.379) 0.073    
At least 3 bonuses          -0.341 (0.289) 0.239 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          0.220 (0.461) 0.633 
Rural -1.081** (0.500) 0.031 -0.036 (0.207) 0.861 -1.248** (0.587) 0.034 -1.423 (4.563) 0.755 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern -2.090* (1.075) 0.052    -1.943* (1.066) 0.068 -2.177 (1.341) 0.104 
Northern -1.314*** (0.179) 0.000    -1.360*** (0.211) 0.000 -1.009** (0.446) 0.024 
Northwest 0.682** (0.299) 0.023    0.784** (0.353) 0.026 0.696 (1.050) 0.507 
Southwest -0.217 (0.236) 0.358    -0.257 (0.221) 0.245 0.008 (0.456) 0.986 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.396 (1.637) 0.809 0.247 (0.466) 0.597 0.610 (2.020) 0.763 0.767 (5.636) 0.892 
MDH -6.754** (2.936) 0.021 -0.160 (0.405) 0.693 -6.343** (2.804) 0.024 -6.570 (4.772) 0.169 
SCH -0.112 (0.786) 0.887 -0.050 (0.493) 0.919 -0.352 (0.460) 0.444 -0.485 (0.515) 0.346 
SCH and RRC 1.048 (0.917) 0.253 0.264 (0.363) 0.467 1.091 (0.744) 0.143 -0.310 (0.570) 0.586 
Not-for-profit 3.842*** (1.398) 0.006 -1.471*** (0.453) 0.001 4.795** (2.269) 0.035 3.519*** (1.313) 0.007 
Health system affiliation 3.825*** (1.077) 0.000 -0.105 (0.174) 0.547 3.933*** (1.106) 0.000 3.073 (2.353) 0.192 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.002 -0.000 (0.000) 0.650 0.000*** (0.000) 0.007 0.000 (0.000) 0.219 
Prior year operating margin -11.713*** (4.096) 0.004 0.100 (0.987) 0.919 -11.767*** (4.196) 0.005 -11.765** (5.385) 0.029 
Case mix index 0.727 (1.069) 0.497 0.134 (0.710) 0.850 0.376 (1.128) 0.739 1.518 (3.294) 0.645 
Readmission penalty 26.256 (25.254) 0.298 -3.660 (9.449) 0.699 18.765 (17.091) 0.272 55.572 (58.303) 0.341 
Panel fixed effects             
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Panel 2 0.100*** (0.031) 0.001 0.106 (0.132) 0.423 0.104*** (0.034) 0.002 0.093*** (0.022) 0.000 
Panel 3 -0.036 (0.101) 0.719 0.063 (0.137) 0.645 -0.007 (0.101) 0.942 -0.106 (0.287) 0.712 
Panel 4 0.030 (0.110) 0.781 -0.213 (0.148) 0.152 0.050 (0.118) 0.675 0.021 (0.305) 0.946 
Panel 5 0.341* (0.178) 0.055 -0.075 (0.151) 0.619 0.364* (0.208) 0.079 0.253* (0.137) 0.065 
Panel 6 -0.211* (0.111) 0.057 0.072 (0.172) 0.676 -0.218* (0.113) 0.053 -0.025 (0.325) 0.939 
Panel 7 0.281 (0.228) 0.219 0.023 (0.203) 0.910 0.295 (0.244) 0.227 0.528 (0.413) 0.202 
Constant -32.231 (27.402) 0.240 6.996 (9.354) 0.455 -25.459 (18.777) 0.175 -61.249 (63.382) 0.334 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-10 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on NP/PA FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.164 (0.162) 0.310 0.079 (0.160) 0.624       
High Medicare reliance 0.148 (0.102) 0.147 0.323* (0.182) 0.078 0.029 (0.169) 0.866 -0.010 (0.091) 0.909 
Penalty*High Medicare reliance 0.087 (0.197) 0.657 -0.428 (0.278) 0.126       
Cumulative penalty       -0.110 (0.084) 0.192    
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance       0.083 (0.105) 0.428    
At least 3 penalties          -0.585** (0.237) 0.013 
At least 3 penalties*High 
Medicare reliance          0.623** (0.258) 0.016 
Rural -0.585** (0.295) 0.047 0.112 (0.280) 0.690 -0.559* (0.297) 0.060 -0.495* (0.274) 0.071 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern -1.326*** (0.397) 0.001    -1.401*** (0.425) 0.001 -1.345*** (0.414) 0.001 
Northern -0.737*** (0.181) 0.000    -0.727*** (0.173) 0.000 -0.593*** (0.158) 0.000 
Northwest 0.274 (0.206) 0.185    0.367* (0.207) 0.076 0.477*** (0.177) 0.007 
Southwest 0.066 (0.150) 0.659    0.082 (0.157) 0.601 0.276 (0.182) 0.130 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.853** (0.389) 0.028 -1.222** (0.586) 0.038 0.795** (0.388) 0.040 0.644* (0.334) 0.054 
MDH -3.388** (1.512) 0.025 0.361 (0.412) 0.382 -3.246** (1.614) 0.044 -2.631** (1.284) 0.040 
SCH -0.348 (0.225) 0.122 -0.121 (0.586) 0.836 -0.120 (0.391) 0.759 -0.026 (0.332) 0.938 
SCH and RRC 0.123 (0.307) 0.689 -1.133** (0.459) 0.014 0.058 (0.299) 0.846 -0.030 (0.271) 0.912 
Not-for-profit 1.924*** (0.418) 0.000 -0.518 (0.662) 0.434 1.967*** (0.520) 0.000 1.817*** (0.475) 0.000 
Health system affiliation 0.531*** (0.078) 0.000 -0.317 (0.213) 0.139 0.533*** (0.079) 0.000 0.422*** (0.083) 0.000 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.260 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin -7.578*** (1.843) 0.000 -1.151 (0.884) 0.194 -7.518*** (1.995) 0.000 -6.501*** (1.505) 0.000 
Case mix index 1.364** (0.533) 0.010 -0.124 (0.828) 0.881 1.515** (0.709) 0.033 1.682*** (0.630) 0.008 
Readmission penalty 11.286 (13.039) 0.387 19.028* (11.431) 0.097 30.075 (28.217) 0.286 51.134 (31.454) 0.104 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.082* (0.044) 0.061 0.129 (0.143) 0.369 0.079* (0.044) 0.071 0.074* (0.043) 0.087 
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Panel 3 0.145*** (0.045) 0.001 -0.030 (0.150) 0.840 0.131** (0.054) 0.015 0.115** (0.046) 0.012 
Panel 4 0.169** (0.077) 0.029 0.337** (0.165) 0.043 0.176** (0.085) 0.038 0.200** (0.091) 0.029 
Panel 5 0.264*** (0.080) 0.001 0.298* (0.175) 0.091 0.257*** (0.077) 0.001 0.153** (0.067) 0.022 
Panel 6 0.218* (0.112) 0.052 0.516** (0.202) 0.011 0.298* (0.160) 0.063 0.300*** (0.091) 0.001 
Panel 7 0.356** (0.154) 0.021 0.497** (0.228) 0.030 0.533** (0.262) 0.042 0.640*** (0.177) 0.000 
Constant -13.564 (13.425) 0.312 -17.264 (11.310) 0.128 -32.560 (29.052) 0.262 -53.667* (32.114) 0.095 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-11 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on NP/PA FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.064 (0.435) 0.882 -0.059 (0.157) 0.710       
High Medicare reliance 0.216* (0.111) 0.051 0.261 (0.184) 0.156 0.208** (0.104) 0.046 0.215** (0.106) 0.043 
Bonus*High Medicare 
reliance -0.099 (0.388) 0.798 -0.143 (0.263) 0.589       
Cumulative bonus       0.281 (0.251) 0.262    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.175 (0.216) 0.418 -0.148 (0.238) 0.535 
At least 3 bonuses          1.086 (0.782) 0.165 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.113 (0.982) 0.908 
Rural -0.608* (0.343) 0.076 0.224 (0.269) 0.405 -0.528* (0.273) 0.053 -0.559* (0.310) 0.072 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern -1.314*** (0.419) 0.002    -1.242** (0.495) 0.012 -1.265*** (0.434) 0.004 
Northern -0.884*** (0.100) 0.000    -0.929*** (0.124) 0.000 -0.922*** (0.094) 0.000 
Northwest 0.182 (0.209) 0.385    0.249 (0.222) 0.264 0.190 (0.196) 0.332 
Southwest -0.001 (0.105) 0.996    -0.010 (0.105) 0.921 -0.024 (0.110) 0.826 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.920** (0.435) 0.034 -1.083* (0.585) 0.066 0.901** (0.389) 0.020 0.902** (0.415) 0.030 
MDH -3.702** (1.671) 0.027 0.402 (0.413) 0.331 -3.838** (1.757) 0.029 -3.848** (1.761) 0.029 
SCH -0.261 (0.353) 0.460 0.026 (0.608) 0.966 -0.434 (0.301) 0.150 -0.467 (0.355) 0.188 
SCH and RRC 0.104 (0.328) 0.751 -1.123** (0.461) 0.016 0.075 (0.291) 0.796 0.067 (0.314) 0.830 
Not-for-profit 1.922*** (0.436) 0.000 -0.434 (0.664) 0.514 2.421*** (0.854) 0.005 2.434** (1.080) 0.024 
Health system affiliation 0.533*** (0.090) 0.000 -0.225 (0.212) 0.291 0.535*** (0.077) 0.000 0.546*** (0.088) 0.000 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.305 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin -8.029*** (2.102) 0.000 -1.069 (0.886) 0.229 -8.301*** (2.243) 0.000 -8.143*** (2.182) 0.000 
Case mix index 1.229** (0.606) 0.042 -0.204 (0.833) 0.807 1.111* (0.614) 0.070 1.154* (0.606) 0.057 
Readmission penalty 19.647 (23.654) 0.406 20.056* (11.495) 0.082 16.325 (20.769) 0.432 20.714 (23.050) 0.369 
Panel fixed effects             
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Panel 2 0.087** (0.044) 0.046 0.125 (0.144) 0.385 0.088** (0.044) 0.046 0.090** (0.044) 0.038 
Panel 3 0.162*** (0.041) 0.000 -0.037 (0.150) 0.803 0.167*** (0.042) 0.000 0.169*** (0.043) 0.000 
Panel 4 0.172* (0.101) 0.091 0.369** (0.170) 0.031 0.171* (0.093) 0.066 0.186* (0.098) 0.058 
Panel 5 0.232*** (0.066) 0.000 0.316* (0.176) 0.075 0.220*** (0.060) 0.000 0.246*** (0.067) 0.000 
Panel 6 0.183** (0.090) 0.043 0.508** (0.199) 0.011 0.161** (0.079) 0.041 0.190** (0.080) 0.018 
Panel 7 0.330 (0.208) 0.113 0.610** (0.242) 0.013 0.296* (0.173) 0.088 0.339* (0.199) 0.089 
Constant -21.743 (23.946) 0.364 -18.313 (11.373) 0.109 -18.941 (21.063) 0.369 -23.250 (23.679) 0.326 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-12 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on RN FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.030 (0.050) 0.552 -0.017 (0.018) 0.356       
High Medicare reliance 0.000 (0.063) 0.998 -0.043** (0.019) 0.023 0.006 (0.073) 0.934 -0.001 (0.055) 0.986 
Penalty*High Medicare reliance 0.013 (0.086) 0.878 -0.026 (0.027) 0.347       
Cumulative penalty       0.001 (0.041) 0.986    
Cumulative penalty*High Medicare 
reliance       -0.002 (0.052) 0.974    
At least 3 penalties          0.077 (0.081) 0.343 
At least 3 penalties*High Medicare 
reliance          0.010 (0.128) 0.937 
Rural -0.455*** (0.138) 0.001 0.023 (0.026) 0.370 -0.457*** (0.138) 0.001 -0.448*** (0.138) 0.001 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.239** (0.110) 0.029    -0.234** (0.117) 0.045 -0.233** (0.105) 0.027 
Northern -0.235*** (0.054) 0.000    -0.243*** (0.058) 0.000 -0.257*** (0.059) 0.000 
Northwest 0.154** (0.064) 0.016    0.146** (0.066) 0.027 0.131** (0.059) 0.027 
Southwest -0.012 (0.054) 0.833    -0.013 (0.055) 0.817 -0.017 (0.055) 0.760 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.229 (0.147) 0.119 -0.047 (0.075) 0.536 0.224 (0.149) 0.133 0.211 (0.158) 0.182 
MDH -0.231 (0.329) 0.481 -0.117*** (0.037) 0.002 -0.238 (0.333) 0.474 -0.245 (0.339) 0.469 
SCH -0.012 (0.114) 0.919 -0.117 (0.078) 0.135 -0.009 (0.122) 0.944 -0.003 (0.125) 0.978 
SCH and RRC 0.121 (0.099) 0.221 0.000 (0.062) 0.995 0.116 (0.097) 0.236 0.121 (0.098) 0.217 
Not-for-profit 0.167** (0.083) 0.046 0.164** (0.070) 0.019 0.165* (0.084) 0.051 0.168** (0.084) 0.046 
Health system affiliation 0.035 (0.062) 0.573 -0.003 (0.022) 0.878 0.029 (0.067) 0.662 0.035 (0.059) 0.550 
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Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.836* (0.475) 0.078 0.193** (0.091) 0.034 0.830* (0.484) 0.086 0.837* (0.503) 0.096 
Case mix index 0.747*** (0.170) 0.000 0.019 (0.089) 0.830 0.735*** (0.192) 0.000 0.721*** (0.167) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -3.399 (4.253) 0.424 0.718 (1.081) 0.507 -3.127 (5.040) 0.535 -3.309 (5.029) 0.511 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.066 (0.047) 0.167 0.024 (0.017) 0.156 0.066 (0.047) 0.163 0.066 (0.047) 0.160 
Panel 3 0.024 (0.021) 0.257 0.021 (0.017) 0.215 0.024 (0.021) 0.251 0.024 (0.020) 0.229 
Panel 4 0.000 (0.022) 0.994 0.034* (0.018) 0.062 -0.003 (0.022) 0.889 -0.003 (0.021) 0.884 
Panel 5 -0.038 (0.028) 0.179 0.018 (0.019) 0.340 -0.048 (0.032) 0.130 -0.049* (0.028) 0.082 
Panel 6 -0.064 (0.050) 0.205 0.050** (0.022) 0.026 -0.079 (0.060) 0.189 -0.095* (0.051) 0.065 
Panel 7 -0.074* (0.039) 0.055 0.040* (0.024) 0.095 -0.086 (0.072) 0.233 -0.115** (0.054) 0.032 
Constant 7.685* (4.274) 0.072 4.214*** (1.075) 0.000 7.439 (5.136) 0.147 7.637 (5.081) 0.133 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-13 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on RN FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
VARIABLES coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.139*** (0.049) 0.005 0.008 (0.018) 0.659       
High Medicare reliance 0.016 (0.048) 0.744 -0.051*** (0.020) 0.010 0.004 (0.048) 0.941 0.009 (0.050) 0.861 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance -0.123* (0.071) 0.080 0.008 (0.026) 0.767       
Cumulative bonus       0.082*** (0.025) 0.001    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.056** (0.025) 0.025 0.001 (0.039) 0.973 
At least 3 bonuses          0.250*** (0.096) 0.009 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.197 (0.133) 0.139 
Rural -0.449*** (0.133) 0.001 0.033 (0.026) 0.200 -0.438*** (0.130) 0.001 -0.453*** (0.138) 0.001 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern -0.248** (0.105) 0.018    -0.252** (0.107) 0.019 -0.241** (0.107) 0.024 
Northern -0.249*** (0.051) 0.000    -0.256*** (0.048) 0.000 -0.266*** (0.055) 0.000 
Northwest 0.141** (0.062) 0.023    0.153*** (0.059) 0.010 0.142** (0.062) 0.022 
Southwest -0.011 (0.052) 0.830    -0.001 (0.053) 0.989 -0.027 (0.054) 0.612 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.228 (0.153) 0.135 -0.041 (0.076) 0.585 0.227 (0.147) 0.124 0.239 (0.148) 0.105 
MDH -0.243 (0.327) 0.456 -0.119*** (0.037) 0.001 -0.224 (0.316) 0.478 -0.233 (0.324) 0.472 
SCH -0.021 (0.113) 0.854 -0.118 (0.079) 0.138 -0.035 (0.115) 0.762 -0.032 (0.125) 0.795 
SCH and RRC 0.126 (0.093) 0.176 0.000 (0.062) 0.994 0.119 (0.088) 0.177 0.110 (0.094) 0.243 
Not-for-profit 0.199*** (0.077) 0.009 0.164** (0.070) 0.020 0.231*** (0.077) 0.003 0.191*** (0.073) 0.009 
Health system affiliation 0.036 (0.054) 0.507 -0.006 (0.023) 0.799 0.044 (0.055) 0.428 0.043 (0.056) 0.436 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.754 (0.475) 0.112 0.197** (0.091) 0.031 0.851* (0.466) 0.068 0.767 (0.474) 0.106 
Case mix index 0.742*** (0.163) 0.000 0.001 (0.088) 0.989 0.758*** (0.159) 0.000 0.696*** (0.165) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -5.166 (3.991) 0.196 0.676 (1.084) 0.533 -2.940 (3.986) 0.461 -3.372 (4.022) 0.402 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.066 (0.047) 0.160 0.024 (0.017) 0.152 0.066 (0.048) 0.165 0.066 (0.046) 0.155 
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Panel 3 0.024 (0.021) 0.241 0.023 (0.017) 0.192 0.023 (0.021) 0.282 0.025 (0.020) 0.200 
Panel 4 -0.027 (0.020) 0.165 0.024 (0.019) 0.193 -0.015 (0.018) 0.404 -0.003 (0.018) 0.889 
Panel 5 -0.071*** (0.027) 0.009 0.006 (0.019) 0.742 -0.073*** (0.027) 0.007 -0.047* (0.027) 0.085 
Panel 6 -0.102** (0.050) 0.042 0.038* (0.022) 0.087 -0.112** (0.052) 0.031 -0.095* (0.050) 0.061 
Panel 7 -0.121*** (0.040) 0.003 0.029 (0.025) 0.236 -0.133*** (0.043) 0.002 -0.103*** (0.038) 0.007 
Constant 9.419** (4.019) 0.019 4.271*** (1.078) 0.000 7.124* (4.050) 0.079 7.701* (4.061) 0.058 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-14 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on LPN FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.016 (0.121) 0.897 0.278*** (0.093) 0.003       
High Medicare reliance -0.001 (0.116) 0.993 0.037 (0.089) 0.675 -0.026 (0.131) 0.845 -0.091 (0.134) 0.496 
Penalty*High Medicare 
reliance -0.279 (0.205) 0.173 -0.083 (0.133) 0.533       
Cumulative penalty       -0.028 (0.074) 0.706    
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.077 (0.088) 0.380    
At least 3 penalties          -0.032 (0.176) 0.854 
At least 3 penalties*High 
Medicare reliance          0.003 (0.167) 0.985 
Rural -0.036 (0.165) 0.826 -0.063 (0.123) 0.610 -0.029 (0.170) 0.865 -0.001 (0.181) 0.994 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.397*** (0.151) 0.008    -0.410*** (0.153) 0.007 -0.386** (0.155) 0.013 
Northern -2.338*** (0.203) 0.000    -2.321*** (0.202) 0.000 -2.339*** (0.205) 0.000 
Northwest -0.091 (0.135) 0.499    -0.089 (0.146) 0.541 -0.090 (0.138) 0.516 
Southwest -0.238** (0.100) 0.017    -0.241** (0.100) 0.016 -0.232** (0.104) 0.026 
CMS provider type 
(ref=IPPS)             
RRC -0.037 (0.306) 0.904 -0.096 (0.356) 0.787 -0.038 (0.309) 0.903 -0.060 (0.309) 0.846 
MDH -0.451 (0.316) 0.154 -0.199 (0.173) 0.251 -0.472 (0.323) 0.144 -0.419 (0.330) 0.203 
SCH -0.117 (0.189) 0.535 0.292 (0.367) 0.427 -0.125 (0.196) 0.524 -0.097 (0.221) 0.660 
SCH and RRC 0.501** (0.203) 0.014 0.080 (0.291) 0.783 0.469** (0.200) 0.019 0.438** (0.213) 0.040 
Not-for-profit 0.683*** (0.137) 0.000 0.285 (0.331) 0.389 0.694*** (0.140) 0.000 0.677*** (0.135) 0.000 
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Health system affiliation 0.242** (0.096) 0.012 -0.131 (0.106) 0.220 0.241** (0.094) 0.010 0.253*** (0.096) 0.008 
Total number of patient 
days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000** (0.000) 0.027 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001 
Prior year operating 
margin -0.641 (0.782) 0.412 -0.865** (0.433) 0.047 -0.715 (0.787) 0.364 -0.558 (0.811) 0.492 
Case mix index 0.862*** (0.314) 0.006 -0.550 (0.445) 0.217 0.879*** (0.330) 0.008 0.835** (0.347) 0.016 
Readmission penalty -3.036 (7.356) 0.680 15.075*** (5.170) 0.004 -3.908 (7.393) 0.597 -2.843 (6.713) 0.672 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.043 (0.033) 0.184 0.027 (0.081) 0.742 0.043 (0.033) 0.195 0.042 (0.034) 0.211 
Panel 3 0.062 (0.062) 0.318 0.028 (0.083) 0.739 0.063 (0.063) 0.318 0.064 (0.062) 0.303 
Panel 4 0.059 (0.068) 0.384 -0.042 (0.089) 0.635 0.017 (0.075) 0.822 -0.003 (0.075) 0.969 
Panel 5 0.060 (0.099) 0.547 -0.122 (0.093) 0.190 0.058 (0.107) 0.590 0.017 (0.101) 0.864 
Panel 6 0.014 (0.101) 0.886 -0.218** (0.110) 0.048 0.022 (0.115) 0.847 -0.035 (0.111) 0.750 
Panel 7 -0.056 (0.098) 0.571 -0.161 (0.117) 0.170 -0.010 (0.130) 0.942 -0.063 (0.123) 0.611 
Constant 4.299 (7.251) 0.553 -12.077** (5.138) 0.019 5.166 (7.257) 0.477 4.154 (6.634) 0.531 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-15 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on LPN FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.193 (0.144) 0.180 0.024 (0.087) 0.780       
High Medicare reliance -0.081 (0.122) 0.507 0.125 (0.093) 0.181 -0.098 (0.116) 0.397 -0.120 (0.138) 0.382 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance -0.072 (0.181) 0.691 -0.331*** (0.124) 0.008       
Cumulative bonus       0.135 (0.102) 0.188    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.019 (0.098) 0.846 0.083 (0.093) 0.370 
At least 3 bonuses          0.272 (0.272) 0.318 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.208 (0.279) 0.455 
Rural 0.001 (0.165) 0.993 -0.138 (0.122) 0.257 0.022 (0.160) 0.890 0.024 (0.180) 0.893 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.402*** (0.150) 0.007    -0.414*** (0.146) 0.005 -0.404*** (0.153) 0.008 
Northern -2.356*** (0.205) 0.000    -2.369*** (0.200) 0.000 -2.366*** (0.204) 0.000 
Northwest -0.100 (0.121) 0.408    -0.099 (0.109) 0.365 -0.098 (0.121) 0.419 
Southwest -0.236** (0.104) 0.023    -0.226** (0.105) 0.031 -0.249** (0.104) 0.016 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC -0.069 (0.314) 0.826 -0.015 (0.357) 0.966 -0.078 (0.311) 0.802 -0.069 (0.307) 0.823 
MDH -0.423 (0.330) 0.200 -0.144 (0.172) 0.405 -0.432 (0.328) 0.188 -0.435 (0.329) 0.186 
SCH -0.139 (0.219) 0.526 0.435 (0.373) 0.244 -0.221 (0.198) 0.265 -0.204 (0.205) 0.320 
SCH and RRC 0.432** (0.181) 0.017 0.074 (0.292) 0.799 0.410*** (0.152) 0.007 0.419** (0.171) 0.014 
Not-for-profit 0.752*** (0.156) 0.000 0.286 (0.332) 0.389 0.845*** (0.210) 0.000 0.724*** (0.145) 0.000 
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Health system affiliation 0.259*** (0.090) 0.004 -0.086 (0.107) 0.424 0.254*** (0.088) 0.004 0.261*** (0.095) 0.006 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000* (0.000) 0.056 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin -0.649 (0.862) 0.452 -0.978** (0.433) 0.025 -0.737 (0.908) 0.417 -0.679 (0.851) 0.425 
Case mix index 0.829** (0.325) 0.011 -0.497 (0.443) 0.263 0.876*** (0.317) 0.006 0.825** (0.327) 0.012 
Readmission penalty -4.715 (6.495) 0.468 14.927*** (5.174) 0.004 -4.324 (6.592) 0.512 -3.674 (6.900) 0.594 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.044 (0.033) 0.189 0.025 (0.081) 0.754 0.045 (0.034) 0.182 0.043 (0.034) 0.212 
Panel 3 0.066 (0.062) 0.288 0.020 (0.083) 0.808 0.068 (0.064) 0.288 0.066 (0.064) 0.303 
Panel 4 -0.039 (0.088) 0.653 0.057 (0.092) 0.535 -0.020 (0.074) 0.791 -0.001 (0.077) 0.992 
Panel 5 -0.016 (0.111) 0.884 -0.016 (0.095) 0.870 -0.027 (0.108) 0.804 0.012 (0.109) 0.911 
Panel 6 -0.076 (0.106) 0.474 -0.118 (0.109) 0.279 -0.114 (0.106) 0.283 -0.075 (0.107) 0.480 
Panel 7 -0.139 (0.124) 0.262 -0.032 (0.124) 0.796 -0.182 (0.124) 0.143 -0.127 (0.129) 0.323 
Constant 5.941 (6.427) 0.355 -11.983** (5.141) 0.020 5.395 (6.513) 0.407 4.952 (6.858) 0.470 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-16 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penaltiess on nursing aide FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.160 (0.111) 0.151 -0.150** (0.075) 0.048       
High Medicare reliance 0.281 (0.171) 0.100 0.079 (0.075) 0.298 0.269 (0.180) 0.135 0.260 (0.167) 0.118 
Penalty*High Medicare reliance -0.129 (0.204) 0.526 0.224** (0.111) 0.045       
Cumulative penalty       -0.095 (0.077) 0.220    
Cumulative penalty*High Medicare 
reliance       -0.020 (0.095) 0.835    
At least 3 penalties          -0.186 (0.153) 0.226 
At least 3 penalties*High Medicare 
reliance          0.006 (0.249) 0.980 
Rural -1.176*** (0.401) 0.003 0.222** (0.105) 0.035 -1.206*** (0.399) 0.002 -1.226*** (0.401) 0.002 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.010 (0.199) 0.960    -0.014 (0.211) 0.947 0.024 (0.202) 0.904 
Northern -0.403*** (0.142) 0.005    -0.391*** (0.134) 0.003 -0.393*** (0.149) 0.008 
Northwest -0.251* (0.134) 0.062    -0.237* (0.134) 0.077 -0.257* (0.136) 0.059 
Southwest -0.678* (0.395) 0.086    -0.680* (0.400) 0.089 -0.644* (0.388) 0.097 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.831* (0.502) 0.098 -0.027 (0.305) 0.930 0.892* (0.497) 0.073 0.834 (0.536) 0.120 
MDH 0.564 (0.459) 0.219 -0.011 (0.148) 0.941 0.606 (0.481) 0.208 0.621 (0.471) 0.187 
SCH 0.711* (0.382) 0.063 0.042 (0.314) 0.894 0.733* (0.393) 0.062 0.755* (0.389) 0.053 
SCH and RRC 0.257 (0.231) 0.265 -0.069 (0.249) 0.781 0.192 (0.227) 0.398 0.128 (0.225) 0.570 
Not-for-profit -0.408* (0.228) 0.073 0.199 (0.283) 0.482 -0.406* (0.238) 0.088 -0.439* (0.237) 0.064 
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Health system affiliation -0.170 (0.135) 0.208 -0.026 (0.091) 0.777 -0.186 (0.145) 0.199 -0.210 (0.131) 0.110 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.192 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 1.071 (0.936) 0.253 -0.166 (0.378) 0.660 1.003 (0.958) 0.295 1.099 (0.930) 0.237 
Case mix index 0.276 (0.429) 0.520 0.097 (0.359) 0.787 0.306 (0.420) 0.466 0.326 (0.423) 0.441 
Readmission penalty -15.689* (8.521) 0.066 4.348 (4.380) 0.321 -14.110 (8.583) 0.100 -13.360 (8.370) 0.110 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.058 (0.044) 0.190 0.031 (0.068) 0.645 0.059 (0.044) 0.177 0.059 (0.044) 0.183 
Panel 3 0.084 (0.060) 0.160 -0.002 (0.070) 0.983 0.083 (0.060) 0.166 0.078 (0.058) 0.179 
Panel 4 -0.013 (0.096) 0.894 0.021 (0.074) 0.780 -0.024 (0.093) 0.796 -0.039 (0.088) 0.654 
Panel 5 0.020 (0.085) 0.818 0.050 (0.077) 0.518 0.016 (0.085) 0.848 -0.017 (0.072) 0.812 
Panel 6 -0.195* (0.112) 0.081 0.126 (0.090) 0.163 -0.178 (0.117) 0.128 -0.255* (0.151) 0.091 
Panel 7 -0.086 (0.083) 0.305 0.200** (0.096) 0.038 -0.027 (0.108) 0.798 -0.094 (0.096) 0.326 
Constant 19.833** (8.528) 0.020 -1.233 (4.353) 0.777 18.245** (8.526) 0.032 17.499** (8.302) 0.035 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-17 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on nursing aide FTEs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.028 (0.110) 0.800 -0.023 (0.074) 0.753       
High Medicare reliance 0.213 (0.148) 0.151 0.109 (0.079) 0.171 0.171 (0.157) 0.277 0.223 (0.155) 0.149 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance 0.107 (0.236) 0.651 0.053 (0.106) 0.619       
Cumulative bonus       0.071 (0.063) 0.257    
Cumulative bonus*High Medicare 
reliance       0.054 (0.080) 0.494    
At least 3 bonuses          -0.372 (0.272) 0.171 
At least 3 bonuses*High Medicare 
reliance          0.584* (0.309) 0.059 
Rural -1.166*** (0.434) 0.007 0.211** (0.104) 0.044 -1.094*** (0.420) 0.009 -1.158*** (0.420) 0.006 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern 0.006 (0.196) 0.976    -0.032 (0.193) 0.869 0.009 (0.190) 0.963 
Northern -0.420*** (0.156) 0.007    -0.447*** (0.159) 0.005 -0.381** (0.175) 0.029 
Northwest -0.272** (0.138) 0.049    -0.250* (0.133) 0.060 -0.279** (0.127) 0.028 
Southwest -0.655* (0.379) 0.084    -0.673* (0.401) 0.093 -0.651* (0.375) 0.082 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.772 (0.525) 0.142 -0.077 (0.307) 0.803 0.778 (0.502) 0.122 0.735 (0.534) 0.169 
MDH 0.581 (0.461) 0.208 -0.045 (0.148) 0.763 0.574 (0.500) 0.250 0.584 (0.475) 0.219 
SCH 0.726* (0.385) 0.059 0.033 (0.321) 0.918 0.630 (0.409) 0.123 0.670* (0.383) 0.080 
SCH and RRC 0.172 (0.214) 0.423 -0.067 (0.251) 0.790 0.164 (0.202) 0.417 0.149 (0.191) 0.435 
Not-for-profit -0.421* (0.222) 0.058 0.231 (0.285) 0.418 -0.351 (0.237) 0.137 -0.460** (0.223) 0.039 
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Health system affiliation -0.189 (0.127) 0.138 -0.038 (0.092) 0.681 -0.165 (0.133) 0.217 -0.201 (0.124) 0.104 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.194 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 1.151 (0.942) 0.222 -0.119 (0.380) 0.753 1.046 (0.958) 0.275 1.282 (0.966) 0.185 
Case mix index 0.318 (0.426) 0.455 0.122 (0.359) 0.733 0.315 (0.400) 0.431 0.376 (0.438) 0.391 
Readmission penalty -14.538* (7.727) 0.060 4.915 (4.404) 0.265 -14.692* (8.547) 0.086 -12.655 (7.748) 0.102 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.060 (0.044) 0.178 0.032 (0.069) 0.642 0.061 (0.043) 0.160 0.060 (0.044) 0.170 
Panel 3 0.081 (0.058) 0.162 -0.002 (0.070) 0.973 0.082 (0.058) 0.156 0.080 (0.056) 0.155 
Panel 4 -0.061 (0.103) 0.556 0.003 (0.076) 0.971 -0.064 (0.086) 0.455 -0.027 (0.084) 0.742 
Panel 5 -0.040 (0.089) 0.654 0.030 (0.079) 0.707 -0.079 (0.082) 0.340 -0.007 (0.068) 0.920 
Panel 6 -0.295* (0.161) 0.066 0.108 (0.090) 0.228 -0.352** (0.145) 0.015 -0.251 (0.163) 0.122 
Panel 7 -0.158 (0.102) 0.122 0.168* (0.101) 0.097 -0.266* (0.138) 0.054 -0.108 (0.093) 0.243 
Constant 18.658** (7.670) 0.015 -1.851 (4.376) 0.672 18.765** (8.505) 0.027 16.747** (7.583) 0.027 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-18 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on all nursing FTEs (RN and LPN) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.023 (0.049) 0.636 -0.003 (0.019) 0.859       
High Medicare reliance 0.008 (0.063) 0.903 -0.042** (0.020) 0.035 0.013 (0.072) 0.857 0.002 (0.055) 0.972 
Penalty*High Medicare reliance -0.007 (0.090) 0.936 -0.031 (0.029) 0.280       
Cumulative penalty       0.004 (0.040) 0.911    
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.009 (0.051) 0.861    
At least 3 penalties          0.086 (0.077) 0.263 
At least 3 penalties*High Medicare 
reliance          -0.004 (0.123) 0.973 
Rural -0.411*** (0.139) 0.003 0.014 (0.027) 0.602 -0.413*** (0.140) 0.003 -0.404*** (0.140) 0.004 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.251** (0.108) 0.020    -0.245** (0.114) 0.032 -0.244** (0.104) 0.018 
Northern -0.296*** (0.055) 0.000    -0.305*** (0.059) 0.000 -0.318*** (0.060) 0.000 
Northwest 0.131** (0.065) 0.044    0.122* (0.067) 0.070 0.108* (0.060) 0.073 
Southwest -0.029 (0.054) 0.599    -0.030 (0.055) 0.586 -0.034 (0.054) 0.531 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.208 (0.142) 0.143 -0.071 (0.080) 0.376 0.201 (0.144) 0.162 0.189 (0.152) 0.213 
MDH -0.252 (0.327) 0.441 -0.108*** (0.039) 0.005 -0.260 (0.330) 0.432 -0.263 (0.336) 0.435 
SCH -0.021 (0.119) 0.862 -0.092 (0.082) 0.264 -0.019 (0.126) 0.881 -0.012 (0.129) 0.927 
SCH and RRC 0.151 (0.108) 0.159 0.007 (0.065) 0.920 0.144 (0.108) 0.180 0.148 (0.108) 0.169 
Not-for-profit 0.196** (0.082) 0.017 0.158** (0.074) 0.034 0.194** (0.083) 0.020 0.197** (0.083) 0.017 
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Health system affiliation 0.048 (0.060) 0.423 -0.019 (0.024) 0.418 0.043 (0.065) 0.510 0.050 (0.057) 0.381 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.724 (0.464) 0.119 0.083 (0.096) 0.387 0.721 (0.469) 0.124 0.734 (0.486) 0.131 
Case mix index 0.754*** (0.169) 0.000 0.025 (0.093) 0.786 0.738*** (0.189) 0.000 0.725*** (0.166) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -3.225 (4.060) 0.427 1.473 (1.142) 0.198 -3.038 (4.708) 0.519 -3.143 (4.720) 0.506 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.064 (0.045) 0.160 0.020 (0.018) 0.267 0.064 (0.045) 0.156 0.064 (0.045) 0.153 
Panel 3 0.024 (0.021) 0.261 0.019 (0.018) 0.308 0.025 (0.021) 0.251 0.025 (0.021) 0.235 
Panel 4 0.000 (0.023) 0.999 0.025 (0.019) 0.193 -0.005 (0.022) 0.824 -0.005 (0.022) 0.810 
Panel 5 -0.036 (0.027) 0.185 0.006 (0.020) 0.780 -0.045 (0.031) 0.145 -0.045 (0.029) 0.117 
Panel 6 -0.064 (0.049) 0.194 0.034 (0.023) 0.146 -0.079 (0.058) 0.170 -0.094* (0.050) 0.060 
Panel 7 -0.076** (0.037) 0.044 0.021 (0.025) 0.404 -0.089 (0.067) 0.188 -0.116** (0.052) 0.025 
Constant 7.562* (4.069) 0.063 3.558*** (1.135) 0.002 7.406 (4.789) 0.122 7.522 (4.761) 0.114 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-19 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on all nursing FTEs (RN and LPN) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.136*** (0.049) 0.005 0.017 (0.019) 0.359       
High Medicare reliance 0.015 (0.049) 0.759 -0.040* (0.021) 0.055 0.002 (0.049) 0.962 0.009 (0.047) 0.844 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance -0.115* (0.069) 0.095 -0.029 (0.027) 0.293       
Cumulative bonus       0.082*** (0.024) 0.001    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.050** (0.024) 0.036    
At least 3 bonuses          0.248*** (0.086) 0.004 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.177** (0.089) 0.047 
Rural -0.404*** (0.135) 0.003 0.019 (0.027) 0.495 -0.392*** (0.131) 0.003 -0.407*** (0.138) 0.003 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.260** (0.104) 0.012    -0.264** (0.105) 0.012 -0.253** (0.102) 0.014 
Northern -0.309*** (0.052) 0.000    -0.315*** (0.049) 0.000 -0.325*** (0.055) 0.000 
Northwest 0.119* (0.062) 0.056    0.131** (0.060) 0.028 0.119* (0.061) 0.050 
Southwest -0.028 (0.053) 0.598    -0.018 (0.053) 0.742 -0.043 (0.053) 0.418 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.206 (0.147) 0.161 -0.056 (0.080) 0.486 0.204 (0.142) 0.152 0.217 (0.142) 0.126 
MDH -0.258 (0.326) 0.428 -0.107*** (0.038) 0.005 -0.241 (0.317) 0.448 -0.250 (0.324) 0.441 
SCH -0.028 (0.119) 0.812 -0.076 (0.084) 0.364 -0.048 (0.118) 0.687 -0.044 (0.128) 0.730 
SCH and RRC 0.153 (0.101) 0.129 0.006 (0.065) 0.931 0.145 (0.094) 0.124 0.136 (0.101) 0.176 
Not-for-profit 0.229*** (0.076) 0.003 0.160** (0.074) 0.032 0.261*** (0.078) 0.001 0.220*** (0.073) 0.002 
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Health system affiliation 0.051 (0.053) 0.332 -0.017 (0.024) 0.466 0.058 (0.053) 0.273 0.058 (0.053) 0.271 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.656 (0.464) 0.158 0.078 (0.096) 0.414 0.742 (0.456) 0.104 0.664 (0.464) 0.152 
Case mix index 0.749*** (0.163) 0.000 0.008 (0.093) 0.934 0.767*** (0.159) 0.000 0.706*** (0.161) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -4.945 (3.869) 0.201 1.391 (1.142) 0.224 -2.808 (3.797) 0.460 -3.229 (3.857) 0.403 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.065 (0.045) 0.154 0.020 (0.018) 0.255 0.064 (0.046) 0.160 0.064 (0.044) 0.150 
Panel 3 0.024 (0.021) 0.255 0.019 (0.018) 0.291 0.022 (0.021) 0.298 0.025 (0.020) 0.212 
Panel 4 -0.029 (0.022) 0.189 0.020 (0.020) 0.314 -0.017 (0.020) 0.388 -0.005 (0.020) 0.806 
Panel 5 -0.067** (0.030) 0.022 -0.002 (0.020) 0.908 -0.070** (0.029) 0.017 -0.043 (0.027) 0.106 
Panel 6 -0.102** (0.050) 0.043 0.025 (0.023) 0.277 -0.112** (0.052) 0.032 -0.094* (0.050) 0.058 
Panel 7 -0.120*** (0.042) 0.005 0.018 (0.026) 0.500 -0.133*** (0.046) 0.004 -0.103*** (0.038) 0.007 
Constant 9.244** (3.886) 0.017 3.652*** (1.135) 0.001 7.039* (3.851) 0.068 7.601* (3.887) 0.051 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-20 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on nursing and nursing aide FTEs (RN, LPN and aide) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.042 (0.053) 0.429 -0.022 (0.023) 0.336       
High Medicare reliance 0.058 (0.073) 0.425 -0.013 (0.023) 0.569 0.063 (0.080) 0.427 0.052 (0.065) 0.426 
Penalty*High Medicare 
reliance -0.026 (0.100) 0.797 0.005 (0.034) 0.875       
Cumulative penalty       -0.006 (0.042) 0.882    
Cumulative penalty*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.017 (0.053) 0.751    
At least 3 penalties          0.064 (0.080) 0.426 
At least 3 penalties*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.026 (0.133) 0.846 
Rural -0.504*** (0.171) 0.003 0.046 (0.032) 0.152 -0.510*** (0.172) 0.003 -0.502*** (0.174) 0.004 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.223** (0.107) 0.038    -0.219* (0.113) 0.052 -0.213** (0.103) 0.038 
Northern -0.311*** (0.053) 0.000    -0.317*** (0.056) 0.000 -0.331*** (0.059) 0.000 
Northwest 0.059 (0.068) 0.381    0.054 (0.069) 0.437 0.038 (0.063) 0.549 
Southwest -0.154*** (0.057) 0.006    -0.155*** (0.056) 0.006 -0.156*** (0.057) 0.006 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.295* (0.168) 0.078 -0.057 (0.093) 0.540 0.291* (0.168) 0.083 0.275 (0.178) 0.121 
MDH -0.137 (0.346) 0.691 -0.106** (0.045) 0.020 -0.143 (0.346) 0.679 -0.146 (0.356) 0.682 
SCH 0.100 (0.133) 0.449 -0.075 (0.096) 0.435 0.103 (0.137) 0.452 0.112 (0.145) 0.442 
SCH and RRC 0.169 (0.121) 0.161 -0.006 (0.076) 0.941 0.156 (0.120) 0.195 0.153 (0.122) 0.210 
Not-for-profit 0.088 (0.060) 0.145 0.174** (0.086) 0.044 0.086 (0.062) 0.163 0.086 (0.060) 0.149 
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Health system affiliation 0.024 (0.065) 0.710 -0.019 (0.028) 0.487 0.015 (0.069) 0.822 0.021 (0.061) 0.734 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.757 (0.483) 0.117 0.035 (0.112) 0.753 0.750 (0.480) 0.118 0.775 (0.503) 0.123 
Case mix index 0.693*** (0.175) 0.000 0.013 (0.109) 0.904 0.680*** (0.194) 0.000 0.667*** (0.173) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -6.083* (3.412) 0.075 2.216* (1.332) 0.097 -5.690 (3.730) 0.127 -5.778 (3.910) 0.140 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.064 (0.044) 0.147 0.025 (0.021) 0.227 0.064 (0.044) 0.144 0.064 (0.044) 0.141 
Panel 3 0.036*** (0.014) 0.008 0.019 (0.021) 0.360 0.037*** (0.014) 0.008 0.037*** (0.014) 0.008 
Panel 4 0.002 (0.021) 0.932 0.029 (0.022) 0.190 -0.006 (0.020) 0.762 -0.010 (0.020) 0.616 
Panel 5 -0.021 (0.028) 0.467 0.024 (0.023) 0.314 -0.030 (0.029) 0.302 -0.037 (0.027) 0.166 
Panel 6 -0.085* (0.051) 0.092 0.057** (0.027) 0.036 -0.097* (0.057) 0.088 -0.121** (0.058) 0.036 
Panel 7 -0.074** (0.033) 0.025 0.059** (0.029) 0.042 -0.075 (0.061) 0.218 -0.110** (0.048) 0.022 
Constant 10.839*** (3.434) 0.002 2.939** (1.324) 0.027 10.477*** (3.817) 0.006 10.580*** (3.968) 0.008 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-21 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on nursing and nursing aide FTEs (RN, LPN and aide) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.114** (0.050) 0.023 0.007 (0.022) 0.754       
High Medicare reliance 0.052 (0.062) 0.405 -0.015 (0.024) 0.537 0.036 (0.061) 0.558 0.048 (0.059) 0.415 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance -0.066 (0.079) 0.405 0.008 (0.032) 0.806       
Cumulative bonus       0.076*** (0.025) 0.002    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.027 (0.031) 0.385    
At least 3 bonuses          0.159* (0.083) 0.057 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.043 (0.100) 0.669 
Rural -0.492*** (0.172) 0.004 0.050 (0.032) 0.113 -0.472*** (0.166) 0.005 -0.493*** (0.176) 0.005 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.228** (0.103) 0.026    -0.237** (0.103) 0.022 -0.220** (0.102) 0.031 
Northern -0.329*** (0.052) 0.000    -0.337*** (0.050) 0.000 -0.339*** (0.057) 0.000 
Northwest 0.046 (0.065) 0.478    0.059 (0.063) 0.343 0.047 (0.064) 0.455 
Southwest -0.153*** (0.057) 0.007    -0.145** (0.056) 0.010 -0.166*** (0.057) 0.004 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.287* (0.174) 0.099 -0.059 (0.093) 0.527 0.280* (0.168) 0.095 0.291* (0.170) 0.087 
MDH -0.141 (0.348) 0.686 -0.110** (0.045) 0.015 -0.129 (0.342) 0.707 -0.136 (0.350) 0.698 
SCH 0.093 (0.139) 0.505 -0.078 (0.097) 0.425 0.059 (0.136) 0.661 0.068 (0.150) 0.650 
SCH and RRC 0.162 (0.116) 0.160 -0.006 (0.076) 0.934 0.151 (0.105) 0.150 0.139 (0.113) 0.218 
Not-for-profit 0.116** (0.059) 0.049 0.176** (0.086) 0.043 0.151** (0.064) 0.019 0.104* (0.060) 0.085 
 170 
Appendices  
 
Health system affiliation 0.026 (0.057) 0.652 -0.021 (0.028) 0.441 0.034 (0.058) 0.556 0.028 (0.057) 0.632 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.721 (0.492) 0.143 0.042 (0.112) 0.709 0.771 (0.485) 0.112 0.717 (0.489) 0.142 
Case mix index 0.684*** (0.167) 0.000 0.005 (0.108) 0.962 0.700*** (0.160) 0.000 0.648*** (0.171) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -7.356** (3.479) 0.034 2.233* (1.332) 0.094 -5.407* (3.222) 0.093 -5.450 (3.537) 0.123 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 0.064 (0.044) 0.144 0.025 (0.021) 0.224 0.064 (0.044) 0.148 0.064 (0.043) 0.140 
Panel 3 0.036*** (0.014) 0.008 0.020 (0.021) 0.346 0.035** (0.014) 0.014 0.037*** (0.013) 0.006 
Panel 4 -0.033 (0.024) 0.162 0.021 (0.023) 0.356 -0.022 (0.019) 0.243 -0.007 (0.018) 0.683 
Panel 5 -0.061** (0.030) 0.044 0.014 (0.024) 0.560 -0.066** (0.028) 0.018 -0.035 (0.025) 0.165 
Panel 6 -0.136** (0.057) 0.018 0.048* (0.027) 0.074 -0.150*** (0.058) 0.009 -0.123** (0.057) 0.031 
Panel 7 -0.126*** (0.044) 0.005 0.049 (0.030) 0.109 -0.148*** (0.049) 0.003 -0.105*** (0.040) 0.008 
Constant 12.090*** (3.503) 0.001 2.927** (1.324) 0.028 10.076*** (3.260) 0.002 10.258*** (3.570) 0.004 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-22 
Series of sensitivity analyses for penalties on other staff FTEs  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Penalty -0.093 (0.064) 0.149 -0.012 (0.027) 0.647       
High Medicare reliance -0.116** (0.059) 0.048 -0.046* (0.027) 0.089 -0.129** (0.060) 0.032 -0.106** (0.048) 0.027 
Penalty*High Medicare reliance 0.094 (0.087) 0.280 0.007 (0.040) 0.852       
Cumulative penalty       -0.039 (0.041) 0.331    
Cumulative penalty*High Medicare 
reliance       0.052** (0.024) 0.030    
At least 3 penalties          0.030 (0.089) 0.734 
At least 3 penalties*High Medicare 
reliance          0.114** (0.057) 0.046 
Rural -0.276** (0.121) 0.023 -0.079** (0.038) 0.037 -0.284** (0.125) 0.023 -0.268** (0.127) 0.034 
Region (ref= Central) 
            
Eastern -0.096 (0.060) 0.107    -0.099 (0.063) 0.117 -0.079 (0.057) 0.166 
Northern -0.534*** (0.162) 0.001    -0.540*** (0.173) 0.002 -0.585*** (0.178) 0.001 
Northwest 0.330*** (0.070) 0.000    0.337*** (0.074) 0.000 0.304*** (0.067) 0.000 
Southwest 0.459*** (0.074) 0.000    0.457*** (0.074) 0.000 0.450*** (0.077) 0.000 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS) 
            
RRC 0.110 (0.144) 0.444 0.132 (0.109) 0.229 0.124 (0.137) 0.366 0.098 (0.149) 0.512 
MDH -0.294 (0.315) 0.351 -0.139*** (0.053) 0.009 -0.271 (0.310) 0.382 -0.295 (0.308) 0.339 
SCH 0.020 (0.089) 0.820 0.028 (0.113) 0.805 0.051 (0.096) 0.591 0.054 (0.093) 0.566 
SCH and RRC 0.300*** (0.092) 0.001 0.247*** (0.089) 0.006 0.291*** (0.088) 0.001 0.304*** (0.092) 0.001 
Not-for-profit 0.761*** (0.107) 0.000 -0.001 (0.101) 0.995 0.757*** (0.107) 0.000 0.755*** (0.111) 0.000 
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Health system affiliation 0.076 (0.077) 0.323 -0.015 (0.033) 0.645 0.076 (0.079) 0.338 0.073 (0.081) 0.363 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 1.193** (0.475) 0.012 -0.170 (0.131) 0.197 1.200** (0.467) 0.010 1.226*** (0.445) 0.006 
Case mix index 1.168*** (0.250) 0.000 0.152 (0.128) 0.237 1.179*** (0.260) 0.000 1.101*** (0.246) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -6.680 (4.301) 0.120 2.111 (1.565) 0.178 -4.720 (4.276) 0.270 -4.200 (4.466) 0.347 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 -0.071*** (0.025) 0.004 -0.025 (0.024) 0.307 -0.072*** (0.025) 0.005 -0.070*** (0.025) 0.004 
Panel 3 -0.066 (0.040) 0.102 0.031 (0.025) 0.217 -0.066* (0.040) 0.094 -0.062 (0.039) 0.108 
Panel 4 -0.093** (0.047) 0.048 0.015 (0.026) 0.570 -0.092** (0.040) 0.021 -0.087** (0.041) 0.035 
Panel 5 -0.145*** (0.053) 0.006 -0.012 (0.027) 0.671 -0.154*** (0.053) 0.004 -0.166*** (0.052) 0.001 
Panel 6 -0.145* (0.079) 0.066 0.019 (0.032) 0.558 -0.152** (0.077) 0.048 -0.191*** (0.071) 0.007 
Panel 7 -0.222*** (0.081) 0.006 -0.034 (0.034) 0.327 -0.201** (0.085) 0.018 -0.257*** (0.077) 0.001 
Constant 10.324** (4.279) 0.016 3.315** (1.556) 0.034 8.360** (4.262) 0.050 7.935* (4.467) 0.076 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-23 
Series of sensitivity analyses for bonuses on other staff FTEs  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 GLM Panel Accumulation  At least 3 
 coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval coef se pval 
                          
Bonus 0.268*** (0.075) 0.000 0.047* (0.026) 0.070       
High Medicare reliance -0.066 (0.049) 0.180 -0.031 (0.028) 0.265 -0.068 (0.047) 0.149 -0.064 (0.046) 0.161 
Bonus*High Medicare reliance -0.183* (0.101) 0.070 -0.048 (0.037) 0.198       
Cumulative bonus       0.166*** (0.039) 0.000    
Cumulative bonus*High 
Medicare reliance       -0.114** (0.045) 0.012    
At least 3 bonuses          0.454*** (0.133) 0.001 
At least 3 bonuses*High 
Medicare reliance          -0.409** (0.189) 0.031 
Rural -0.275** (0.109) 0.011 -0.083** (0.037) 0.025 -0.272** (0.107) 0.011 -0.294** (0.122) 0.016 
Region (ref= Central)             
Eastern -0.112** (0.056) 0.046    -0.101** (0.050) 0.045 -0.088* (0.051) 0.083 
Northern -0.575*** (0.156) 0.000    -0.574*** (0.141) 0.000 -0.583*** (0.148) 0.000 
Northwest 0.299*** (0.068) 0.000    0.308*** (0.065) 0.000 0.292*** (0.065) 0.000 
Southwest 0.450*** (0.073) 0.000    0.469*** (0.070) 0.000 0.438*** (0.069) 0.000 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)             
RRC 0.104 (0.158) 0.509 0.139 (0.109) 0.201 0.122 (0.149) 0.412 0.139 (0.146) 0.343 
MDH -0.326 (0.314) 0.299 -0.140*** (0.053) 0.008 -0.308 (0.306) 0.314 -0.320 (0.317) 0.311 
SCH -0.017 (0.085) 0.838 0.043 (0.114) 0.707 -0.055 (0.106) 0.604 0.001 (0.133) 0.994 
SCH and RRC 0.292*** (0.077) 0.000 0.240*** (0.089) 0.007 0.278*** (0.072) 0.000 0.285*** (0.080) 0.000 
Not-for-profit 0.816*** (0.106) 0.000 0.000 (0.101) 0.999 0.886*** (0.109) 0.000 0.793*** (0.093) 0.000 
Health system affiliation 0.063 (0.071) 0.375 -0.011 (0.033) 0.733 0.058 (0.061) 0.342 0.064 (0.068) 0.348 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 
Prior year operating margin 0.943** (0.450) 0.036 -0.177 (0.131) 0.175 0.983** (0.438) 0.025 0.940** (0.455) 0.039 
Case mix index 1.135*** (0.240) 0.000 0.143 (0.127) 0.261 1.163*** (0.225) 0.000 1.106*** (0.230) 0.000 
Readmission penalty -7.949** (3.221) 0.014 2.021 (1.558) 0.195 -6.504* (3.408) 0.056 -6.402 (3.966) 0.106 
Panel fixed effects             
Panel 2 -0.068*** (0.025) 0.006 -0.024 (0.024) 0.315 -0.069*** (0.025) 0.006 -0.069*** (0.025) 0.006 
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Panel 3 -0.063 (0.040) 0.112 0.031 (0.025) 0.216 -0.066 (0.041) 0.104 -0.061 (0.039) 0.118 
Panel 4 -0.120*** (0.040) 0.003 0.002 (0.027) 0.927 -0.108*** (0.041) 0.008 -0.093** (0.040) 0.020 
Panel 5 -0.191*** (0.053) 0.000 -0.028 (0.028) 0.314 -0.194*** (0.055) 0.000 -0.162*** (0.052) 0.002 
Panel 6 -0.200*** (0.077) 0.010 0.005 (0.031) 0.878 -0.216*** (0.080) 0.007 -0.187** (0.077) 0.015 
Panel 7 -0.308*** (0.066) 0.000 -0.050 (0.036) 0.161 -0.317*** (0.071) 0.000 -0.264*** (0.073) 0.000 
Constant 11.570*** (3.210) 0.000 3.405** (1.548) 0.028 9.998*** (3.410) 0.003 10.105** (3.965) 0.011 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-24 
Provider FTEs following implementation of HVBP (post) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Direct 
patient 
care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing Aides Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Post HVBP -0.058 -0.019 -0.852 -0.091 -0.026 -0.317** -0.250*** -0.170*** 
 (0.077) (0.123) (0.605) (0.419) (0.070) (0.124) (0.080) (0.066) 
High Medicare reliance 0.023 0.011 0.596* 0.223** -0.002 -0.014 0.145 -0.049 
 (0.052) (0.082) (0.314) (0.104) (0.044) (0.066) (0.097) (0.048) 
Rural -0.372** -0.533*** -1.578 -0.669** -0.488*** -0.148 -0.818*** -0.389*** 
 (0.162) (0.158) (2.583) (0.340) (0.151) (0.158) (0.263) (0.135) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.005 0.196 -1.583** -1.163** -0.176 0.082 0.140 0.164* 
 (0.080) (0.144) (0.773) (0.456) (0.169) (0.112) (0.171) (0.087) 
Northern -0.274** 0.000 -1.820*** -0.874*** -0.219*** -1.082*** -0.009 -0.087 
 (0.117) (0.193) (0.297) (0.217) (0.064) (0.338) (0.161) (0.151) 
Northwest 0.184*** 0.212 -0.548 0.164 0.159** -0.053 0.040 0.302*** 
 (0.063) (0.370) (0.945) (0.328) (0.065) (0.082) (0.201) (0.067) 
Southwest 0.119* 0.093 -1.197** -0.059 0.010 0.079 -0.027 0.317*** 
 (0.063) (0.192) (0.502) (0.353) (0.063) (0.106) (0.262) (0.080) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)         
Rural referral center (RRC) 0.238 0.416 1.474 1.003** 0.247 0.195 0.362 0.330** 
 (0.164) (0.438) (3.481) (0.412) (0.162) (0.178) (0.480) (0.135) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) -0.474 0.275 -6.799* -3.885** -0.221 -0.392 0.011 -0.158 
 (0.338) (0.242) (3.475) (1.663) (0.330) (0.266) (0.313) (0.284) 
Sole community hospital 
(SCH) -0.018 0.391* -0.589 -0.385** 0.018 -0.096 0.275 0.165 
 (0.153) (0.216) (0.498) (0.174) (0.134) (0.251) (0.196) (0.128) 
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SCH and RRC 0.151 0.522*** 0.610 0.162 0.117 0.339** 0.247* 0.349*** 
 (0.130) (0.156) (0.488) (0.330) (0.102) (0.138) (0.135) (0.107) 
Not-for-profit 0.260*** 0.342* 3.324*** 2.003*** 0.107 0.127 -0.079 0.350*** 
 (0.086) (0.206) (0.940) (0.413) (0.105) (0.116) (0.135) (0.103) 
Health system affiliation -0.040 0.051 3.011* 0.557*** 0.022 -0.056 0.004 -0.018 
 (0.055) (0.209) (1.565) (0.109) (0.065) (0.057) (0.081) (0.069) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margin 0.392 1.785*** -12.544*** -8.329*** 0.777* -0.494 0.340 1.069*** 
 (0.381) (0.617) (4.325) (2.128) (0.460) (0.438) (0.536) (0.373) 
Case mix index 0.699*** 0.338 -0.335 1.126* 0.620*** 0.664** 0.462** 0.620*** 
 (0.163) (0.357) (1.271) (0.654) (0.221) (0.263) (0.191) (0.182) 
Readmission penalty 0.007 -0.147 1.171* 0.330 -0.049 0.094 0.190*** -0.060 
 (0.063) (0.104) (0.652) (0.378) (0.076) (0.077) (0.068) (0.046) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel fixed effects         
Panel 2 0.026 -0.053 0.133*** 0.088* 0.070 0.078 0.002 -0.084** 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.037) (0.051) (0.044) (0.049) (0.025) (0.034) 
 0.339 0.248 0.000 0.087 0.111 0.113 0.951 0.013 
Panel 3 0.103 0.028 0.054 0.171*** 0.005 0.052 -0.157 -0.033 
 (0.086) (0.043) (0.124) (0.034) (0.019) (0.074) (0.112) (0.024) 
 0.227 0.510 0.662 0.000 0.804 0.484 0.163 0.168 
Panel 4 0.101** 0.036 -0.236 -0.101 0.070*** 0.260*** -0.053 0.169*** 
 (0.048) (0.206) (0.184) (0.113) (0.024) (0.079) (0.119) (0.041) 
 0.035 0.863 0.199 0.371 0.003 0.001 0.658 0.000 
Panel 5 0.023 0.038 0.114 -0.021 0.025 0.286*** 0.054 0.089*** 
 (0.040) (0.082) (0.094) (0.093) (0.018) (0.086) (0.110) (0.033) 
 0.558 0.646 0.223 0.820 0.171 0.001 0.622 0.007 
Panel 6 0.017 0.067 -0.606** -0.143 0.017 0.027 -0.139 0.117*** 
 (0.027) (0.078) (0.270) (0.191) (0.031) (0.052) (0.203) (0.037) 
 0.527 0.393 0.025 0.454 0.591 0.599 0.495 0.001 
Constant 4.977*** 4.017*** -2.597 -2.050* 4.517*** 1.934*** 3.507*** 4.772*** 
 (0.247) (0.761) (1.941) (1.130) (0.373) (0.340) (0.287) (0.260) 
 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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APPENDIX 2-25 
Ratio of possible substitute FTEs following implementation of HVBP (post) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Ratio of 
physician to 
NP/PA FTEs 
Ratio of RN 
to LPN FTEs 
Ratio of RN 
to nursing 
aide FTEs 
  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Post HVBP  -4.600*** -1.503 -0.125 
 (0.766) (1.738) (0.390) 
High Medicare reliance 4.066*** -0.156 0.175 
 (0.680) (0.556) (0.338) 
Rural -4.995*** 2.670*** 0.192 
 (1.702) (0.487) (0.770) 
Region (ref= Central)    
Eastern 0.606 2.169 0.330 
 (1.566) (1.701) (0.721) 
Northern -1.258 7.005*** -0.358 
 (1.776) (0.834) (0.584) 
Northwest 2.391 7.043*** -5.646*** 
 (1.721) (1.177) (1.045) 
Southwest -4.185*** 4.469*** 0.784* 
 (1.483) (1.000) (0.447) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)    
Rural referral center (RRC) 5.346*** -1.424* 1.305* 
 (1.921) (0.752) (0.785) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) 1.933 -2.905* -0.906 
 (1.320) (1.681) (0.860) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) 2.648* -0.138 -0.629 
 (1.391) (0.416) (0.599) 
SCH and RRC -3.627** -4.560*** 0.269 
 (1.559) (1.016) (0.760) 
Not-for-profit 4.158*** -0.448 1.254 
 (1.516) (0.378) (1.166) 
Health system affiliation 6.749*** 2.893*** 0.001 
 (1.526) (0.821) (0.514) 
Total number of patient days -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margin -5.870* -10.377*** -2.384*** 
 (3.282) (2.056) (0.806) 
Case mix index 2.536*** 4.699*** -3.503 
 (0.894) (1.178) (2.925) 
Readmission penalty -0.875 1.093 0.052 
 (0.616) (1.602) (0.329) 
Prior year FTE -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.012*** 
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 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Panel fixed effects    
Panel 2 -0.639 0.470 0.500*** 
 (0.923) (0.370) (0.179) 
Panel 3 -0.287 2.003*** -0.021 
 (0.921) (0.234) (0.233) 
Panel 4 4.259*** 1.882*** 0.518** 
 (0.144) (0.678) (0.216) 
Panel 5 3.832*** 0.520*** 0.193 
 (0.102) (0.141) (0.177) 
Panel 6 4.469*** 4.072*** 0.246 
 (0.639) (0.749) (0.156) 
Constant -13.579*** -15.137*** 4.413* 
 (3.871) (3.160) (2.389) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-26 
Ratio of possible substitute FTEs following HVBP penalty 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Ratio of 
physician 
to NP/PA 
FTEs 
Ratio of 
RN to 
LPN 
FTEs 
Ratio of 
RN to 
nursing 
aide FTEs 
  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Penalty -0.091 -5.172*** -0.385 
 (0.284) (1.651) (0.518) 
High Medicare reliance 4.087*** -7.647*** 0.249 
 (0.707) (2.871) (0.397) 
Rural -4.995*** -6.492*** 0.086 
 (1.757) (2.515) (0.880) 
Region (ref= Central)    
Eastern 0.592 -5.525*** 0.321 
 (1.592) (0.496) (0.688) 
Northern -1.281 6.667*** 0.252 
 (1.801) (2.588) (0.951) 
Northwest 2.430 5.552*** -6.129*** 
 (1.728) (1.984) (1.556) 
Southwest -4.190*** -0.713 0.878* 
 (1.508) (0.943) (0.489) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)    
Rural referral center (RRC) 5.402*** 8.218*** 1.334 
 (2.061) (2.316) (0.894) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) 1.956 8.261*** -0.952 
 (1.375) (2.333) (0.908) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) 2.650* 11.922*** -0.548 
 (1.454) (3.385) (0.579) 
SCH and RRC -3.591** 3.401*** 0.203 
 (1.532) (0.800) (0.858) 
Not-for-profit 4.239*** -2.672* 1.050 
 (1.550) (1.523) (1.153) 
Health system affiliation 6.743*** 0.887 0.162 
 (1.484) (1.677) (0.705) 
Total number of patient days -0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margin -5.872* -7.158*** -2.424*** 
 (3.263) (1.547) (0.876) 
Case mix index 2.628*** -3.594 -3.228 
 (0.935) (4.837) (2.730) 
Readmission penalty -0.847 -1.241 -0.011 
 (0.609) (1.634) (0.293) 
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Prior year FTE -0.007*** 0.007 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
Panel fixed effects    
Panel 2 -0.654 0.102** 0.509*** 
 (0.916) (0.046) (0.190) 
Panel 3 -0.292 2.939*** -0.058 
 (0.918) (0.531) (0.211) 
Panel 4 -0.342 4.412*** 0.477 
 (0.836) (0.918) (0.396) 
Panel 5 -0.765 5.877*** 0.115 
 (0.783) (0.819) (0.364) 
Panel 6 -0.143 6.682*** 0.164 
 (0.998) (0.922) (0.357) 
Panel 7 -4.695*** 5.890*** 0.245 
 (0.719) (0.826) (0.821) 
Constant -13.768*** -1.670 4.192* 
 (3.980) (5.421) (2.367) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-27 
Ratio of possible substitute FTEs following HVBP bonus 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Ratio of 
physician to 
NP/PA 
FTEs 
Ratio of RN 
to LPN 
FTEs 
Ratio of RN 
to nursing 
aide FTEs 
  (SE) (SE) (SE) 
Bonus 0.324 0.605 0.521*** 
 (0.294) (0.371) (0.199) 
High Medicare reliance 4.080*** 0.079 0.095 
 (0.693) (0.713) (0.398) 
Rural -5.051** 2.811*** 0.221 
 (2.055) (0.851) (0.800) 
Region (ref= Central)    
Eastern 0.468 -2.270*** 0.194 
 (1.634) (0.738) (0.664) 
Northern -1.498 6.099*** -0.346 
 (1.926) (0.730) (0.571) 
Northwest 2.361 5.889*** -5.592*** 
 (1.760) (1.019) (1.003) 
Southwest -4.600** 3.420*** 0.792* 
 (1.909) (0.708) (0.429) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)    
Rural referral center (RRC) 5.664** -1.596 1.305* 
 (2.386) (1.185) (0.666) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) 2.303 -3.693* -0.817 
 (1.686) (2.021) (0.918) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) 2.699 -3.157* -0.688 
 (1.775) (1.689) (0.531) 
SCH and RRC -3.858** -4.928*** 0.259 
 (1.626) (1.347) (0.683) 
Not-for-profit 4.562*** -0.026 1.208 
 (1.476) (0.430) (0.864) 
Health system affiliation 6.930*** 2.683*** 0.115 
 (1.487) (0.411) (0.555) 
Total number of patient days -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margin -6.004* -10.654*** -2.344*** 
 (3.211) (2.351) (0.800) 
Case mix index 2.843*** 3.962*** -3.566 
 (0.901) (1.328) (3.034) 
Readmission penalty -0.676 -2.730*** 0.084 
 (0.716) (0.535) (0.295) 
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Prior year FTE -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Panel fixed effects    
Panel 2 -0.640 0.451 0.504*** 
 (0.924) (0.356) (0.180) 
Panel 3 -0.254 2.080*** -0.020 
 (0.935) (0.235) (0.241) 
Panel 4 -0.615 4.300*** 0.363 
 (0.703) (0.566) (0.297) 
Panel 5 -1.041 2.936*** 0.036 
 (0.640) (0.596) (0.315) 
Panel 6 -0.286 6.359*** 0.094 
 (0.961) (0.835) (0.315) 
Panel 7 -5.230*** 2.423*** -0.154 
 (0.582) (0.644) (0.454) 
Constant -14.463*** -13.352*** 4.401* 
 (3.775) (2.824) (2.431) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX 2-28 
Effect of penalties of all provider type FTEs, using total margins as a covariate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Direct 
patient 
care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
                  
Penalty -0.057 -0.068 -0.353** -0.156 -0.021 -0.045 -0.271*** -0.035 
 (0.044) (0.226) (0.139) (0.146) (0.044) (0.065) (0.094) (0.042) 
High Medicare reliance 0.022 0.026 0.318 0.123 0.000 -0.007 0.141 -0.039 
 (0.054) (0.087) (0.251) (0.097) (0.047) (0.065) (0.093) (0.053) 
Rural -0.372** -0.582*** -0.461 -0.410* -0.503*** -0.149 -0.767*** -0.412*** 
 (0.158) (0.181) (0.794) (0.224) (0.158) (0.154) (0.224) (0.147) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.016 0.183 -1.490** -1.174** -0.173 0.068 0.082 0.147* 
 (0.082) (0.152) (0.717) (0.471) (0.171) (0.111) (0.170) (0.084) 
Northern -0.263** -0.005 -1.543*** -0.830*** -0.212*** -1.087*** -0.004 -0.091 
 (0.113) (0.212) (0.297) (0.236) (0.058) (0.342) (0.142) (0.141) 
Northwest 0.196*** 0.147 -0.140 0.440 0.152** -0.047 0.064 0.283*** 
 (0.067) (0.413) (0.495) (0.354) (0.063) (0.083) (0.163) (0.062) 
Southwest 0.114* 0.078 -0.777** 0.103 0.000 0.085 -0.050 0.298*** 
 (0.062) (0.199) (0.344) (0.362) (0.061) (0.106) (0.249) (0.075) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)         
Rural referral center (RRC) 0.238 0.457 0.720 0.649* 0.257 0.212 0.473 0.349** 
 (0.163) (0.460) (1.972) (0.350) (0.165) (0.180) (0.418) (0.139) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) -0.456 0.273 -2.886* -1.890** -0.200 -0.412* -0.041 -0.143 
 (0.333) (0.294) (1.595) (0.918) (0.328) (0.244) (0.325) (0.289) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) -0.010 0.422 -1.369*** -0.958*** 0.045 -0.095 0.197 0.201 
 (0.153) (0.322) (0.203) (0.140) (0.151) (0.237) (0.168) (0.149) 
SCH and RRC 0.168 0.558*** 0.489* 0.096 0.129 0.341** 0.288*** 0.363*** 
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 (0.125) (0.173) (0.260) (0.322) (0.105) (0.139) (0.108) (0.109) 
 0.181 0.001 0.059 0.766 0.220 0.014 0.007 0.001 
Not-for-profit 0.267*** 0.320 2.993*** 1.872*** 0.098 0.139 -0.026 0.349*** 
 (0.083) (0.202) (0.525) (0.252) (0.101) (0.117) (0.121) (0.101) 
Health system affiliation -0.029 0.044 2.720** 0.545*** 0.027 -0.057 0.063 -0.011 
 (0.052) (0.220) (1.147) (0.100) (0.068) (0.058) (0.090) (0.065) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year total margin 0.411 1.259** -5.761*** -4.532*** 0.713** -0.593* -0.137 0.826*** 
 (0.324) (0.534) (1.880) (1.572) (0.328) (0.320) (0.486) (0.303) 
Case mix index 0.735*** 0.342 -0.353 0.784 0.620*** 0.706*** 0.468** 0.662*** 
 (0.168) (0.376) (1.223) (0.718) (0.228) (0.272) (0.189) (0.174) 
Readmission penalty 0.023 -0.141 0.958** 0.149 -0.043 0.098 0.219*** -0.055 
 (0.060) (0.096) (0.476) (0.343) (0.072) (0.078) (0.070) (0.045) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel fixed effects         
Panel 2 0.024 -0.060 0.163* 0.040 0.068 0.078 -0.004 -0.084** 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.091) (0.097) (0.043) (0.048) (0.025) (0.035) 
Panel 3 0.102 0.037 -0.031 0.135 0.005 0.051 -0.160 -0.035 
 (0.087) (0.041) (0.141) (0.092) (0.020) (0.076) (0.119) (0.025) 
Panel 4 0.043 0.017 -0.583 0.088 0.037 -0.044 -0.312*** -0.010 
 (0.062) (0.205) (0.505) (0.382) (0.068) (0.086) (0.114) (0.043) 
Panel 5 -0.031 0.043 -0.331 0.150 -0.004 -0.017 -0.150* -0.080 
 (0.047) (0.128) (0.503) (0.366) (0.067) (0.086) (0.091) (0.050) 
Panel 6 -0.012 0.094 -0.946* -0.031 0.002 -0.259** -0.299** -0.028 
 (0.068) (0.124) (0.520) (0.367) (0.073) (0.117) (0.127) (0.051) 
Panel 7  -0.046 0.035 -0.489 0.124 -0.016 -0.320** -0.168 -0.149** 
 (0.072) (0.124) (0.523) (0.388) (0.072) (0.126) (0.103) (0.067) 
Constant 4.906*** 4.069*** -2.173 -1.550 4.519*** 1.876*** 3.430*** 4.730*** 
 (0.265) (0.823) (2.042) (1.078) (0.384) (0.358) (0.283) (0.257) 
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APPENDIX 2-29 
Effect of bonuses of all provider type FTEs, using total margins as a covariate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Direct 
patient 
care 
Administration Physicians 
Physician 
assistants/ 
Nurse 
practitioners 
Registered 
nurses 
Licensed 
practical 
nurses 
Nursing 
Aides 
Other 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
                  
Bonus 0.120 0.309*** 0.097 0.085 0.091** 0.099 0.032 0.196*** 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.343) (0.238) (0.042) (0.063) (0.062) (0.052) 
High Medicare reliance 0.010 -0.008 0.368 0.126 -0.010 -0.015 0.154 -0.056 
 (0.056) (0.088) (0.257) (0.121) (0.047) (0.062) (0.100) (0.049) 
Rural -0.356** -0.519*** -0.455 -0.393 -0.486*** -0.135 -0.831*** -0.378*** 
 (0.158) (0.155) (0.847) (0.257) (0.154) (0.147) (0.270) (0.131) 
Region (ref= Central)         
Eastern -0.013 0.146 -1.369* -1.145** -0.180 0.058 0.120 0.132* 
 (0.078) (0.136) (0.728) (0.478) (0.167) (0.104) (0.168) (0.079) 
Northern -0.275** -0.045 -1.961*** -0.911*** -0.225*** -1.093*** -0.017 -0.109 
 (0.109) (0.194) (0.405) (0.226) (0.061) (0.332) (0.165) (0.131) 
Northwest 0.186*** 0.147 -0.116 0.450 0.152** -0.055 0.017 0.281*** 
 (0.062) (0.370) (0.668) (0.402) (0.065) (0.077) (0.198) (0.061) 
Southwest 0.117* 0.065 -1.002** 0.124 -0.001 0.080 -0.038 0.293*** 
 (0.064) (0.192) (0.464) (0.380) (0.061) (0.102) (0.266) (0.072) 
CMS provider type (ref=IPPS)         
Rural referral center (RRC) 0.229 0.432 1.138 0.660* 0.248 0.205 0.394 0.338** 
 (0.165) (0.430) (1.736) (0.366) (0.163) (0.182) (0.481) (0.136) 
Medicare-dependent hospital 
(MDH) -0.471 0.273 -2.799* -2.003* -0.203 -0.414* -0.007 -0.149 
 (0.340) (0.269) (1.661) (1.058) (0.329) (0.243) (0.323) (0.294) 
Sole community hospital (SCH) -0.044 0.313 -1.394*** -0.986*** 0.018 -0.116 0.272 0.127 
 (0.155) (0.250) (0.221) (0.184) (0.144) (0.224) (0.193) (0.134) 
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SCH and RRC 0.162 0.542*** 0.555 0.067 0.129 0.322** 0.250* 0.355*** 
 (0.118) (0.121) (0.374) (0.325) (0.096) (0.136) (0.133) (0.087) 
Not-for-profit 0.285*** 0.388** 3.428*** 1.917*** 0.121 0.156 -0.073 0.390*** 
 (0.083) (0.183) (0.613) (0.242) (0.099) (0.116) (0.135) (0.098) 
Health system affiliation -0.034 0.045 2.712*** 0.543*** 0.029 -0.056 0.011 -0.008 
 (0.049) (0.171) (0.851) (0.106) (0.064) (0.054) (0.080) (0.057) 
Total number of patient days 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year total margin 0.316 1.112** -5.855*** -4.906** 0.684** -0.610* -0.019 0.736** 
 (0.319) (0.520) (2.233) (1.919) (0.322) (0.323) (0.491) (0.286) 
Case mix index 0.705*** 0.342 -1.373 0.691 0.619*** 0.692*** 0.484** 0.658*** 
 (0.161) (0.357) (1.490) (0.765) (0.218) (0.254) (0.188) (0.171) 
Readmission penalty 0.026 -0.136 0.820* 0.162 -0.029 0.091 0.189*** -0.037 
 (0.054) (0.085) (0.473) (0.330) (0.064) (0.080) (0.072) (0.034) 
Prior year FTE 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Panel fixed effects         
Panel 2 0.025 -0.056 0.157 0.039 0.068 0.075 -0.003 -0.085** 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.099) (0.108) (0.043) (0.048) (0.027) (0.036) 
Panel 3 0.102 0.042 0.063 0.168*** 0.004 0.048 -0.162 -0.036 
 (0.086) (0.042) (0.143) (0.064) (0.020) (0.076) (0.116) (0.026) 
Panel 4 0.006 -0.070 -0.612 0.048 0.005 -0.076 -0.321** -0.056 
 (0.063) (0.158) (0.535) (0.375) (0.055) (0.092) (0.128) (0.040) 
Panel 5 -0.075 -0.063 -0.281 0.097 -0.040 -0.054 -0.213* -0.132*** 
 (0.053) (0.073) (0.502) (0.356) (0.052) (0.088) (0.113) (0.044) 
Panel 6 -0.073 0.007 -1.052* -0.127 -0.034 -0.304** -0.399** -0.085** 
 (0.063) (0.133) (0.550) (0.381) (0.058) (0.131) (0.194) (0.043) 
Panel 7  -0.106 -0.086 -0.470 0.040 -0.061 -0.354*** -0.263*** -0.230*** 
 (0.083) (0.113) (0.543) (0.375) (0.059) (0.127) (0.084) (0.062) 
Constant 4.928*** 3.989*** -1.335 -1.547 4.491*** 1.877*** 3.497*** 4.675*** 
 (0.253) (0.750) (1.529) (1.177) (0.367) (0.342) (0.284) (0.250) 
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APPENDIX 3-1 
Hospital in center bandwidth as estimated by hospitals with an adjustment between 0.999 and 
1.001 
 
Hospitals below 
adjustment 
threshold (penalty) 
Hospitals above 
adjustment 
threshold (bonus) 
 N = 40 N = 37 
  % % 
Uninsured rate (mean) 12.9 12.9 
Rural 25.0 16.22 
Region   
Central 22.5 24.3 
Eastern 27.5 24.3 
Northern 10.0 21.6 
Northwest 15.0 5.4 
Southwest 25.0 24.3 
Not-for-profit 87.5 62.2 
Health system 80.0 89.2 
Provider type   
IPPS 85.0 86.5 
Rural referral center (RRC) 2.5 0.0 
Medicare dependent hospital 7.5 5.4 
Sole community hospital (SCH) 5.0 8.1 
SCH/RRC 0.0 0.0 
High Medicare reliance 20.0 16.2 
Total patient days (mean) 72,869 56,807 
Prior year total margins 5.1 7.4 
HRRP penalty 85.0 94.6 
Case mix index (mean) 1.5 1.5 
Net charity care  $21,300,000 $9,767,260 
Charity care for patients under 100% FPL $14,500,000 $1,823,210 
Charity care for patients 100% - 200% FPL $8,428,630 $7,602,625 
All uncompensated care $28,800,000 $15,100,000 
Uncompensated care as percent of total 
operating expenses 7.0 5.7 
Charity care for patients under 100% FPL as 
percent of total operating expenses 2.5 0.8 
Note: Hospitals with 0% adjustment are not included
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APPENDIX 3-2 
Panel analysis of HVBP bonuses on charity care 
 
Net 
charity 
care 
Charity 
care < 
100% FPL 
Charity 
care 100-
200% FPL 
Uncompensated 
care 
 coef coef coef coef 
 (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
          
Bonus -0.024 -0.835 0.097 0.010 
 (0.040) (0.458) (0.297) (0.027) 
High uninsured rate 0.048 -0.823 0.499 0.017 
 (0.065) (0.572) (0.452) (0.046) 
Bonus*High uninsured rate 0.037 -0.053 0.318 0.015 
 (0.063) (0.628) (0.430) (0.049) 
High Medicare reliance -0.006 -0.045 -0.288 -0.082 
 (0.058) (0.674) (0.358) (0.049) 
Rural -0.079 0.879 -0.990 -0.040 
 (0.066) (0.793) (0.933) (0.052) 
Region     
Eastern 0.099 -7.536 3.401 0.099 
 (0.213) (2.031) (1.791) (0.181) 
Northern -0.406 -1.284 1.432 -0.336 
 (0.229) (2.750) (1.629) (0.251) 
Northwest -0.120 -0.291 -2.937 -0.049 
 (0.212) (1.687) (2.439) (0.167) 
Southwest -0.582 1.724 -3.894 -0.485 
 (0.192) (1.546) (2.526) (0.180) 
CMS provider type     
Rural referral center -0.198 1.611 -3.828 0.705 
 (0.667) (2.796) (4.353) (0.155) 
Medicare-dependent hospital -0.216 0.166 -1.871 -0.239 
 (0.131) (0.503) (1.877) (0.104) 
Sole community hospital -0.975 -0.657 -2.981 -0.491 
 (0.215) (1.682) (2.187) (0.194) 
Sole community and rural referral center 0.251 -4.640 1.282 0.130 
 (0.165) (2.841) (1.111) (0.088) 
Not-for-profit 0.688 -3.662 -2.884 0.198 
 (0.138) (1.422) (1.716) (0.170) 
Health system 0.071 -4.526 -0.574 0.029 
 (0.074) (1.394) (0.852) (0.065) 
Total patient days 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior year operating margins 0.770 -0.776 -1.014 -0.066 
 (0.256) (3.207) (7.123) (0.623) 
Case mix index 0.317 -1.893 3.630 0.361 
 (0.370) (3.365) (2.716) (0.285) 
HRRP penalty -0.046 0.519 -0.840 -0.029 
 (0.054) (1.064) (0.482) (0.038) 
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APPENDIX 3-3 
RD model with charity care as percent of operating costs 
 
